



# SS464: Homeland Security

Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy



Lesson 10



## National Security Architecture & Interagency Process



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# Agenda

1. National Security Act of 1947
2. Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
3. National Security Council & NSPD-1: Organization of the National Security Council System
4. Interagency Process
5. Conclusion

# Post-WWII Need for Unification of the Armed Services

- ▶ Pre-WWII armed services sought voice in foreign affairs
- ▶ Need for unification clear during and after WWII:
  - War fought through variety of ad-hoc boards, committees & processes
  - Challenges of mobilizing and industrial war production
  - Challenges of coalition warfare
  - Secretary of the Army & Secretary of the Navy both in the Cabinet
  - Soviet challenge: nuclear weapons, “total war” and rapidly developing technology of war
  - Life magazine, 1945: “how large the subject of security has grown, larger than a combined Army and Navy
  - Recognition that foreign, military, and economic matters closely tied
- ▶ 1943: General Marshall proposes plan for reorganization & unification
- ▶ 1945: James Forrestal & Ferdinand Eberstadt present the Eberstadt report
- ▶ October & December 1945: Truman presents reorganization proposals to Congress

# Debate over National Security Act of 1947

- ▶ Army favored strong centralization: unified defense department with civilian Secretary
- ▶ Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal favor decentralized but better coordinated system ... committees of experts
- ▶ Fears of a German general staff with powerful commander
- ▶ Need to balance security unification with protection of democratic ideals
- ▶ 1946: Truman proposed a combination
- ▶ Passed in July 1947
- ▶ Compromise among competing interests ... bureaucratic politics

# National Security Act of 1947

- ▶ “National Military Establishment”
- ▶ Department of the Air Force
- ▶ Secretary of Defense – cabinet status, no department
- ▶ National Security Council: President; Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, Chairman of National Security Resources Board, and others as President may direct
- ▶ NSC executive secretary (still the only part of the NSC staff ensconced in statute ... no law establishes the position of National Security Advisor)
- ▶ Central Intelligence Agency
- ▶ National Security Agency
- ▶ Joint Chiefs of Staff (with no chairman) and small Joint Staff

# 1949 Amendment

- ▶ Created the Department of Defense from the National Military Establishment – gave him Deputy Secretary & three Assistant Secretaries
- ▶ Gave Secretary of Defense greater power
- ▶ Subordinated the service Secretaries and removed them from NSC
- ▶ Created Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) but no command authority, non-voting member of Joint Chiefs, and a statutory advisor within the NSC
- ▶ Expanded Joint Staff

(Major amendments to NSA 1947 in 1953, 1958, and 1986)

# Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986

- ▶ Desert One, Beirut, Grenada, other organizational problems
- ▶ Joint Chiefs
- ▶ Established CJCS as the principal military advisor to the President
  - No tiebreaker vote on Joint Chiefs
  - Dissenting views presented to the President
- ▶ Created Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
- ▶ Strengthened the role of Commanders in Chief of unified and special commands: chain of command from President to Secretary of Defense to CINC
- ▶ Established personnel policies to strengthen the Joint Staff

# Presidential Coordinating Councils

- ▶ National Security Council (1947)
- ▶ Council on Environmental Quality (1969)
- ▶ Domestic Policy Council (1970)
- ▶ National Economic Council (1993)
- ▶ Homeland Security Council (2002)

# National Security Council

- ▶ NSC vs. NSC Staff
- ▶ Every President has tailored the NSC and NSC staff to their needs:
  - Eisenhower: large, organized staff with strong coordinating role in both policy and operations
  - Kennedy: smaller and less formal advisory entity
- ▶ Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) – e.g. the National Security Advisor:
  - Honest broker: e.g. Scowcroft, Rice
  - Policy advocate: e.g. Kissinger, Berger

# National Security Presidential Directives

- ▶ Instruments for communicating presidential decisions about US national security policies
  - National security: defense of US & USG, global advancement of US interests, economic prosperity
- ▶ Replace prior Presidential Decisions Directives (PDDs) & Presidential Review Directives (PRDs) with NSPDs & HSPDs
- ▶ Broader than, but work hand-in-hand with, Executive Orders
- ▶ Many are classified
- ▶ Coordinated among departments and agencies through the “interagency process”
- ▶ NSPD-1: Organization of the National Security Council System (February 13, 2001)


# NSC & HSC Purpose

- ▶ 1. Advise President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, & military policies relating to national security
- ▶ 2. Coordinate executive departments & agencies in policy development
  - Works in conjunction with the National Economic Council (NEC)
  - Post 9-11 works with the Office of Homeland Security (OHS)
  - Post-Homeland Security Act of 2002, works with the Homeland Security Council (Title IX of the Act)
- ▶ 3. Help the President oversee implementation of policy

# NSC and HSC Meetings

- ▶ Meet at President's direction
  - Regular attendees: Pres, VP, SecState, SecTreas, SecDef, NSA
  - Statutory advisors: DCI, CJCS
  - Others: COS to the Pres, Asst to the Pres for Econ Policy
  - Pertaining to their responsibilities: Atty General & Director, OMB
- ▶ Homeland Security Council includes broader array of departments and agencies (a prominent reason for consolidation into DHS to enhance advice to the President and effective coordination of policy)
- ▶ Substantial degree of overlap ... presents a challenge

# Homeland Security vs. National Security



Unwieldy number of agencies

Important non-security missions

No multi-year resource management

Dysfunctional interagency process

Incoherent congressional oversight

“Huddle” of key agencies

Primary or only mission is security

Mature multi-year resource mgmt


Long-standing interagency process

Streamlined congressional oversight

Different policy environments

Different policy instruments

# Mechanics of US Interagency Process



# NSC & HSC Principals Committees (PC)

- ▶ What the NSC and HSC are called when they meet without the President
- ▶ Senior interagency forum for consideration of national security policy
- ▶ Meets at the call of NSA or HSA, in consultation with regular attendees of NSC/PC or HSC/PC
  - Chair: NSA
  - Executive secretary: DepNSA
  - Regular attendees: SecState, SecTreas, SecDef, COS to Pres, NSA
  - Pertaining to their responsibilities: DCI, CJCS, Atty General & Director, OMB

# Principals Committee (PC)

- ▶ NSC or HSC without the President: e.g. Cabinet Secretaries & agency heads
- ▶ Final coordinating step before recommendations to President
- ▶ Consensus-based (direct Presidential guidance or mandates are rare; President usually seeks consensus and rarely approves policy without achieving it)
- ▶ National Security Advisor or Homeland Security Advisor chair:
  - “Honest broker” to ensure integrity of process
  - Doesn’t “paper over” lack of consensus
  - Ensure preparation and dissemination of discussion papers and relevant documents
  - Ensure an appropriate range of feasible options presented to President
- ▶ Frequently broadened, when necessary, to include other departments and agencies

# Deputies Committee (DC)

- ▶ Senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for national security and homeland security policy
  - Prescribe and review work of Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) and interagency groups
  - Occasionally important policy is introduced at this level
  - Ensure that NSC and HSC Principal Committee issues have been properly analyzed & prepared for discussion
  - Reduce the non-consensus issues to a minimum
  - Meets at call of chair (Deputy National Security Advisor or Deputy Homeland Security Advisor) in consultation with other DC regular attendees
  - Regular members can request committee meeting for crisis management

# Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs)

- ▶ Develop, initiate, and facilitate/oversee implementation of national security and homeland security policy
- ▶ Subject-specific areas: e.g. counterproliferation, border security, critical infrastructure protection
- ▶ Day-to-day forum for interagency coordination of national security policy
- ▶ Provide policy analysis for PC and DC
- ▶ Ensure timely responses to decisions made by President
- ▶ Chaired by Senior Directors (who run the functional bureaus with NSC and HSC)
- ▶ Representatives from departments and agencies: flexible; usually Assistant Secretaries; occasionally Undersecretaries
- ▶ Establishes interagency working groups (ad hoc) on specific issues

# Substance vs. Process

- ▶ Most of us who think about foreign policy and security policy rightfully focus on substance, not process:
  - Define desired outcome (national interests); develop strategy to achieve that outcome; design, calibrate and implement policy to carry-out this optimal strategy.
  - In other words, policy is entirely subordinate to strategy, which is entirely subordinate to outcomes (interests).
  - This is a critically important framework.
  - Appeals to military officers (define the objective, make a plan, execute the plan).

# Process Matters

- ▶ But substance (or interest-based analysis) often falls short of explaining what nations actually do.
- ▶ Substance is not the only factor, nor necessarily the predominant factor, shaping policy.
- ▶ For those new to policy development at a national level, can cause significant frustration
- ▶ Frustration impedes one's ability to lead and hence to get things done.
- ▶ Oftentimes, the most effective policymakers are not the most "intelligent" or "insightful" strategists or experts, but rather those who understand the interagency system and know how to work within it to get results.

# Dynamics of US Interagency Process

- ▶ President's power constrained by the legislative
- ▶ Presidential advisors have no formal authority
- ▶ Tiebreaker is the President ... but not realistic that he can engage on every disagreement
- ▶ Therefore, process driven by consensus
- ▶ Tendency towards least-common-denominator policy
- ▶ Time-consuming; very detailed negotiations
- ▶ Agencies share same overriding goal, but each agency has different mission, organization, culture, statutory authority.
- ▶ Successful chairs of PCCs and working groups carefully balance driving policy while doing the "spade-work" of building consensus and ironing out details

# Lessons Learned

- ▶ Leadership is essential to get results.
- ▶ On rare occasions, President must give authority for staff to develop policy outside of the normal process:
  - Advisors as “policy advocates”
  - vs. advisors as “honest brokers”
- ▶ Understand the equities of each agency
- ▶ Be inclusive from the start
- ▶ Get agreement on the problem
- ▶ Retain position of objectivity – facilitate the negotiation
- ▶ Pressure agencies to resolve differences at lowest levels
- ▶ Act with implicit authority, but don't overstep bounds
- ▶ Straddle need for clarity (detailed policy design) with flexibility (policy articulated at Presidential level)