

SCUSA 60 THEME:  
“MEASURING PROGRESS AND DEFINING NEW CHALLENGES”

**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE SOLDIER, THE STATE, IGOs, AND NGOS**

During the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, society has already endured many of the crises that could become a mainstay during this century. More specifically, unprecedented floods, famine, global terrorism, global climate change, mass migration, food shortage, and disease are among the forces at work that will drive the necessity for civilian and military institutions to work together to create public value and further the common good. But will civilian and military entities be able to effectively work together to address these unprecedented problems and threats? What are the conventional barriers that must be overcome in order for these seemingly disparate entities to work together? What institutional changes are needed in society in order to further cooperation between civilian and military organizations? Are the designations between civilian and military organizations of a passé paradigm? If not, what are the bright lines between military and civilian responsibilities in these various contingencies? **These and many other questions must be answered if we, as a nation – indeed, we, as a society – are going to answer the calling to serve democratic societies. This is your task, SCUSA 60.**

*Bridging the Gap: NGOs, IGOs, ROs, and MNCs*

Solutions for solving or mitigating the effects of these broadly-defined security challenges often require states to work in concert with non-state actors. Among other benefits, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and regional organizations (ROs) can enhance legitimacy, encourage participation, and facilitate collective solutions that involve interested states. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can provide information, expertise, and services that states cannot or will not provide. Multi-national corporations (MNCs) exist to make money, although their reliance on states for rule of law and regional stability has created new incentives for them to be more socially responsible actors.

A significant part of U.S. interaction with the rest of the world is through these non-state actors. The U.S. often underestimates their contribution or the degree to which other states value them. Not only do they provide a forum to identify grievances and create cooperative and burden-sharing paths, but they also provide enormous contributions in issues such as health, environment, etc. The transnational nature of the current security paradigm demands international cooperation. The established IGOs and ROs such as the United Nations (UN), the Bretton Woods institutions, Council of Europe, the Organization of American States (OAS), African Union (AU), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can provide platforms for such cooperation.

In addition, some experts contend that IGOs and ROs are the best hope to restrain the U.S.’s overwhelming power. By definition IGOs’, ROs’, and NGOs’ agendas do not mirror U.S. national interests, since they must also accommodate the often conflicting interests of participating members. As such, the U.S. must be even more sensitive to policy decisions and roles within and in relation to these organizations.

At the same time, NGOs have an unprecedented international presence at all levels of governance upon which the U.S. does not yet systematically capitalize. NGOs can facilitate breaking international stalemates where success is determined by the action on the ground rather

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than by agreements in capitals. Because of their diversity and small size, NGOs are capable of operating at grass roots levels, adapting to local situations, implementing innovative programs, and communicating with all levels of society without the restrictions of operating in accordance with a particular state policy or government. The prevalence of NGOs dedicated to working on the platforms of human rights, international law, peace, women's rights, environment, economic development, and ethnic unity/group rights fills a void of political representation and services within civil society that can be overlooked by U.S. foreign policy.

In today's security environment, it is rare to find a military intervention—whether in active hostilities, peacekeeping, or humanitarian operations—which does not involve IGOs, ROs, and NGOs working alongside states. Yet, the militaries of these states, particularly the U.S. military, have been slow to integrate non-state actors into the national military decision making process, and consequently have not taken advantage of their comparative advantages in certain resources and expertise. Should militaries and governments foster these integrative relationships or develop organic capacities to address the problems they face? IGOs and ROs, including security organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the AU, or the proposed European Union Defence Force, require consensus for military action and therefore are often slow to respond to complex emergencies. The NGO community is often wary of working with state agencies (including militaries) due to fear that such collaboration would violate the principles of impartiality. Is this impartiality still a relevant concern given the increasing tendency of local groups to target any Westerners, and if it is still relevant, how can NGOs work in coordination with governments without sacrificing their perceived autonomy? Often, the end result is a diversity of actors and interests working at odds with one another. Authors P.J. Simmons and Daniel Byman argue that the military, IGOs, and NGOs alike should improve their mutual awareness, communication and, when possible, collaboration between actors.

The growth of trade, foreign direct investment, and technology has reduced the power of the state and increased the influence of MNCs, IGOs, and ROs on the global economy. IGOs such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank have enormous potential to facilitate the economic development and human security nexus highlighted within the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy. Critics (such as Jeffrey Sachs and Richard Falk in the articles below) charge that U.S. efforts remain woefully inadequate in comparison to our international responsibility.

Reforming the U.N. Security Council is still no closer to reaching consensus, even though most agree the status quo is unacceptable. The barriers to reforming this international body are indicative of challenges in building consensus for any international cooperation. The deliberations illustrate the fundamental differences of interests and offer useful lessons for the leadership and consensus required to achieve long term international cooperation. The articles listed below by UN Deputy Secretary General Mark Malloch Brown, Michael Glennon, and Shashi Tharoor usefully engage this debate, while the General Assembly debates from 2007 reinforce the enormous challenges with changing organizations, even when most needed.

### *Breaking Down the Barriers Between Civilian and Military Organizations in State-Building*

Since 2001, the U.S. government has embarked on two complicated state-building commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. To the consternation of some observers, state-building has become a core function of the U.S. military, but the U.S. military, as an institution, has had relatively limited experience in state-building. More specifically, the modern military has

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largely engaged in state-building during the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts from the early 1990's up until today. Tensions over state-building continue today in Afghanistan and Iraq. This remains one of the most difficult endeavors that the military is required to undertake. At present, it is questionable whether the U.S. military possesses the subject matter experts, the capacity, or the organizational culture to fully embrace state-building as a core function within its mandate. Nonetheless, the U.S. military is identified as the organization which possesses the manpower and the logistics projection capability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations, and it has done so in an ad hoc manner. The answer to building the capacity to state-build in the U.S. government will not come in any one agency. On the contrary, the answer as well as the mandate will likely come in an interagency form in the future.

### *Issues on the Ground*

In the new security paradigm, U.S. forces have been hampered in Afghanistan and Iraq because they have not been able to fully engage the local populace. As a result, in some cases, the local populations have turned against U.S. forces in particular areas largely due to their inability to relate to and provide for the necessary resources that the population needed and/or desired. On the other hand, there have been cases, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, in which the U.S. forces have tried to conduct public works projects without the requisite experience and expertise necessary to ensure their success. These ineffective efforts can be wasteful at best and counterproductive at worst, as they can undermine the fragile trust and local capacity that U.S. forces are attempting to foster.

This anecdotal evidence begs the question of how to leverage civilian expertise from throughout the world in these theaters of war, if the military and the NGOs/IGOs/NMCs do not ever interact with each other before entering the theater. What are the mechanisms and courses of action that can be leveraged in order to facilitate this interaction between NGO/IGO/NMC civilians and the ground? How do we break down the cultural barriers between civilian international organizations and the military? Furthermore, how can the government, including the military, interact with these international civilian agencies without breaking the NGO/IGO's commitment to neutrality among the parties? These questions represent the framing questions that must be considered in order to effectively address the necessity to overcome the barriers between civilian and military organizations, on the ground, in a combat zone.

### *Framing the Debate for Possible Solutions at Home:*

#### *The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 largely ended the rivalries among the Army, Navy, and Air Force services within the Department of Defense. These inter-service rivalries long-plagued the Department of Defense from World War II, to the National Security Act of 1947, and through the Vietnam War era. In World War II, the President received information and advice from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, two stove-piped lines of communications. In fact, the inter-service rivalries rose to a crescendo during the Vietnam War as the services fought over jurisdiction, responsibilities, and operational decisions. Then we witnessed the disastrous outcomes of inter-service rivalry manifest during the botched 1980 Iran hostage rescue mission known as Operation Iron Claw. As a result, of this

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failed mission to rescue the 52 diplomats held hostage by Iran, eight service members were killed and the hostages remained captive for a total of 444-days.

Due to these experiences, the United States Congress, led by Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative William Nichols, passed the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 in order to break down the barriers as well as the rivalries among the military services. The Act created the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS and VCJCS). Additionally, it established the CJCS as the primary military advisor to the President. The Act also diminished the rivalries among the services by integrating the procurement process, the planning process, and the career progression process for military officers – requiring them to serve in joint assignments before they move into senior ranks. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has been widely viewed as successful in furthering a more effective military through the joint procurement of stealth and smart technology systems, the innovation of Network Centric Warfare, and the operational success of Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

However, some critiques of Goldwater-Nichols have endured. Some have argued that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is too detached from the operational commanders. Therefore, the CJCS is unable to adequately advise the President on strategy due to this lack of operational knowledge. This weakness has come to light during the recent Iraq War. Thus, when reflecting on the Goldwater-Nichols Act, one must consider the intent of the legislation as well as the outcomes it produced.

### *Building Capacity*

Many argue that by understanding the underlying problems and operational issues that gave rise to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, one can better comprehend the tensions between military and civilian national security and emergency management agencies at the inter-agency level today. Consequently, there has been a re-emergence of interest in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and a discussion regarding the potential to legislate a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the interagency process.

However, before a discussion about redesigning the interactions between agencies in government, one must understand that the disparity between the military and the civilian agencies in terms of operational and force projection capacities as well as institutional barriers. For example, the military is subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which provides the coercive means to deploy service members to combat zones around the world. Civilians at the DoD's counterpart agencies are not subject to the same coercive measures; in fact, the U.S. government civil service is unionized. Additionally, there are only 6000 Foreign Service officers in the Department of State. Therefore, a careful consideration toward capacity building must occur before discussion regarding partnership between any of the civilian agencies with the military.

As a consequence, the above mentioned capacity issues are emblematic of the different agencies' operational limitations when considering effective policy solutions. Moreover, even if the interagency process transforms from its current ad hoc nature to a more formalized process that is codified in law, policymakers will not be able to leverage the fruits of this institutionalized cooperation among military and civilian agencies if they do not have the capacity to operationally complement one another in terms of sheer numbers and skill sets.

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### *Goldwater-Nichols 2.0: Seamless Integration – Creating an Operational Civil-Military Relationship*

Even though capacity remains an issue, there are attempts afoot to create a fully integrated chain-of-command structure in parts of the interagency system in order to bring the comparative advantages from various agencies and disciplines to bear on the complex problems the U.S. faces in regions around the world. Among the most recent and well-known examples of this attempt to integrate the interagency capabilities is in the newly established U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) within the Department of Defense. After 10 years of thought-work, the U.S. government recognized the necessity to establish an integrated, regionally based national security apparatus for Africa due to its strategic importance to the United States. Furthermore, the command was formed with the understanding that peace and stability can only be achieved by leveraging the relevant interagency capabilities throughout the U.S. government. AFRICOM's vision statement fully embodies the essence of this paradigm-shifting approach to handling regional problems:

“The designers of U.S. Africa Command clearly understood the relationships between security, development, diplomacy and prosperity in Africa. As a result, U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, reflects a much more integrated staff structure, one that includes significant management and staff representation by the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. government agencies involved in Africa. The command also will seek to incorporate partner nations and humanitarian organizations, from Africa and elsewhere, to work alongside the U.S. staff on common approaches to shared interests.”<sup>1</sup>

With the AFRICOM framework in mind, will this new U.S. entity work? Will it be able to execute the intended goals of its charter? Is this civil-military organization sustainable? And can this model be replicated at the strategic level of the interagency process within the U.S. government?

### *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*

In the final analysis, the future of civil-military crisis prevention and management must be met with a careful consideration of desired capabilities, structure, cultural integration, monetary authority, and international cooperation with non-state entities. Without these components, it is virtually impossible to develop and actualize policy solutions for a civil-military integration and/or partnership within as well as outside of government to address the challenges we will face in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Nonetheless, today's problems, as well as the problems of the future, call on you to engage in the thought-work associated with creating policy solutions to the complexities of integrating civil-military, interagency, and international institutions. **Therefore, it is the task**

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Africa Command, available from <http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp>; accessed 22 September 2008.

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**of this SCUSA roundtable is to grapple with these important issues and craft sound policy proposals to effective civil-military relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.**

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**SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS**

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