



WELCOME TO SENIOR CONFERENCE XLV

On behalf of Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy, it is my honor and pleasure to welcome you to West Point.

As the U.S. Army's newly-designated Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic, the Chief of Staff of the Army has asked that the U.S. Military Academy focus this year's senior conference on the topic of "The Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict." The United States Military Academy (USMA) Senior Conference provides a forum for distinguished representatives—from government, academia, business, the think-tank community, and the joint military services—to discuss topics of national security importance. This year's conference, our forty-fifth gathering, continues that tradition of gathering the nation's brightest intellectual minds and focusing their efforts to examine this topic of critical importance to the Army.

Senior Conference 2008 will address the challenges that significantly affect the development of the Army's professional officer corps in a strategic era marked by new challenges and opportunities. How will international, domestic, and technological trends shape the Army's future environment? How will the future strategic environment affect the Army's roles and missions as well as the knowledge, competencies, and values needed in the Army's officer corps? How should the Army train and employ officers in the future to take best advantage of their knowledge and abilities to achieve the Nation's political objectives through the use of land power? Throughout the Conference we will examine the implications of these questions for the Army's Professional Military Ethic.

Thank you again for joining us for Senior Conference. We are grateful to the United States Military Academy Association of Graduates and the United States Army's Center of Excellence for Professional Military Ethic for their support of this event.

MICHAEL J. MEESE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Professor and Head
Department of Social Sciences

SENIOR CONFERENCE XLV STAFF

Colonel Mike Meese
Professor and Head
Department of Social Sciences

Colonel Cindy Jebb
Professor and Deputy Head

Major Scott Taylor
Executive Secretary

Major Paul Oh
Deputy Secretary

Ms. Joy Pasquazi
Conference Coordinator

Major Nick Ayers
Transportation Officer

Major Jonathan Dunn
Billeting and Banquets Officer

Major Eric Jamison
Finance Officer

Major Eric Bjorkland
Audio-Visual Officer

Major Mike Shekleton
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Major Brent Kauffman
Rapporteur

Major Kevin Toner
Rapporteur

Major Matthew Zais
Rapporteur

Major Ed Williams
Rapporteur

Captain Hartleigh Caine
Rapporteur

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IMPORTANT ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

IMPORTANT NUMBERS

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Major Paul Oh	Deputy Secretary	938 x2857
Ms. Joy Pasquazi	Conference Coordinator	x6401
Major Eric Jamison	Finance Officer	x3497
Major Nick Ayers	Transportation Officer	x3411 (785) 375-7484 (c)
Major Jonathan Dunn	Facilities Officer	x3738
Social Sciences Admin Office		x3554
Secure Phone		x8170
Fax		x5463
Hotel Thayer		(845) 446-4731

LODGING

Checking Out: We recommend that you check out on Saturday prior to 8:00 a.m. (the start time for the fourth plenary session). Please allow some extra time for check out. The Thayer Hotel will hold your bags until you depart - you may drop them at the Crest Alcove (just behind where the fourth plenary session is).

For questions or issues that the hotel staff cannot address please see Major Jonathan Dunn, who is coordinating your lodging and will be present throughout Senior Conference.

TRANSPORTATION

Departure: Please review the sheet enclosed in your welcome packet which details your departure arrangements (time of ground transportation, airline, flight number), as we know them. If our information is not correct, or if you need to adjust your plans, please see Major Nick Ayers, the Conference Transportation Officer, as soon as possible.

In and Around: We will provide your ground transportation to and from all Conference events. If you have any special requirements please see Major Nick Ayers.

Reimbursement for Travel: If the Department of Social Sciences is funding your participation please fax or mail copies of all receipts to Eric Jamison.

PRÉCIS

As the U.S. Army's newly-designated Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic, the Chief of Staff of the Army has asked that the U.S. Military Academy focus this year's senior conference on the topic of "The Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict." The United States Military Academy (USMA) Senior Conference provides a forum for distinguished representatives—from government, academia, business, the think-tank community, and the joint military services—to discuss topics of national security importance. This year's conference, our forty-fifth gathering, continues that tradition of gathering the nation's brightest intellectual minds and focusing their efforts to examine this topic of critical importance to the Army.

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Senior Conference provides a perfect forum—sequestered and informal settings at West Point—for assembling a distinguished group of participants for two days of informal discussions. Prior to the Conference, a group of scholars and practitioners will gather at the Academy to discuss the future strategic environment and its likely implications for the Army to establish the foundation for Senior Conference discussions. At the June event, panels will focus on key challenges facing the U.S. Army, and keynote speakers will suggest new directions for analysis. Throughout these sessions, in which comments are "not for attribution," there will be a free and candid exchange of ideas among all Conference participants.

Keynote speakers include the Chief of Staff of the Army General George Casey, Commanding General of TRADOC General Scott Wallace and former Secretary of Defense Dr. William Perry. Invitees will include active

duty and retired general officers, elected and other senior government officials, scholars, members of the business community, members of the press, and other senior members of the national security policy community.

Senior Conference 2008 is administered on behalf of the U.S. Army's Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic and the Superintendent by the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy. It is made possible by the support of the U.S. Army's Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic and the USMA Association of Graduates.

SCHEDULE FOR THURSDAY, JUNE 5 - THAYER HOTEL

Civilian Business Attire

12:00 p.m.	Check-in and Registration	Thayer Hotel Main Lobby
6:00-7:00 p.m.	Reception	Thayer Hotel Garden Terrace
7:00-10:00 p.m.	Dinner and Keynote Address	Thayer Hotel Lawn Terrace
	Opening Address General William S. Wallace <i>Commanding General, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command</i>	
10:00 p.m.	After Dinner Mixer	Hotel Lounge

SCHEDULE FOR FRIDAY, JUNE 6

*Civilian Casual Attire for Plenary Sessions
Civilian Business Attire for Dinner*

7:00-8:00 a.m.	Full Breakfast Buffet	Thayer Hotel, Dining Room
8:00-8:30 a.m.	Movement to Eisenhower Hall	Main Lobby
8:30-10:30 a.m.	First Plenary Session <i>The Future Strategic Environment: What is this Era of Persistent Conflict?</i>	Eisenhower Hall, Riverside Café
10:00-10:15 a.m.	Break	
10:45-12:45 p.m.	Second Plenary Session <i>Implications for the Army Profession</i>	Eisenhower Hall Riverside Café
12:45-1:00 p.m.	Movement to South Dock	Bus
1:00-2:30 p.m.	Lunch Buffet and River Cruise	Superintendent's Boat
2:30-2:45 p.m.	Movement to Eisenhower Hall	Bus
2:45-3:00 p.m.	Introduction to PME COE	Eisenhower Hall Riverside Café
3:00-4:00 p.m.	Keynote Address General George W. Casey Chief of Staff, United States Army	Riverside Café
4:00 p.m.	Movement to Thayer Hotel or Bus Tour of West Point	Bus
6:00-7:00 p.m.	Cocktails	Hotel Thayer Hudson Room
7:00-10:00 p.m.	Dinner and Keynote Address Dr. William J. Perry Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution Nineteenth United States Secretary of Defense	Hudson Room

SCHEDULE FOR SATURDAY, JUNE 7

Civilian Casual Attire for Plenary Sessions

7:00-8:00 a.m.	Full Breakfast Buffet	Thayer Hotel, Dining Room
8:00-9:45 a.m.	Third Plenary Session <i>Developing and Employing the Army's Future Officer Corps</i>	Thayer Hotel Crest Terrace
9:45-10:00 a.m.	Break	
10:00-11:45 p.m.	Fourth Plenary Session <i>Implications for the Professional Military Ethic</i>	Thayer Hotel Crest Terrace
12:00 p.m.	Lunch Buffet	Hotel Thayer

FIRST PLENARY SESSION

THE FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: WHAT IS THIS ERA OF PERSISTENT CONFLICT?

- Friday 0830-1030 –

- What will the international strategic environment look like in the next 20 years?
- What will the domestic environment look like in the next 20 years?
- What will the technological environment look like in the next 20 years?
- What do trends in each of these areas suggest about likely demands upon the Army and the Professional Military Ethic?

Moderator: COL Cindy R. Jebb, PhD, Deputy Head,
Department of Social Sciences, USMA

Panelists: Mr. Mark Foulon, Senior Advisor, Department of Treasury
Mr. Kalev Sepp, PhD, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Special Operations Capabilities
Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Director,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments
Ms. Lorelei Kelly, Director,
The Real Security Initiative at the White
House Project

SECOND PLENARY SESSION

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY PROFESSION

- Friday 1045-1245 -

- How will the future strategic environment affect the Army's roles and missions?
- What are the implications for the knowledge and competencies needed within the Army? As an example, will there be a need for greater or different competencies in joint, interagency, and combined operations?
- What are the implications for the Army's core values, identity, and the Professional Military Ethic?

Moderator: Colonel Matthew Moten, PhD, Deputy Head,
Department of History, USMA

Panelists: Dr. David S. C. Chu,
Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness, Department of Defense
Mr. Pete Bechtel, Deputy Director,
U.S. Army Plans and Policy
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cassidy, PhD,
Joint Special Operations Command

THIRD PLENARY SESSION

DEVELOPING AND EMPLOYING THE ARMY'S FUTURE OFFICER CORPS

- Saturday 0800-0945 -

- What education will best prepare officers to operate the future strategic environment? Is the current professional military education system adequate? Or does it need to be altered or supplemented?
- How should Army officers be trained to operate the future strategic environment?
- How should the Army assign officers to best develop, as well as leverage, their knowledge and abilities? Does this require change in current Army structures?

Moderator: Colonel Michael J. Meese, PhD, Head,
Department of Social Sciences, USMA

Panelists: Lieutenant General Michael D. Rochelle, Deputy Chief of Staff,
G-1, Department of the Army

Mr. Maxie McFarland, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

Mr. Chip Leonard, Associate Director,
Manpower and Training Program, RAND Arroyo Center

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHIC

- Saturday 1000-1145 -

- Does the Army's articulation of its core values need to be revised as a result of new challenges?
- What are the implications for the Army's development of leaders capable of dealing with the moral-ethical challenges associated with a new strategic environment?
- In the future, how does the Army instill the Professional Military Ethic in newly commissioned officers?

Moderator: Colonel Sean Hannah, PhD, Director, Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic, USMA

Panelists: General (Retired) Frederick Franks, Visiting Scholar,
Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic, USMA

Dr. Don Snider, PhD, Professor,
Department of Social Sciences, USMA

Chaplain (Colonel) Eric Wester, Armed Forces Chaplaincy
Center, Joint Transition Team, Joint Chaplain Emergency
Response Team

DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY

William J. Perry, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies, where he is codirector of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities. His previous academic experience includes professor (halftime) at Stanford from 1988 to 1993, when he was the codirector of the Center for International Security and Arms Control. He also served as a part-time lecturer in the Department of Mathematics at Santa Clara University from 1971 to 1977.



Perry was the nineteenth United States secretary of defense, serving from February 1994 to January 1997. His previous government experience was as deputy secretary of defense (1993–94) and undersecretary of defense for research and engineering (1977–81).

Perry's business experience includes serving as a laboratory director for General Telephone and Electronics (1954–64); founding and serving as the president of ESL (1964–77); executive vice-president of Hambrecht & Quist (1981–85); and founding and serving as the chairman of Technology Strategies and Alliances (1985–93). He serves on the board of directors of Anteon International Corporation and several emerging high-tech companies and is chairman of Global Technology Partners.

Perry was born October 11, 1927, in Vandergrift, Pennsylvania. He attended grade school and high school in Butler, Pennsylvania. He received his B.S. and M.S. degrees from Stanford University and his Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State, all in mathematics. He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the Army Corps of Engineers and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant in the army reserves from 1950 to 1955.

Perry has received numerous awards, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1997), the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and again in 1981), and Outstanding Civilian Service Medals from the army (1962 and 1997), the air force (1997), the navy (1997), the Defense Intelligence Agency (1977 and 1997), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (1981), and the coast guard (1997). He received the American Electronic Association's Medal of Achievement (1980), the Eisenhower Award (1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the Forrestal Medal (1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The National Academy of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche Medal (1996). He has been honored with awards from the enlisted personnel of the army, navy, and air force. Perry has received decorations from the governments of Germany, England, France, Korea, Albania, Poland, Ukraine, Bahrain, Slovenia, Hungary, and Japan.

GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY

General George W. Casey, Jr. became the 36th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army on 10 April 2007. In his previous assignment, he was the Commander, Multi-National Force – Iraq, a coalition of over thirty countries, from 01 July 2004 until 10 February 2007. General Casey was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1970. Throughout his career, he has served in operational assignments in Germany, Italy, Egypt, Southwest Asia and the United States. He has commanded at every level from platoon to Division.



His principal staff assignments have been as a Chief of Staff, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Operations Officer and Chief of Staff, V (US/GE) Corps, Heidelberg, Germany; Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Staff, Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/J7, US Joint Forces Command, Director Strategic Plans and Policy and Director of the Joint Staff and 30th Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army.

He commanded a mechanized infantry battalion at Fort Carson, Colorado; a mechanized infantry brigade at Fort Hood, Texas; served as Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver and Support in the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia and Germany; and commanded the 1st Armored Division in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. General Casey holds a Masters Degree in International Relations from Denver University and has served as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

GENERAL WILLIAM S. WALLACE

General Wallace assumed the duties of Commander, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command on October 13, 2005, after serving as the Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth.

General Wallace was born on December 31, 1946, in Chicago, Illinois. He was commissioned through the United States Military Academy in 1969. He has a Master of Science degree in Operations Research and Master of Arts degrees in International Relations and National Security and Strategic Studies.



As TRADOC Commander, General Wallace is responsible for recruiting, training, and educating the Army's Soldiers; developing its leaders; supporting training in units; developing doctrine; establishing standards; and building the future Army. TRADOC is comprised of over 50,000 Soldiers and Department of the Army civilians operating in 33 Army schools across sixteen installations.

General Wallace has commanded with distinction at every possible level from platoon to corps and on two separate occasions led Soldiers in combat. In 1972, he served as an assistant district advisor and later as an operations advisor in the Bac Lieu Province, Vietnam. And recently as the V Corps Commander, General Wallace led the Army's attack to Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom. General Wallace's first assignment was as a platoon leader and troop executive officer in the 2nd Squadron, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Meade. After returning from his first combat tour, he commanded a company at Fort Bragg in the 4th Battalion (Light) (Airborne), 68th Armored Regiment with the 82nd Airborne Division. During the first of three tours to Germany, he took command of 3rd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in 1986. Following an assignment as the Senior Armored Task Force Trainer and chief of staff at the Army's National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, General Wallace returned to Germany in 1992 becoming the 55th Colonel of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Fulda. After Regimental command, he returned to Fort Irwin, where he commanded the NTC's

operation group and later became commander of the NTC. In 1997, General Wallace took command of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood. Following division command, he served as Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, and as the Director, Joint Training J-7, in the U.S. Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia. Returning to Germany for his third tour, General Wallace assumed command of V Corps in 2001.

General Wallace attended both the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses; the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey; the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth; and the United States Naval War College in Newport. Among his awards and decorations are the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Legion of Merit with four oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Army Commendation Medal with "V" device, the Army Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Army Achievement Medal, the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry, the Combat Infantryman's Badge, the Parachutist Badge, and the Ranger Tab.

PANELISTS

Mr. Pete Bechtel

Mr. Bechtel guides the overall development of Army strategy, policies, and plans that direct activities across all areas of the Army's responsibilities under Title 10, United States Code. He directly oversees the formulation of Army strategic guidance, future concepts and joint doctrine, force planning and sourcing, strategic mobility and force projection strategies, strategy and policy for combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Army Global Posture changes now underway. Mr. Bechtel has led the Army staff efforts to improve the mix of capabilities to meet the ground-domain demands of the Defense Strategy and of the emerging focus areas articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review process.

These activities shape the programs that allow the Army to meet its responsibilities as a land force provider to the combatant commanders while simultaneously transforming into a twenty-first century campaign capable, joint and expeditionary force. Mr. Bechtel's office ensures that the Department's Strategic vision and demanding operational requirements remain the centerpieces for the shaping and balance of future forces, and for the disposition of Army capabilities to meet the dynamic global demands of the current security environment.

As an Army Infantry Officer, Mr. Bechtel had a wide variety of leadership and staff experiences in both tactical and institutional Army units, including several peacekeeping and operational deployments to Latin America and the Persian Gulf. Mr. Bechtel also has previously served as the Deputy Chief of Army War Plans Division, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the United States Military Academy, West Point, and as a Strategist and Special Assistant within the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, Washington DC.

Mr. Bechtel graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. He also holds a Master of Public Administration degree from Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. His awards and decorations include the Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Ranger Tab, Airborne and Air Assault badges, various military awards and the Commanders' Award for Civilian Service.

Mr. Bechtel and his wife Christine reside in Gaithersburg, Maryland. His daughter Caitlin is a student at the Massachusetts College of Art and Design in Boston; his son William is a high school student and dedicated Boy Scout.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cassidy

Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, is a joint strategic planner currently serving at Fort Bragg, NC. He is also a Fellow with the Center for Advanced Defense Studies and a member of the Royal United Services Institute.

He has previously served as a battalion commander, as a special assistant to the Commanding General of U.S. Army forces in Europe, as a brigade operations officer in the 4th Infantry Division during the first part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, as squadron executive officer of 1-10 Cavalry, as Troop Commander in 1-17 Cavalry of the 82nd Airborne Division, and as an assistant professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy.

LTC Cassidy has master's degrees in international relations and diplomacy from Boston University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. LTC Cassidy earned his Ph.D. in international security from the Fletcher School and holds the Diplome d'Etude Supérieure de Défense from the French Joint Defense College at the École Militaire.

LTC Cassidy has published articles on the topics of military culture and irregular warfare in *Parameters*, *Military Review*, *the Fletcher Forum*, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, and the *RUSI Journal*. He has also published a monograph with the Strategic Studies Institute on Russian counterinsurgency efforts in Chechnya and Afghanistan (2003). He is the author of two books: *Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War* (2004) and *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror* (2006). His second book was released in paperback by Stanford University Press in February 2008.

Dr. David S.C. Chu

David S. C. Chu was sworn in as the [Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness](#) on June 1, 2001. A Presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate, he is the Secretary's senior policy advisor on recruitment, career development, pay and benefits for 1.4 million active duty military personnel, 1.3 million Guard and Reserve personnel and 680,000 DoD civilians and is responsible for overseeing the state of military readiness. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness also oversees the \$15 billion Defense Health Program, Defense Commissaries and Exchanges with \$14.5 billion in annual sales, the Defense Education Activity which supports over 100,000 students, and the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, the nation's largest equal opportunity training program.

Dr. Chu earlier served in government as the Director and then Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) from May 1981 to January 1993. In that capacity, he advised the Secretary of Defense on the future size and structure of the armed forces, their equipment, and their preparation for crisis or conflict. From 1978 to 1981, Dr. Chu served as the Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs, Congressional Budget Office, providing advice to the Congress on the full range of national security and international economic issues.

Dr. Chu began his service to the nation in 1968 when he was commissioned in the Army and became an instructor at the U.S. Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee VA. He later served a tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam, working in the Office of the Comptroller, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. He obtained the rank of captain and completed his service with the Army in 1970.

Prior to rejoining the Department of Defense, Dr. Chu served in several senior executive positions with RAND, including Director of the Arroyo Center, the Army's federally funded research and development center for studies and analysis and Director of RAND's Washington Office.

Dr. Chu received a Bachelor of Arts Degree, magna cum laude, in Economics and Mathematics from Yale University in 1964 and a Doctorate in Economics, also from Yale, in 1972. He is a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration and a recipient of its National Public Senior Award. He holds the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public service with silver palm.

Mr. Mark Foulon

Mark Foulon is a member of the Senior Executive Service in the United States Department of Commerce. From 2007 – 2008, he served on detail as Chief of Staff for International Affairs at the Department of Treasury. At Commerce, Foulon was Deputy Undersecretary for Industry and Security from 2003 –2006 and Acting Under Secretary of Industry and Security from 2006 –2007.

Foulon came to the Commerce Department from the Department of State, where he was a member of the Policy Planning Staff and a senior speechwriter to the Secretary of State. A former Foreign Service Officer with experience in the Middle East and Europe, Foulon also served as an aide to U.S. Senator Bill Bradley focusing on trade and national security.

Foulon also brings to his position business experience gained as a consultant for McKinsey & Co. and as a principal in several high-technology start-up businesses.

A native of Spokane, Washington, Foulon is a graduate of Yale and Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar.

General (Retired) Frederick Franks

General (ret.) Fred Franks graduated 3 June 1959 from the United States Military Academy and retired from active Army service 1 December 1994. Since active Army retirement, General Franks collaborated with Tom Clancy on a book, Into the Storm, a Study in Command. He is the visiting Chair in the Center for the Professional Military Ethic at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He has been a senior mentor in the US Army's Strategic Leader Course, teaching strategic change, and serves as a senior mentor in the US Army Battle Command Training Program and Joint Warfighting Center. General Franks also serves on the Board of Trustees of USMA, a corporate Board of Directors, as Chairman of the Board of VII Corps Desert Storm Veterans Association, a nonprofit organization devoted to assisting VII Corps Desert Storm veterans and next of kin, and on an Amputee Board of Advisors at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. In September 2001 President George W. Bush appointed him to the American Battle Monuments Commission.

During his active Army service, General Franks commanded Armored Cavalry units at the platoon, troop, squadron, and regimental levels in the 11th and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiments in periods from early 1960 to 1984. General Franks served in combat in Vietnam as S-3, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment from August 1969 until being medically evacuated to Valley Forge General Hospital in May 1970 after being wounded in action in Cambodia. After having his leg amputated below the knee and rehabilitation at Valley Forge General Hospital he was permitted to remain on active duty and returned to active service in early 1972. He also commanded Seventh Army Training Command (84-85), 1st Armored Division (88-89), and VII Corps in Germany (89-91). As VII Corps Commanding General, General Franks commanded the 146,000 US and British forces of VII Corps during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm that attacked over 250 kilometers in 89 hours and as part of the Coalition liberated Kuwait in February 1991. He concluded his active service as Commanding General Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from 1991-1994, responsible for the U. S. Army's school system and for formulating concepts and requirements for future land warfare. Other key assignments were as the Deputy Commandant, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas (85-87), and as the first J-7, Director of Plans and Interoperability, on the Joint Staff in Washington, DC (87-88) following enactment of Goldwater-Nichols National Security Act. He also served on the English department faculty at West Point. General Franks holds two Master Degrees from Columbia University in New York City and an honorary Master of Military Art and Science from U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He successfully completed U.S. Army Airborne and Ranger training, as well as military service schools to include the National War College in Washington, DC He has received four awards for valor, two Purple Hearts, numerous military awards for service, as well as individual decorations and awards from foreign governments, his native Pennsylvania, and the Harry S. Truman Good Neighbor Award Foundation in Kansas City. He has been elected to his hometown Wilson High School Athletic and Academic Halls of Fame. In May 2000 the Association of Graduates named him a Distinguished Graduate of West Point.

He and his wife of over 44 years, Denise, are both natives of Pennsylvania. They currently divide their time between Naples, Florida and Alexandria, Virginia. They have a daughter, Marjorie (Bozek), and three grandchildren, Jake, Mickey, and Denise.

Colonel Sean Hannah

Colonel Sean T. Hannah, Ph.D., is the Director of the Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic (ACPME), at the United States Military Academy. The ACPME is tasked by the Chief of Staff of the Army with the mission to increase Army-wide understanding, ownership, and sustained development of the professional military ethic (PME) through research, education, and publication. His personal research has investigated positive forms of leadership development such as authenticity, leader identity, moral development, leadership efficacy, and courage. His most recent works are published in the *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *the Leadership Quarterly*, and *the Journal of Positive Psychology*. His recent leadership writings also appear in the books *Affect and Emotion: New Directions in Management Theory and Research*; *Knowledge Driven Corporation: A Discontinuous Model*; *Forging the Warriors Character*;

Leadership Lessons from West Point; as well as *Authentic Leadership Theory and Practice: Origins, Effects, and Development*. A career Army officer, he served in numerous combat and contingency operations including Desert Storm, Operation Sea Signal, and the Pentagon on 9/11.

Colonel Cindy Jebb

Colonel Cindy R. Jebb is Professor and Deputy Head in the Department of Social Sciences. She teaches courses in Comparative Politics, International Security, Cultural Anthropology, and Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Colonel Jebb has served in numerous command and staff positions in the United States and overseas, to include tours with the 1st Armored Division, III Corps, and the National Security Agency. Before reporting to the United States Military Academy, she served as the Deputy Commander of the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade, which supported NSA. During 2000-2001, she served as USMA Fellow at the Naval War College (2000-2001), where she taught the graduate-level course on Strategy and Force Planning, and during 2006-2007, she served as a Visiting Fellow for the Pell Center. She has several published articles and authored/co-authored three books: *Bridging the Gap: Ethnicity, Legitimacy, and State Alignment in the International System*, (Lexington Publisher) ; *Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity*, co-authored with P.H. Liotta (Praeger Publisher); and, *The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy Versus Terrorism*, co-authored with P.H. Liotta, Thom Sherlock, and Ruth Beitler, (Praeger Security International Publisher). Colonel Jebb received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University in 1997, a MA in Political Science from Duke in 1992, an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 2000, and a BS from the United States Military Academy in 1982.

Ms. Lorelei Kelly

Lorelei Kelly is a national security specialist working to educate elected leaders and the public about the national security challenges revealed by 9/11. She is the Policy Director for the Real Security Initiative of the White House Project, (www.thewhitehouseproject.org) an organization whose mission is to elevate women's voices in media, culture and politics—specifically to bring more women into national security decision making. In addition to working with the underground democracy movements of Eastern Europe throughout 1989, Lorelei's professional background includes teaching at Stanford University's Center on Conflict and Negotiation, Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center and more than 8 years working on bipartisan national security education in Congress, where she continues to advise the Progressive Caucus. She has a Grinnell College BA and a Stanford MA. Lorelei has been trained as a professional mediator in both domestic and international conflict resolution settings. She also attended the Air Command and Staff College program of the US Air Force as well as continuing education programs at the National Defense University and Army War College. Her latest publication is a guidebook for citizens entitled "Policy Matters: Educating Congress on Peace and Security" which is available online at www.stimson.org. She blogs regularly at democracyarsenal.org and Huffingtonpost.com. She is currently writing a citizen's handbook on civil-military dialogue with former West Point professor Dr. Dana Eyre (Army, CA Reservist).

Dr. Andrew Krepinevich

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and investment strategies for the 21st century.

Dr. Krepinevich is an accomplished author and lecturer on US military strategy and policy. His recent works include *Strategy for a Long Peace*; *Transforming America's Alliances*; *The Quadrennial Defense Review: Rethinking the U.S. Military Posture*, and *How to Win in Iraq*. His work has appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, *The National Interest*, *Issues in Science and Technology*, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, *The Naval War College Review*, and *Strategic Review*, among other scholarly and public interest journals. Dr. Krepinevich received the 1987 Furniss Award for his book, *The Army and Vietnam*.

Dr. Krepinevich gained extensive strategic planning experience in national security and technology policy through his work in the Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment, service on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense, and as a member of the National Defense Panel in 1997, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation in 2002-03, and Joint Forces Command's Transformation Advisory Board. Dr. Krepinevich has testified on numerous occasions before the Senate and House Budget Committees, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, and the House Government Reform Committee. He frequently contributes to both national and local print and broadcast media, including *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal*, and has appeared on each of the major networks, National Public Radio, and The McLaughlin Group. Dr. Krepinevich has lectured before a wide range of professional and academic audiences, including those at Harvard, Princeton, Yale and Stanford, the U.S. Military Academy, the Air University, the Army and Naval War Colleges, Europe's Marshall Center, and France's Ecole Militaire.

Dr. Krepinevich has served as a consultant on military affairs for many senior government officials, including several secretaries of defense, the CIA's National Intelligence Council, and all four military services, as well as the current U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. He has also advised the governments of several close allies on defense matters, including those of Australia, France, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.

He has taught a wide variety of national security and defense policymaking courses while on the faculties of West Point, George Mason University, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and Georgetown University. He is currently the Distinguished Visiting Professor at the George Mason University's School of Public Policy. Following an Army career that spanned twenty-one years, Dr. Krepinevich retired to become the president of what is now the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

A graduate of West Point, Dr. Krepinevich holds an MPA and Ph.D. from Harvard University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Mr. Henry A. Leonard

Henry A. Leonard was born into an Army family in 1949 at West Point, New York. His extended family has accumulated decades of service in all branches of the military. He

currently resides with his wife, Barbara Carr Butler, in Alexandria, Virginia. They have three sons: a sales and advertising executive with a start-up outdoor sports magazine, a lieutenant of infantry recently returned from a tour in Iraq, and a student of international politics at the College of William and Mary.

Chip Leonard served over 27 years as a career Army officer, half of which was with tactical units, including seven years of direct command experience at successive levels, culminating with command of a diverse 1400-man brigade with global missions. In addition, he served in key operational staff positions at battalion, brigade, division, and corps level. He has served in Vietnam and in Germany, and his assignments in the continental United States have frequently involved him in operational and strategic planning worldwide. During his tour in Germany as an operations officer, he re-designed concepts for a segment of NATO's Central European defense, leading to more efficient stationing and deployment patterns.

Chip's higher-level staff experience includes four tours with the Headquarters, Department of the Army staff, two tours with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, one tour with the Joint Staff, and a tour as an instructor of economics at the United States Military Academy. He has produced analysis that contributed to key Department of Defense and Army decisions on rapid deployment forces, personnel management policies, and allocation of resources for recruiting and retention programs. He developed assessments for the Army Chief of Staff on major issues related to support of national strategy.

Since joining RAND in 1998, Chip has been continuously involved in coordinating projects examining the Army's manpower, unit training, leader development, training resource management, officer career management programs. He has also provided or assisted in providing several quick analyses and assessments of key issues for senior Army leaders. His current position is Associate Director, Manpower and Training Program, RAND Arroyo Center.

Leonard's professional interests include strategic planning, operations/systems analysis, economic analysis, and executive communications. An avid follower of team sports at all levels, he enjoys avocational interests in outdoor sports, especially skiing and mountain climbing, and less active pastimes such as reading, woodworking, and gardening.

Mr. Maxie McFarland

Mr. Maxie L. McFarland was selected to the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service in July 2002 and is currently serving as the (Director of Intelligence) G-2 for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. In this position, he serves as the Army's lead for developing, defining and applying current and future threats and environments in support of leader development, concept development, capability design, training readiness and experimentation. He is the Army's lead for Red Teaming, Culture and Language Strategy, Human Terrain System, Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, and the Army's Counter-IED Integration Center. Mr. McFarland leads teams that support the Army's Combat Training Centers, deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, all of the

Army's educational institutions and capability development and integration activities. He is responsible for managing a staff of more than 500 employees, acts as the program manager for TRADOC civilian intelligence career field personnel and oversees a budget in excess of \$250 million.

From December 2006 to May 2007, Mr. McFarland was assigned by the Army Chief of Staff to support the establishment and expansion of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). He served as a special advisor to the Director and as the Deputy Director for Concepts, Strategy and Intelligence. Mr. McFarland was responsible for designing JIEDDO's Counter-IED Operational Integration Center (COIC), establishing the law enforcement support program, and overseeing the development of ISR capabilities to counter IED Threats as well as numerous other initiatives.

Colonel Michael J. Meese

Colonel Michael J. Meese is a Professor, U.S. Military Academy, and Head of the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. He teaches economics and national security courses and leads the 70 military and civilian faculty members in the Department and the Combating Terrorism Center who teach political science, economics, and terrorism-related courses. From June to September 2007, he worked as a senior advisor to the Commander of Multinational Force-Iraq as the Chief of his Initiatives Group to assist in General Petraeus's assessment, recommendations, and testimony concerning Iraq. From January-March 2007, he assisted with the development of Iraq campaign plan, concentrating on economic and political issues. Colonel Meese has written extensively on defense economics, terrorism, and national security issues. He also serves on the Defense Science Board Panel on Improvised Explosive Devices. He is a field artillery officer with previous assignments with the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, Iraq, with the Stabilization Force Headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina conducting peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations, and with other units in Germany and the United States. He is a graduate of the National War College, Command and General Staff College, U.S. Military Academy, and holds a Ph.D., MPA and an M.A. from Princeton University.

Colonel Matthew Moten

Colonel Matthew Moten is professor and deputy head of the Department of History at the United States Military Academy. He spent much of his career in armor and cavalry assignments. In April, 1999 he became speechwriter to the Chief of Staff, Army, General Eric K. Shinseki. He later served as legislative advisor to the Chief of Staff. In 2002 Colonel Moten was selected as an Academy Professor in the USMA Department of History, and was assigned as Chief, Military History Division. From January to June of 2005, he served as deputy commanding officer, Dragon Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps and Task Force Dragon, Multi-National Corps, Iraq. He assumed duty as Deputy Head, Department of History in March, 2006. He holds a doctorate in history from Rice University and is author of *The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession*.

Lieutenant General Michael D. Rochelle

Lieutenant General Rochelle was born on 28 March 1950, in Norfolk, Virginia. After graduating Central High School in Providence, Rhode Island, he enrolled at Norfolk State University in Norfolk, Virginia, where he earned a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Foreign Language Education in 1972. While enrolled and finishing his degree at Norfolk State University, he concurrently completed the Advanced ROTC program and was commissioned as a Regular Army Officer in June 1972. To augment his bachelor's degree, LTG Rochelle later attended Shippensburg University where he earned a Master of Arts Degree in Public Administration.

His military education includes the Army War College, Army Command and General Staff College, Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, and the Adjutant General Officer Basic and Advanced Courses.

Lieutenant General Rochelle's command assignments included commander of the 226th Adjutant General Company (Postal) in Munich, Germany; the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Station, Portland, Maine; the Brunswick Recruiting Battalion (now the New England Recruiting Battalion), Brunswick, Maine; the U.S. Army Garrison at Fort Monroe, Virginia; the U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute, Fort Jackson, South Carolina; and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky. Lieutenant General Rochelle's staff assignments included operations officer, professional development officer, and ultimately as deputy chief, General Officer Management Office, Office of the Chief of Staff Army, Headquarters Department of the Army; between commanding the Brunswick Recruiting Battalion and as the Garrison Commander at Fort Monroe, Lieutenant General Rochelle served as the Division G-1 and Adjutant General of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); and he served as the Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable John J. Hamre, and later as the Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Prior to his becoming the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, Lieutenant General Rochelle served as the Director of the U.S. Army Installation Management Agency (IMA).

Lieutenant General Rochelle's decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster (Army), the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with three oak leaf clusters, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Army Commendation Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the Joint Service Achievement Medal, Recruiter Badge, Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge, Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge, and the Army Staff Identification Badge.

Dr. Kalev Sepp

Dr. Kalev I. Sepp is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Capabilities. Dr. Sepp is responsible for the Department of Defense global counterterrorism portfolio, which includes policy oversight of sensitive special operations missions, and formulation of the Department's global counterterrorism strategy. He received his current appointment in July 2007. A former U.S. Army Special Forces officer, he earned his Ph.D. at Harvard University, and his Combat Infantryman Badge in El Salvador.

He served as an analyst and strategist in Iraq and Afghanistan, and as an expert member of the Baker-Hamilton Bipartisan Commission on Iraq, a.k.a. the Iraq Study Group. For his work in Iraq, he was awarded the Department of the Navy Superior Civilian Service Medal.

Dr. Sepp graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College with a Master's degree in Military Art and Science. He previously taught at the U.S. Military Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School.

Dr. Don M. Snider

Dr. Snider was appointed to the civilian faculty of the U.S. Military Academy in 1998. This followed a military career in the US Army, five years in Washington DC as analyst and director of political-military research at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and three years as the Olin Distinguished Professor of National Security Studies at West Point.

His current research interests include military innovation and adaptation, American civil-military relations, the identities and development of the American Army officer, and military professions. He was research director for, and co-editor of, *The Future of the Army Profession, 2d Edition* (McGraw-Hill, 2005), now a textbook at the Army War College and West Point. He is currently directing a book project on the use of moral precepts in the development of leaders of character at West Point.

Dr. Snider's publications include: "Leadership by Example" (*Army Magazine*, November 2005), "Jointness, Defense Transformation, and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession," (*Parameters*, Autumn 2003); "Officership: The Professional Practice" (*Military Review*, Jan-Feb 2003); "The Civil-Military Gap and Professional Military Education" (*Armed Forces and Society*, Winter 2001, co-author); "America's Post-Modern Military" (*World Policy Journal*, Spring 2000); *Army Professionalism, The Military Ethic and Officership in the 21st Century* (Strategic Studies Institute, 1999, co-author); "The Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," (*Orbis*, Winter 1999); "Civil-Military Relations and the Ability to Influence," (*Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 1999, co-author); *U.S. Civil-Military Relations: Transition or Crisis* (CSIS, 1995, co-editor); *The Gulf War and What We Learned*, (Westview, 1992, co-author).

In addition to Congressional testimonies, his publications have appeared in *Survival*, *The Washington Quarterly*, *AirPower Review*, *National Security Studies Quarterly*, *Command*, *Assembly*, *Armed Forces Journal International*, and the *Joint Forces Quarterly*; his op/eds have appeared in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Times*, the *Atlanta Constitution-Journal*, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, and the *Chicago Tribune*.

Early in his military career, Dr. Snider served three combat tours as an infantryman in the Republic of Vietnam. After battalion command in the 7th Infantry Division, he specialized in military strategy and defense policy, serving consecutively as Chief of Plans for Theater Army in Europe, Joint Planner for the Army Chief of Staff, and Federal

Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution. In 1987 he joined the staff of the National Security Council in the White House serving as Director, Defense Policy, in both the Reagan and Bush Administrations. In his last position on active duty he served in the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Dr. Snider holds a Doctorate in Public Policy from the University of Maryland (1993) and Master's Degrees in Economics and in Public Policy from the University of Wisconsin (1969). He is a member of The Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, and serves on the Executive Committee of the Inter-University Seminar (IUS) on Armed Forces and Society.

Chaplain (Colonel) Eric Wester

Chaplain (COL) Eric Wester reports 1 July 2008 for a newly established position as Senior Military Fellow, Institute for National Security Ethics and Leadership (INSEL), National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington DC. In addition to teaching military ethics at the National War College, he joins the Institute to launch its mission of fostering interservice and interagency professional and academic development in ethics.

Chaplain Wester most recently served as Executive Assistant for the Joint Working Group, charged by the Army, Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Chaplains to create the new Armed Forces Chaplaincy Center. Establishing the AFCC fulfills a Base Realignment and Closure mandate to co-locate all military chaplain schools by 15 September 2011 at Fort Jackson, SC. Ground breaking for the new Armed Forces Chaplaincy Center occurred 6 May 2008 with construction and relocation of the Navy and USAF students, staff and faculty scheduled for completion in 2009.

He was born in Columbus, OH in 1955 and enlisted in the Army in 1973. While serving three years at Fort Bragg as an Army Chaplain Assistant, he earned the Associate of Arts degree, Fayetteville State University, 1976. He completed the Bachelor of Arts degree, 1978, University of Toledo, majoring in psychology. He earned the Master of Divinity degree, Trinity Lutheran Seminary, 1982, and a Master of Theology degree, pastoral counseling, New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 1989.

His most recent degree is a Master of Strategic Studies from the US Army War College, 2004, and he began publishing in the area of ethics. His first article, "Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case in Iraq," Parameters, was published in December 2004. In July 2007, he published, "Preemption and Last Resort: Using Armed Force as a Penultimate and Moral Choice," Parameters. His review essay, "Rethinking Morality in War," was published in January 2008, Parameters, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA.

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Future Strategic Environment in an Era of Persistent Conflict

Major Paul Oh

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Framing the future strategic environment in an era of persistent conflict is an immense challenge. Unlike the Cold War era, the United States no longer has an overarching paradigm through which it can view the world. Non-state actors and irregular warfare dominate the attention of America as it continues to fight insurgencies while coping with terrorist threats like Al Qaeda. Traditional threats persist in places like the Korean peninsula while the rise of China presents the prospect of a future strategic competitor. Increasingly global forces, whether in economics, environment or health, are having a greater impact on citizens around the world. Domestically, there is uncertainty on how to best structure, fund, and oversee the national security apparatus to meet these future challenges. No overarching paradigm suffices; the United States is left with the prospect of racing from one crisis to the next.

Various studies have presented forecasts of the future to help policymakers plan to meet the national security challenges of the next twenty years and beyond. Among the most recent are:


- *Mapping the Global Future* by the National Intelligence Council (NIC)
- *Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* by United States Joint Forces Command
- *Forging a World of Liberty under Law* by the Princeton Project on National Security (PPNS)
- *The New Global Puzzle* by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)
- *Global Strategic Trends Programme* by the British Ministry of Defense Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)

This paper serves two purposes:

Part I: First, it surveys these studies to highlight some of the primary trends that will characterize and shape the future strategic environment. These trends are globalization, demographics, rise of emerging powers, environment and competition for resources, non-state actors and challenge to governance, and advances in technology. These trends will present complex and multidimensional challenges that may require careful use of the military in conjunction with other instruments of national powers.

Part II: Second, the paper examines military response to this future strategic environment by examining three different mission sets the United States will most likely be involved in-- expeditionary warfare to manage violence and peace, defense of the command of the commons, and homeland defense. First, the land force will spearhead the expeditionary missions to “contested zones”¹ to protect American interests abroad. Second, the sea, air and space forces will lead in countering threats to the American command of the commons – air, sea, space, and cyberspace, where the American military currently has dominance. Finally, the military will support the interagency effort in Homeland Defense as technological advances weaken the traditional natural barriers to

attack on U.S. soil. This section will attempt to define the operating environment for these mission sets and broadly evaluate the likely threats that the United States will face.



Part I: Future Trends of the Next Twenty Years

Globalization

The Good...

In *Mapping the Global Future*, the NIC calls globalization the overarching “mega-trend” that will shape all other trends of the future.² Globalization is an amorphous concept, but here it is meant in its broadest definition – primarily the more rapid exchange of capital, goods, and services, but also information, technology, ideas, people, and culture.³ Markets for goods, finance, services, and labor will continue to become more internationalized and interdependent.⁴ Such integration will bring immense benefits to the world as a whole. Globalization will continue to be the engine for greater economic growth. The world as a whole will be richer with many lifted out of poverty. It is unclear, however, whether a richer world where America has less relative economic power will be better for the United States in terms of its global influence.⁵

Barring major shocks, the global economy is expected to be 80 percent larger in 2020 than in 2000 with average per capita income 50 percent higher.⁶ According to the EUISS, the world economy will grow at a sustained annual rate of 3.5 percent between 2006 and 2020.⁷ The United States, EU, and Japan will likely continue to lead in many high-value markets, with the United States continuing to be the main driving force as the world’s leading economic power. Emerging economies will continue to do well, with the

Chinese and Indian GDP tripling by 2025.⁸ The percentage of the world's population living in extreme poverty will likely continue to decline.⁹

The Bad...

The benefits of globalization will not be global. The harsh realities of competitive capitalism will produce definite winners and losers,¹⁰ and result in increased social and economic stratification both internationally and within countries. Internationally, these losers will be concentrated in certain areas of the “arc of instability,” a “swath of territory running from the Caribbean Basin through most of Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southeast Asia.”¹¹ Here, the gap between those countries benefiting economically, technologically, and socially and the countries that are left behind will continue to widen.¹² And although absolute poverty is declining worldwide, this will not be the case for these regions. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, people living in absolute poverty – less than one dollar a day – have been increasing from 160 million in 1981 to 303 million today.¹³ Poverty and aggravated income inequality will remain a monumental challenge in the next twenty years.

DCDC notes that “absolute poverty and the comparative disadvantage will fuel perceptions of injustice.”¹⁴ The resulting disparities will be clearly evident to all because of globalized telecommunications. Populations of the “have-not” countries that perceive themselves to be losing relative ground may continue to be breeding grounds for extremist and criminalist ideologies that lead to violence within and outside that society.

Greater economic interdependence will lead to greater political interdependence. Although such a scenario greatly diminishes the prospects of major industrialized war between two nations, it also means that what happens in one part of the globe will impact the other parts of the globalized world. Economic shocks will reverberate throughout the globe. A drastic downturn in the U.S. economy, for example, could cause a global economic depression¹⁵ perhaps requiring global or regional political solutions.

...And the Ugly

The new era of globalization also means that we cannot depend on geography to shield ourselves from the multiple problems of the developing world. This was made clear in 9/11 when the hate espoused by the extremist ideology of radical Islam manifested itself in attacks on U.S. soil. But the dangers of interdependence are manifested in other areas as well. Effects of climate change, disease and pandemics originating from remote parts of the world will affect the United States.

Infectious disease is already the number one killer of human beings.¹⁶ AIDS is a scourge in most of the world and poses an extreme societal threat in portions of sub-Saharan Africa. Even more frightening is the threat of a global avian influenza pandemic.¹⁷ The ever increasing connectivity of nations resulting from globalization means that a strain originating in a remote part of an undeveloped country can spread throughout the world at a frightening pace. A pandemic would also cause severe economic hardship in a globalized world, even if a disease is physically kept out of the United States.

Demographic Trends

Developed countries

The world's population is estimated to increase by 23.4 percent from 2005 to 2025.¹⁸ The population growth in the developed world, however, will remain relatively stable. The United States will grow to 364 million citizens by 2030 while the EU-25 will grow from 458 million to 470 million in 2025 before declining.¹⁹ Japan and Russia will experience a decrease in population, with Japan's population falling from 128 million to 124.8 million and Russia's population falling from 143.2 million to 129.2 million within the next twenty years.²⁰

Developed countries will also experience significant population aging. In the European Union, the ratio of employment age citizens (15-65) to the retired over 65 will shift from about 4 to 1 in 2000 to 2 to 1 by 2050.²¹ Japan will approach 2 to 1 by 2025²², and the median age will increase from 42.9 to 50 years.²³ This trend will fortunately not have as severe an impact on the United States due to higher fertility rates and greater immigration.²⁴ Less conducive to large-scale immigration, Europe and Japan could face societal upheaval as they try to assimilate large numbers of migrant workers from the developing world. These factors will soon greatly stress the social welfare structure of these countries while challenging their ability to maintain economic productivity or to fund discretionary spending, such as on defense spending and foreign assistance.

Developing countries

The overwhelming portion of global population growth (90 percent) by 2030 will occur in developing and poorer countries.²⁵ Population growth in these areas will be 43 to 48.4 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, 38 percent in the Middle East/North Africa region, 24 percent in Latin America, and 21 percent in Asia. Nine out of ten people will be living in the developing world in the next twenty years.²⁶

In contrast to the developed world, a significant portion of the population growth will be the "youth" of the region with a "youth bulge" occurring in Latin American, Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.²⁷ About 59 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa will be under 24 years by 2025.²⁸ In the Middle East and North Africa area, the working-age population will expand by 50 percent and 40 percent respectively. The nexus of a bulging youth population and the low socio-economic conditions in the developing world will challenge governments to provide employment for a young and undereducated populace with little employment opportunities, setting up the potential for violent conflict. As a recent *Economist* article notes, these young men without "either jobs or prospects" will trade "urban for rural poverty, head for the slums, bringing their anger, and machetes, with them."²⁹ In the last two decades, 80 percent of all civil conflicts took place in countries where 60 percent or more of the population was under thirty years of age.³⁰

Migration

Significant portions of the global population will be on the move, much of it to the cities. By 2030, 61 percent of the global population will live in cities as compared to 47 percent

in 2000.³¹ And while the urbanization ratio will be greater in developed countries compared to developing countries (81.7 percent versus 57 percent), the developing countries will struggle to control the transition to urban societies.³² Shantytowns in “mega-cities” struggling with crime and disease will likely proliferate. Migration to relatively wealthier countries will also continue as workers search for better economic opportunities. The DCDC reports that the number of people living outside their country of origin will increase from 175 million in 2020 to 230 million by 2050.³³ Environmental degradation, natural disasters, or armed conflicts will also forcibly uproot populations. How both the developing and developed countries absorb the influx of migrants may determine the level of conflict associated with these movements.

Identity

How segments of the global population identify themselves may drastically change in the next twenty years. Individual loyalty to the state and state institutions will become increasingly conditional.³⁴ Identity politics will increasingly be based on religious convictions and ethnic affiliations.³⁵ Religious identity may become a greater factor in how people identify themselves. Although Europe will remain mostly secular, religious practices will continue to spread in areas as diverse as China, Africa, Latin America, and the United States. In areas of the developing world, Islam will continue to increase as the overarching identity for large segments of some populations. In other regions, ethnicity and tribal loyalties will continue to be the dominant form of identification.

Rise of Emerging Powers

The rise of powerful global players will reshape how we mentally map the globe as we move increasingly towards an increasingly multi-polar world. *Mapping the Global Future* likens the emergence of China and India to the rise of a united Germany in the 19th century and the rise of the United States in the 20th Century.³⁶ The global center of gravity will shift steadily to the Pacific.

China

China will become a powerful actor in the global system. The rise of China has been called “one of the seminal events of the early 21st century.”³⁷ China’s economic and diplomatic influence will continue to expand globally. Its gross national product (GNP) is expected to surpass all economic powers except the United States within twenty years.³⁸ Its demand for energy to fuel this growth will make it a global presence as it ventures out to secure sources of energy. In East Asia, China is likely to wield its growing influence to shape the region’s “political-institutional contours” to build a regional community that excludes the United States.³⁹ All this will likely be accompanied by a continued Chinese build-up of its military to reinforce its growing world power status.

Whether China continues to pursue a peaceful rise will have a profound impact on the course of international affairs in the next 30 years. The rise and fall of great powers has been one of the most important dynamics in the international system, a dynamic that is often accompanied by instability and conflict.⁴⁰ DCDC believes China will approach

international affairs with a fair amount of pragmatism, but will face daunting challenges as it develops. It may exert its growing hard and soft power to either protect its growth or ensure internal stability. When China does establish itself as a global power, it may be less restrained in its conduct of foreign affairs.⁴¹

Other Powers

Depending on governance and policy, other nations may also play a greater role in the international arena. Among those mentioned in the studies are India, Russia, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil.⁴² Depending on its ability to achieve greater political cohesion, a more united European Union could also play a greater role, especially by serving as a model of global and regional governance.⁴³ Another possibility would be the rise of a rival alliance.⁴⁴

The rise of these powers may mean a decline of relative power of the United States. Though the United States would continue to play the major role in international affairs, its overwhelming dominance may decline. In the next twenty years, we may see a more multi-polar world with political, economic, and military power diffused throughout the globe and America's ability to influence dialogue in key global issues greatly diminished.

Environment and Competition for Resources

Environmental degradation

Scientific consensus increasingly points to human activities as a main contributing factor in global warming. Although climate science is complex and the estimates of probable damages differ, the possibilities of catastrophic effects caused by global warming seem very real. Major consequences are likely due to “melting ice-caps, thermal expansion of the oceans, and changes to ocean currents and flows.”⁴⁵ Possible consequences on land include increased desertification, reduced land for habitation and agriculture, spread of diseases, and an increase of extreme weather events.

The worst-hit regions will likely face political, economic, and social instability.⁴⁶ These regions will be mostly within the arc of instability, impacting the non-integrated areas of the globe and particularly worsening the already marginal living standards in many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations.⁴⁷ The likelihood of more failed states collapsing will increase as weak governments are unable to cope with decreases in food and water and increases in disease and violent uprisings.

Competition for resources

Exacerbating the environmental concerns is the ever-increasing competition for resources. As countries grow richer and modernize, the demand for resources will greatly increase in the next twenty years. According to the International Energy Agency, demand for energy will likely grow by more than 50 percent by 2035 with fossil fuels projected to meet 80 percent of this increase.⁴⁸ The world economy will remain heavily dependent on oil through 2025 at a minimum.⁴⁹ Similarly, global consumption of natural gas will increase by 87 percent.⁵⁰ The United States has so far shown little inclination to tackle seriously its addiction to oil. Growing Asian powers' consumption of oil will also

sky-rocket; China will have to increase consumption by 150 percent and India by 100 percent by 2020 to maintain current growth.⁵¹ Such explosive consumption will exacerbate global warming in the absence of a global framework to tackle the problem.

As a result of global growth, competition for these resources will intensify as the United States and other major economies vie to secure access to energy supplies. The competition will bid up energy prices, making it even more difficult for developing nations to afford minimal energy for their populations. As Isaiah Wilson notes, resource security has persistently been the primary objective of national security and military strategies of advanced nations. Quest for this security will continue to draw nations into military and economic engagement in the “arc of instability.”⁵² The United States will continue its involvement in the Middle East for years to come. China will continue to build bilateral agreements with various nations in Africa to secure their oil supply.

The degradation of our environment and increased economic growth of nations will cause competition not only for traditional energy sources, but also for basic necessities like food and water. Major portions of the population will be living in areas of “water stress” and the amount of arable land may diminish.⁵³ The consumption of **blue water** (river, lake and renewable groundwater) will continue to increase, depriving even more people of access to clean drinking water.⁵⁴ Concurrently, environmental degradation, intensification of agriculture, and a quickened pace of urbanization will all contribute to the reduced fertility of and access to arable land.⁵⁵ Increased reliance on “bio-fuels” to provide for growing energy needs will reduce crop yields devoted to food supplies. There will also be increased competition for other food sources, to include the dwindling fish stocks.⁵⁶ Even now, African fishermen are bemoaning the disappearance of their livelihood while Europeans bemoan the increasing prices for fish in restaurants.⁵⁷

Non-State Actors and Challenges to Governance

Scholars view the rise of non-state actors as a fundamental challenge to the Westphalian-based international system.⁵⁸ The United States, as the leader and architect of the system, has been and will continue to be the primary focus of this challenge. Non-state actors, who do not see themselves bound by borders of a nation, are likely to continue to grow in strength and lethality. Small, empowered groups will be increasingly able to do greater things while states’ near monopoly on information and destructive power continues to diminish.⁵⁹ Their cause has been aided by various factors. The NIC describes the “perfect storm” in certain regions of the underdeveloped world as the combination of weak governments, lagging economies, religious extremism, and the youth bulge gives fuel to extreme movements.⁶⁰

Al Qaeda remains a formidable near term threat. Recent testimony by American intelligence officials reported that Al Qaeda is continuing to gain strength from its sanctuary in Pakistan and “improving its ability to recruit, train, and position operatives capable of carrying out attacks inside the United States.”⁶¹ Even if Al Qaeda is neutralized, the NIC believes that the factors that gave rise to Al Qaeda will not abate in

the next 15 years. It predicts that by 2020, Al Qaeda will be superseded by “similarly inspired but more diffuse extremist groups.”⁶²

Challenges to Governance

Non-state actors such as Al Qaeda will play a major role in spreading extreme and violent ideologies. Fueled by the perceived injustices in a globalized world and by frustration with the oppressiveness of regional authoritarian regimes, major segments of the population in the arc of instability may rally to the promises of radical Islam. These forces may continue to attack the institutions of traditional state government through violent means. These forces may also transcend national boundaries to form a transnational governing body dedicated to terrorism and jihad. The NIC, for example, presents a possible scenario where political Islam provides a context in which a Sunni Caliphate forms and draws on Islamic popular support to challenge traditional regimes.⁶³ PPNS presents another scenario where a radical arc of Shi’ite governments rule from Iran to Palestine and sponsor terrorism in the West while seeking to destabilize the Middle East.⁶⁴

Whatever scenario evolves, governments in the arc of instability will face daunting challenges to stability. They will have to deal with the adverse effects of globalization, climate change, unemployment of their increasing youth populations, and a new form of identity politics. To succeed, they will need to fight their own internal corruption and reform their inefficient and authoritative governments. They will need to do this in the presence of a radical ideology that fiercely attacks their legitimacy and any connections to the western world.

International crime will also be a factor that challenges governance.⁶⁵ This criminal activity will continue to increase in sophistication and lethality as enhanced communication technologies and weapons continue to proliferate.⁶⁶ Their activities will increasingly be intertwined with civil conflict and terrorist activities as they leverage the benefits of increased globalization and alliances with states and non-state actors, to include terrorists.

Non-state actors may also provide opportunities for increased cooperation to meet these future challenges. International organizations, regional organizations, and non-governmental organizations will continue to grow in capacity to varying degrees. Although governance over major problems like trade or international crime has increased due to expanded transnational government networks⁶⁷, new collaborative institutions and mechanisms will be required to cope with increasingly complex global and regional problems.⁶⁸ These networks will need to continue to be strengthened to find solutions to globalized problems.

Technology

Advances in technology elicit great hope as well as great fear, with major breakthroughs having an impact on every aspect of our lives. We can expect further progress in information technology and nanotechnology, innovations in biotechnology, and increased

investments in research and development.⁶⁹ Faster computers combined with elements of nanotechnology and biotechnology may improve our ability to deal with society's daunting challenges, to include human health, environmental issues, and malnutrition.

On the other hand, the availability and ease of transfer of technology allows broader access to previously unavailable weapons. The ease of use of off the shelf, commercial technology has also exacerbated to problem of proliferation.⁷⁰ This is most dangerous in terms of weapons of mass destruction. PPNS asserts that the "world is on the cusp of a new era of nuclear danger."⁷¹ North Korea may very well possess nuclear weapons. Despite the findings of the recent United States National Intelligence Estimate, it seems likely that Iran is still determined to acquire the ability to build nuclear weapons. If the international community cannot reign in these countries, other countries in the Middle East and East Asia will likely also attempt to join the nuclear club.⁷²

Countries will also continue to pursue chemical and biological weapons, as well as delivery capabilities for these weapons. Chemical and biological weapons can be integrated into legitimate commercial infrastructures to further conceal a country's capabilities.⁷³ At the same time, more countries will be able to acquire ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. By 2020, the NIC believes that both North Korea and Iran will have Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities, and several countries will develop space launch vehicles (SLV).⁷⁴ A preview of such capabilities came on 5 February 2008 when Iran launched a Kavoshgar-1 rocket into space using technology similar to that needed for long-range ballistic missiles.⁷⁵

Concurrently, many in the United States fear the waning of American domination in research and development of new, emerging technology. The number of American Ph.D. engineering students is decreasing while the number of foreign students returning to their countries from U.S. universities is on the rise.⁷⁶ At the same time, the *Economist* notes that the domestic trends in American politics and immigration policy are keeping the world's best and brightest talents from "darkening America's doors."⁷⁷

Technology and Terrorists

The potential nexus of terrorist groups and nuclear weapons is perhaps the most frightening scenario for national security experts. The increasing ease with which terrorist elements can acquire weapons to deliver a nuclear attack on the United States presents a nightmare scenario. Graham Allison notes that there are more than two hundred addresses around the world from which terrorists can acquire nuclear weapons or fissile material.⁷⁸ Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea are among the likely sources. If terrorists cannot acquire a nuclear bomb, Allison also notes that the technology and tools are now available for terrorists to build their own.⁷⁹ The difficult task, in this scenario, would be acquiring the fissile material needed for a home-made bomb. There is evidence that Al Qaeda attempted to acquire a nuclear weapon for an attack on the United States.⁸⁰ The prospect of Iran gaining nuclear capabilities is also of great concern in part because of the capabilities of its proxy force, Hezbollah.⁸¹

Part II: Operating Environment and Threat Evaluation

Part II of this paper explores the ramifications of these trends for each type of mission the U.S. military will undertake. Specifically, it explores the operating environment and the nature of the threat that is most likely for each mission set. There are obvious limitations to such attempts to categorize. First, missions will likely be joint and/or interagency ventures with success not achieved purely through the application of military force. Second, the labeling of these challenges as “threats” inherently implies an adversarial relationship, which may not always be the case. The emergence of great powers, for example, may not necessarily lead to adverse conditions in international affairs. Third, some challenges do not fit nicely into this categorization, causing a non-identification of an emerging threat. The emerging radical Islamic community in Europe may be an example.

Such a categorization does highlight, however, the vastly different types of missions our military forces may be involved in during the next twenty years. With tighter budgets for discretionary spending, the nation will need to make difficult decisions regarding prioritization of missions and the most efficient and effective use of our military forces. Examining and analyzing by mission sets allows each service to plan accordingly, providing a basis from which to adapt to the myriad of possibilities that the future strategic environment may hold.

So what do these trends mean for our military forces? American expeditionary forces will need to enter what Posen labels “contested zones.” These zones correspond to areas in what the Pentagon has labeled the global “arc of insecurity.” Any mission to these zones will be both dangerous and difficult as the combinations of political, physical, and technological facts negate many of American military advantages. Although this will have to be a joint venture, land forces will likely spearhead such missions. The air, sea and space forces, on the other hand, will lead the effort in countering threats to the “command of the commons.” The rise of emerging powers and advances in technology will mean countries will venture into the commons where the U.S. military has traditionally maintained dominance. Finally, all forces will continue to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies in defending the homeland against non-traditional actors. For each mission type, the U.S. military will face increasingly capable threats seeking to take advantage of any vulnerabilities.

Expeditionary Warfare to Contested Zones

Though both the Navy and Air Force have begun structuring their forces for expeditionary warfare, the land force will likely spearhead the missions into the “contested zones,” located mainly in the “arc of insecurity.” These areas, running from the Caribbean Basin through most of Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southeast Asia, will disproportionately involve the losers from globalization.⁸² In fact, these zones are where the many trends of the next twenty years will converge. Increased poverty or at least relative poverty, large numbers of unemployed youth, environmental degradation,

competition for resources, emergence of deadly non-state actors, failed states, and proliferation of devastating technology will be the most evident and severe here.

The American expeditionary force may be drawn into these areas for a variety of reasons. First, these areas will continue to be breeding grounds and safe-havens for extremist ideologies and criminal elements. Second, increased global demand and competition for energy sources could demand military intervention in these contested zones. Third, tribal wars or genocide may oblige the United States to join multi-lateral forces deployed to stabilize failed states or regions so to preclude the spread of any effects. Fourth, humanitarian interventions may increase if natural or man-made disasters cause mass suffering or death. In these zones, the American forces will be involved in both the management of violence and management of peace, forcing it to “fight” wars in a different fashion.

Posen notes that political, physical, and technological facts will make the missions into these areas particularly difficult. First, local actors have stronger interests in a war’s stakes than the United States. Second, our adversaries will have a plentiful supply of males of fighting age. Third, they will have the “home court advantage.” Fourth, they have studied the way the U.S. military fights. Fifth, the weapons required for close combat are inexpensive and plentiful.⁸³ In addition, conflicts that involve more than battles between traditional armies will also require non-traditional expertise in areas like cultural awareness,⁸⁴ working with and training allied nations, interagency operations, and diplomacy. Major General Robert Scales goes as far as stating that the next World War will be the social scientists’ war, describing the wars to follow as “psycho-cultural wars” requiring officers with knowledge based on the discipline of social sciences.⁸⁵ These factors negate the traditional advantages of the American way of war built on technological and organizational expertise.

Operating Environment

What will the operating environment look like for our expeditionary forces in the contested zones? A survey of the literature suggests that U.S. forces will have to operate in an environment that is characterized by the following factors:

- *Highly Urban Environment/Megacities* - 60 percent of the global population is expected to live in cities by 2030.⁸⁶ Some of these cities will grow into megacities containing huge shantytowns. They may be characterized by a high crime rate, ineffective or corrupt police force, and high level of instability. Some megacities may collapse into chaos.⁸⁷
- *Extreme Environments* – These regions may become increasingly inhospitable due to human activities and climate change. There may be less access to basic resources needed for survival, like food and water. These conditions could often obligate U.S. forces to provide such resources to populations in countries in which it operates.
- *Communicable Disease* - They may also have high level of communicable disease, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, hepatitis, and tuberculosis.⁸⁸

- Endemic Hostility – There may be underlying hostility among the populace caused by transnational or inter-communal conflicts or virulent anti-American ideologies, such as militant Islam.⁸⁹
- Collapse of Functioning State –U.S. forces may have to operate in regions where the government has failed and local warlords use extreme violence to control populations.⁹⁰
- Non-military Partners –U.S. forces will have to understand how to work with other government agencies and elements of society to combat the adversary.⁹¹ The management of peace will undoubtedly be an interagency affair as the integration of the instruments of national power become increasingly crucial for success. The presence of media and internet coverage will also complicate missions. The military will need heightened awareness of legal implications and Rules of Engagement.⁹²
- Cheaper and Deadlier Weapons – Adversaries will continue to benefit from wide availability of weapons, and they will continue to modify what is cheaply available to cause maximum damage on U.S. forces.
- Weapons of Mass Destruction – Advances in and proliferation of technology may make use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons on U.S. forces a possibility.
- Greater Collaboration with Developing Country Militaries - Demographic decline and fiscal pressures will result in reduced military capabilities among developed-country allies. Future coalitions will increasingly rely on less well-trained and poorly-equipped developing country forces that may not share the U.S. professional military ethic.⁹³
- Media on the Battlefield - The media will likely cover the actions of the expeditionary force on the ground and communicate them in real time to a global audience.⁹⁴
- Humanitarian Disasters – Increasingly devastating natural disasters caused by climate change could continue to require more military humanitarian assistance.

Nature of the Threat

- Terrorists – Terrorists will continue to target U.S. interests abroad, seeking soft targets to send messages and inspire similar groups to action.
- Paramilitary Forces – These forces will be intermingled with the local population and could be allied with terrorist groups. The United States will face rebel groups, gangs, insurgents, and private military companies (PMCs).

- *Tribal Forces* – Armed tribal forces may especially be a challenge as they have the potential to switch from being adversaries to allies depending on American strategy and tactics and on shifting local political calculations.
- *Criminal Elements* – Weak governance will allow both transnational and local criminal elements to thrive. Drug cartels will continue to be an international presence and the most notorious criminal networks.⁹⁵
- *Traditional Militaries* – Although hostility with another state may be rare, increased competition for resources may cause state-to-state conflicts.

Maintaining the Command of the Commons

Posen describes the “commons” as those areas that no state owns but that provide access to much of the globe. It is analogous to the command of the seas, though Posen also includes command of the air and space.⁹⁶ The JOE includes the command of cyberspace as well. According to Posen, “command of the commons” means that the United States gets vastly more military use out of the commons than others, that the United States can generally deny use to others, and that others would lose access if they attempt to deny use to the United States. The command of the commons has been “the key military enabler” of America’s global position and has allowed the United States to better exploit other sources of power.⁹⁷

U.S. sea, air and space forces will lead in responding to these challenges to the command of commons. Though the command of the commons will most likely remain uncontested in the near and medium term, the rise of emerging powers could lead to competition over time. Posen notes that the sources of U.S. command include American economic resources and military exploitation of information technology.⁹⁸ As American economic power begins to decline relatively and as advanced technology becomes more diffused, other nations may exploit these factors to become viable contenders. Already, nations have launched missiles into space, started investing in blue water navies, and increased their cyber warfare capabilities.

Operating Environment

- *Increased Interest in Space* – Emerging powers will continue to expand their space programs. Advances in technologies will enable more nations to launch rockets and satellites.⁹⁹ The United States will be increasingly concerned about capability of nations to convert this technology into ICBMs as well as weapons threatening to U.S. space capabilities.
- *Nuclear Proliferation* – As more countries acquire nuclear weapons, American ability or proclivity to intervene in various areas of the commons (or contested areas) may decline due to the threat of nuclear retaliation.

- Missile Technology Proliferation – Missile technology proliferation may deny certain areas of the commons to the United States. Examples include sea lanes in the Straits of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Malacca.¹⁰⁰
- Connectivity Vulnerabilities – Increased automation and reliance on information technology leave the United States more vulnerable to cyber-attacks as adversaries use techniques such as worms, viruses, Trojan horses, botnets, or electromagnetic pulse (EMP).¹⁰¹

Nature of the Threat

- Emerging Powers -The rise of great powers will feature nations with increased conventional military capabilities like that of the United States. They will possess “information-enabled network” forces as well as naval forces with air and undersea capabilities.¹⁰² Nations may be able to challenge command of their regional sea lanes, as well as U.S. dominance in space and cyberspace.
- Terrorist or Criminal Elements – Non-state actors may be able to exploit IT technology to conduct Cyber-warfare.

Military Support to Homeland Defense

With globalization and advances in technology shrinking the world, the homeland of the United States will be more vulnerable. 9/11 was a watershed moment in America as national policymakers began reexamining existing defenses and the balance between security and liberty. Many fear that terrorist and other criminal elements will continue to exploit the openness of American civil society to attack our financial, energy, or governmental infrastructure. The increasing availability of weapons of nuclear destruction may result in an attack that dwarfs the physical and psychological damages of 2001.

Despite the lack of terrorist attacks in the United States since 2001, it is still unclear if security measures implemented so far have made America safer. Many doubt the effectiveness of our changes and criticize the behemoth Department of Homeland Defense and the restructuring that occurred with the creation of this agency. These concerns were heightened by FEMA’s performance during Hurricane Katrina. Additionally, some scholars doubt the wisdom of the creation of the Office of National Intelligence and the preservation of the FBI lead, as a law enforcement agency, on domestic intelligence.¹⁰³ Still others call for reform of Congressional committee jurisdictions and oversight capabilities. How the U.S. military will best support this interagency effort is still unclear. The military has been viewed simultaneously as the last and greatest safety net for devastating events as well as a possible threat to civil liberties when operating within the U.S. borders.

The demand for higher levels of security in the homeland leads to tension with many of the political and cultural traditions of America. Increased surveillance domestically

quickly conflicts with cherished civil liberties. Similarly, increased border protection affects immigration and even openness to foreign business travelers, both of which can have negative economic and cultural impacts. The vigorous, often partisan, debates in Washington on wiretapping, waterboarding, and immigration will likely continue well into the future.

Operating Environment

- *Weapons of Mass Destruction* – Proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical technology and material will leave the United States increasingly vulnerable to attacks with WMD.
- *Natural Disasters* - Hurricane Katrina may have been a sign of things to come, with the nation looking more to the military as the most effective institution for dealing with devastating natural disasters.
- *Economic Shocks* - Terrorist elements may target key financial nodes in the United States, such as the New York Stock Exchange, to attack the global financial system.
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- *Energy Crisis* – Shortages of supplies relative to increasing demand may leave the United States susceptible to energy shocks.
- *Refugee Flows* – Economic and environmental factors may increase both legal and illegal migration from mostly Latin America, but also from elsewhere.
- *Cyber-attacks* – Increased automation of our financial systems, physical infrastructure, and government operations renders the homeland more vulnerable to attacks on our information systems by both state and non-state actors.

Nature of the Threat

- *Non-State Actors* – Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups remain the biggest threat to U.S. homeland. Other Islamic terrorist groups may emerge that are not directly linked to Al Qaeda, but are inspired by similar same extremist ideology.
- *Home-grown Terrorists* – Elements of our society may become disposed to extremist Islamic ideology and independently plan attacks.
- *Criminal Elements* – Transnational criminals, including drug cartels, will continue to have a presence in the U.S.
- *State Actors* – Although state attacks on U.S. homeland will be rare, hostile states may use proxy forces to attack vulnerable sites using difficult-to-trace methods, such as cyber-attack. States could also potentially use economic measures, such as energy embargos or financial measures as holders of US debt, to damage the US economy.

Conclusion

The challenges of the next twenty years are immense and diverse. Some are immediate and others are long-term or systemic. In this context, the U.S. military must be sufficiently flexible and multi-talented to play the various roles the nation may ask of it. Operations in the contested zones will be extremely complex and multidimensional, and perhaps more frequent; the military will have to redefine the concept of war and the nature and utility of military forces. Great power politics will continue and may manifest itself in a challenge to American command of the commons. America may have to reexamine its hegemonic status and the role of U.S. forces in maintaining the international system. Threats to the U.S. homeland will continue and increase. The military will need to function effectively in the interagency process to aid in the defense of our homeland. Yet our military must do this in an era of likely declining military funding. Forward-thinking analysis of the impact of likely trends on these various military missions will prove essential to effectively and efficiently preparing for the challenges ahead.

¹Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* 28, no.1 (Summer 2003): 5-46. Posen divides the world into two areas: the "commons" and the "contested zones." The United States currently enjoys the command of the commons, which he defines as composed of air, sea, and space. The contested zones, on the other hand, are "enemy held territory." U.S. currently does not have dominance in these areas.

²National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global World* (Government Printing Office, 2004), 10.

³Ibid., 27.

⁴Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), *The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036* (2007), 3.

⁵West Point Mini-Conference, March 2008.

⁶National Intelligence Council, 10.

⁷European Union Institute of Security Studies (EUISS), *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* (EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 32.

⁸Ibid., 32.

⁹Ibid., 34.

¹⁰DCDC, 3.

¹¹Joint Chief of Staff.

¹²National Intelligence Council, 29.

¹³EUISS, 34.

¹⁴DCDC, 3.

¹⁵United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operating Environment (JOE): Trends and Challenges for the Future Joint Force Through 2030* (December 2007), 54.

¹⁶The Princeton Project on National Security (PPNS), *Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security In the 21st Century* (The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2006), 51.

¹⁷Ibid., 50-51.

¹⁸EUISS, 15.

¹⁹EUISS, 19, 20.

²⁰Ibid, 20, 21

²¹UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division, "Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?," 21.

²²Ibid, 53.

²³EUISS, 20.

²⁴Ibid., 20.

²⁵The United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision*.

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- ²⁶ EUISS, 15.
- ²⁷ United States Joint Forces Command, (*JOE*), 10.
- ²⁸ EUISS, 22.
- ²⁹ “Young, alive but not very heaven.” *The Economist*, February 2-8, 2008. 54.
- ³⁰ United States Joint Forces Command, (*JOE*), 10.
- ³¹ Barney Cohen, “Urbanization in developing countries: Current trends, future projections, and key challenges for sustainability.” *Technology in Society* 28 (2006), 68.
- ³² EUISS, 17 .
- ³³ UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division. *International Migration Report 2002* (New York , 2002).
- ³⁴ DCDC, 10.
- ³⁵ National Intelligence Council, 79.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.
- ³⁷ PPNS, 47.
- ³⁸ National Intelligence Council, 9.
- ³⁹ PPNS, 46.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 48.
- ⁴¹ DCDC, 45.
- ⁴² DCDC, 38, National Intelligence Council, 51.
- ⁴³ National Intelligence Council, 57.
- ⁴⁴ West Point Mini-Conference, March 2008.
- ⁴⁵ DCDC, 2.
- ⁴⁶ PPNS, 53.
- ⁴⁷ United States Joint Forces Command, (*JOE*).
- ⁴⁸ International Energy Agency: *World Energy Outlook 2005*.
- ⁴⁹ United States Joint Forces Command, (*JOE*), 30.
- ⁵⁰ EUISS, 54.
- ⁵¹ PPNS, 53.
- ⁵² Isaiah Wilson, “The Arc of Instability and Energy Predation.”
- ⁵³ DCDC, 8.
- ⁵⁴ EUISS, 78.
- ⁵⁵ DCDC, 8.
- ⁵⁶ United States Joint Forces Command, (*JOE*), 25; DCDC, 78.
- ⁵⁷ Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Europe’s Appetite for Seafood Propels Illegal Trade,” *New York Times*, January 15, 2008.
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- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 36.
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- ⁸³ Posen, 24.
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- ⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 59.
- ⁹² DCDC, 72.
- ⁹³ West Point Mini-Conference, March 2008.
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The Army's Professional Military Ethic (PME)

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*The purpose of any profession is to serve society by effectively delivering a necessary and useful specialized service. To fulfill those societal needs, professions—such as medicine, law, the clergy, and the military—develop and maintain distinct bodies of specialized knowledge and impart expertise through formal, theoretical, and practical education. Each profession establishes a unique subculture that distinguishes practitioners from the society they serve while supporting and enhancing that society. **Professions create their own standards of performance and codes of ethics to maintain their effectiveness.** To that end they develop particular vocabularies, establish journals, and sometimes adopt distinct forms of dress. In exchange to holding their members to high technical and ethical standards, society grants professionals a great deal of autonomy. (bold added by authors)*

Field Manual 1, 14 June 2005, paragraph 1-40

“Leadership is a potent combination of strategy and character. If you must be without one, be without the strategy.”

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

Introduction

The epigraphs above frame very well this descriptive essay on the Army's Professional Military Ethic (PME). At least four aspects of the PME—each within the focus of this essay—are clearly noted in them.

First, we should note from Field Manual (FM) 1, the Army's capstone doctrinal manual, the purpose of the ethic. It is “to maintain [the Army's] effectiveness.” The implication is as clear as it is true—without such an ethic the Army cannot be effective at what it does. As is well documented in the literature of professions, their ethics provide the primary means of social direction and control over their members as they perform their expert duties, often under chaotic conditions.¹ For the Army profession, its evolving expert knowledge in the “moral-ethical” domain is what enables the profession to develop individual professionals—Soldiers and their leaders—to fight battles and campaigns “effectively and rightly,” as expected by the client the profession serves.² Without such “good, right and just” application of their expertise, the Army will lose its lifeblood—the trust of the American people!

Second, we must note that the PME is uniquely the ethic of a profession, the Army Profession, which produces sustained land power for use under Joint Command, one of three military professions currently serving the Republic.³ Thus, it is not the ethic of a bureaucracy or of a business, though the Army has aspects of bureaucracy within it.

This highlights one of, if not the, major challenge currently facing the strategic leaders of the profession, the Colonels and General Officers: how to lead the Army in such a manner that its culture, ethic, and behavior is that of a profession, even though it is organized in many aspects as a hierarchical bureaucracy. The most insightful conclusion drawn from over four years of study of the Army as profession (2000-2004) rings as true today in the latter stages of the Iraq deployments as it did when published initially in 2002.⁴ It is the lament of middle grade Soldiers and their leaders when their strategic leaders do not conform the Army and its subcultures into the behavior of a profession—“How can I be a professional, if there is no profession?”⁵

Reflecting on this lament, we should all be reminded of what at least one articulation of the PME currently states, “I am an expert and I am a professional,” (the ninth statement of The Soldier’s Creed). But how can they be “an expert and a professional” if there is no profession; rather, just a bureaucracy? Clearly, then, the maintenance of the profession’s ethic is one of the most precious and vital privileges of those who are the stewards of the Army on behalf of the Republic.

Thirdly, FM 1 makes clear that the ethic is about culture—it is integral to it. The PME is the core of moral principles, values and beliefs within the center of the culture “that distinguishes practitioners from the society they serve while supporting and enhancing that society.” But Army culture is a topic little understood and even less studied by the Army.⁶ So we will treat it in some detail in this essay, both to inform about its basic character and to open a professional discussion as to its dysfunction as well as, in the case of the PME, its absolutely vital aspects.

And fourth, the comment by General Schwarzkopf reminds us succinctly that the PME is ultimately about individual character as manifested in the decisions and actions of all who are considered leaders within the profession, be they commissioned, non-commissioned, or civilian. Unless the profession’s ethic is manifested integrally in the personal lives and official actions of its leaders, and through them its Soldiers, the Army is simply not a profession at all, and its effectiveness as even a bureaucracy will be greatly impaired.

The purpose of this essay, then, is to provide a framework with which scholars and practitioners can discuss the various aspects of the Army’s PME. Such discussion is especially challenging because we lack common models and language for communication. Current Army doctrine and scholarly research do not provide a construct to examine the PME, nor do they analyze how the PME changes with cultural shifts, evolving wars, or other external shocks. When professionals discuss their PME, for example, are they analyzing the ethic of the profession or that of the individual professional; is the ethic they are discussing defined in legal or moral terms, etc. To preclude such “talking past each other,” this essay offers a proposal for the missing constructs and language with which we can more carefully examine the Army’s Professional Military Ethic.

This paper is structured in four sections. The first section places the Army's PME in its macro context, which is the profession's culture. It examines the three major, long-term influences on that culture and its core ethos, and thus how it evolves over time. It is our contention that in this era of persistent conflict, we are witnessing changes within these three influences that are impacting the Army's PME. In order to analyze these influences we introduce in the second section a more disaggregated framework, one in which we propose that the PME can be divided first by its legal and moral components, then by application at the institution and the individual level. Given a two by two matrix of components, this provides four "quadrants" within which to discuss different sources of the PME: legal-institutional, moral-institutional, legal-individual, moral-individual. In the third section, turning from description to analysis; we examine whether recent doctrinal adaptations by the Army (FM 3-0, 3-24, and 6-22, etc.) indicate actual evolution in the profession's ethos. Then in the fourth and concluding section, we present what we believe to be the most significant developmental challenge facing the Army profession – the moral development of Army Leaders, moving them from "values to virtues" in order that Army professionals can match consistently their renowned military-technical competencies with the high quality of their moral character. In this section, we conclude with a set of specific issues which we believe conferees should discuss.

I. The Army's Professional Culture and Its Ethos, a Macro View⁷

For the purposes of this discussion, the most useful starting point is the broad definition for any organizational culture offered by Edgar Schein:

We must first specify that a given set of people has had enough stability and common history to have allowed a culture to form. This means that some organizations will have no overarching culture because they have no common history or have frequent turnover of members. Other organizations can be presumed to have strong cultures because of a long shared history or because they have shared important intense experiences (as in a combat unit). But the content and strength of a culture have to be empirically determined. They cannot be presumed from observing surface cultural phenomena. Culture is what a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration. Such learning is simultaneously a behavioral, cognitive, and an emotional process. . . .

Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore, (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, or feel in relation to these problems.⁸

Schein's classic definition accords with the implications drawn from FM-1 in the introduction of this essay. Military culture is the deep structure of organization that is drawn from the Army's past successes and from its current interactions with the present environment. It is rooted in the prevailing assumptions, values, and traditions which collectively, over time, have created shared individual expectations among the members of the Army profession. Meaning is established through socialization to a variety of identity groups (e.g., Army branches and components, etc.) that converge in the operations of the organization. Professional culture includes both attitudes and behavior about what is right, what is good, and what is important, often manifested in shared heroes, stories, and rituals that promote bonding among the members. It is, in short, the "glue" that makes the profession a distinctive source of identity and experience that, in turn, informs the character of its individual members. Thus, a strong culture exists when a clear set of norms and expectations -- usually as a function of leadership -- permeates the entire organization. It is essentially "how we do things around here."⁹

Closely associated with an organization's culture is its climate. In contrast to culture, organizational climate refers to environmental stimuli rooted in the organization's value system, such as rewards and punishments, communications flow, and operations tempo, which determine individual and team perceptions about the quality of working conditions. It is essentially "how we feel about this organization."¹⁰ Climate is often considered to be alterable in the near term and largely limited to those aspects of the organizational environment of which members are aware.

Climate and culture are obviously related in complex ways, climate being an observable and measurable artifact of culture, and considered by many to be one of the major determinants of organizational effectiveness. For the purposes of this essay, such definitions would seem to establish from the outset that those who seek to understand the Army's PME, must look deeply within its culture.

Influences on the Culture and Ethic



Figure 1 – *Influences on Army Culture and Ethos.*

Figure 1 depicts the three major categories of influences on the Army's professional culture: (1) the functional imperatives of the profession, 2) America's culture, values, beliefs, and norms, and 3) international laws and treaties of which the United States are a party. It is our contention that operating in the era of persistent conflict has and will continue to bring about changes in all three of these influences on the Army's culture and ethos.

In this new era we are witnessing globalization, wide-spread environmental changes, the rise of non-state actors, and the regionalization of persistent conflict – all trends that have already profoundly impacted America's security posture and strategy to confront evolving threats. The U.S. Army, for its part, will most likely continue in expeditionary type missions to extremely hostile and unstable environments. It will likely operate "among the peoples" in areas where government is either weak or failed and where non-state adversaries have access to increasingly destructive weapons, and asymmetric advantages such as language and cultural awareness. Operating in such an environment has already placed new demands on the Army and its ethic, and we anticipate that such will continue for the foreseeable future.

For example, the functional imperatives that inform the profession's PME are already changing. Whereas "we don't do nation-building, we only do BIG wars" was documented a decade ago as a long standing cultural norm¹¹, the Army has recently sought aggressively to re-master the competencies of counterinsurgency and nation-building. Such is reflected in the equal footing now given to stability operations in the Army's new FM 3-0.

Second, our national culture, values, beliefs, and norms are evolving, partially due to 9/11, but also due to generational change within our increasingly immigrated population. The tolerance for security over civil liberties, for example, is greater now than a decade ago. Though debate continues, suspension of habeas corpus for enemy combatants, increases in government surveillance, and use of military tribunals is at least tolerated. Lastly, prevailing views of international laws and treaties are evolving. The use of harsh interrogation techniques and status of enemy combatants given to those we capture are departures from the norms followed throughout the pre-9/11 era.

Understanding how these changes in operating environment, type of warfare, and nature of the threats will affect the Army's PME is a daunting undertaking, one well beyond the scope of this brief review essay. It is, however, an essential task to be tackled before the Army can determine how best to develop moral leaders capable of dealing with the ethical challenges imposed by this new era of persistent conflict.

One question that this macro framework does raise for conferees is: what is the boundary between the Army's culture and its ethos? In other words, just what aspects of Army culture are truly ethos that is so revered for its positive influence on mission effectiveness that it must be documented and passed on to future generations of leaders? Clearly "taking care of your soldiers and their families" is ethos; but what else qualifies? This

would appear to be a major area for urgent research in any effort to explicate the Army’s PME.

We believe one way to get at this question, and others, is a more disaggregated framework that begins to examine the different elements within the Army’s PME. The following section is an introduction of such a framework.

II. A Framework for Dialogue on the Army’s PME

Here we present a common framework and language for the study of Army’s system of ethics. We submit that the Army’s professional military ethic is a shared system of beliefs and norms, both legal (codified) and moral (non-legal), which define the Army’s commitment to serve the nation. There are multiple sources for the Army’s PME, derived from documents as diverse as our founding Constitution, the Just War traditions, oaths of office, the Army’s Seven Values, and the NCO Creed. The beliefs and norms of behavior stemming from these documents guide the performance of our service as a profession as well as the performance of individual professionals.

A Framework of the Army’s PME




Figure 2 – Framework of the Army PME

This framework first makes delineation between legal and moral foundations. The legal foundation is codified, and stems from various legal documents starting with the Constitution. The moral foundation has no legal basis, but has been learned over time as providing for mission success and for fulfilling service within a “social trustee” profession.”¹² In one sense the separation of the PME into these components reflects the importance of the profession and its leaders adhering to the higher Western ethic of not only avoiding evil (as defined by the law), but also of doing good (as defined in terms of

interpersonal relations by which humans can flourish [one definition of what is moral]). In the murky environment of persistent conflict, what is legal may not necessarily be moral, and our leaders may, on occasion, have to rely on moral guidelines to conduct good and right actions.

Second, the PME can be further divided into values and norms that guide the performance of the collective Army as institution versus those that are more clearly directed at the decisions and actions of the individual professional. These divisions produce four different quadrants we can use to analyze the Army's PME: the legal-institutional, moral-institutional, legal-individual, and the moral-individual.

Quadrant 1 is the legal–institutional, the legal and codified foundation of our ethic that guides the behavior of the Army as a Profession. Without doubt, the primary source of this component of our ethic is the U.S. Constitution, which institutionalizes the aptly described “invitation to struggle” among the branches of our government.¹³ The legal placement of the military under the equal purview of both Congress and the President is a basic feature of American civil-military relations and, as noted in the previous section, strongly influences the norms that the Army has adopted for participation in such relationships, particularly by senior officers. As noted in the figure, other legal codes that the military ethos is influenced by include the various treaties to which the United States is a party, Status of Forces Agreements, and the evolving Law of Land Warfare.

There exists in this quadrant also those legal-institutional ethics that apply only to the Army. The section of Title 10, U.S. Code that applies directly to the Army, for example, stipulates that the Army be “organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.” The code states that the Army is primarily “responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war.” The emphasis on sustained land combat and prosecution of war has over the years influenced Army culture towards large, conventional, army-on-army conflicts.

Quadrant 2 is the moral-institutional component, the moral, non legal foundation that is applied to the Army as a Profession. Sources of the moral-institutional ethic include the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the Just War traditions, to mention just two. One example of this type of component of our ethic is the traditional Army cultural preference to fight the “Big War.” Another is the understanding that the real lifeblood of the Army is its relationship of trust held by the American people and their leaders. A third example is the Army's “can-do” attitude. While a positive cultural norm that has enabled the Army to prevail repeatedly over adversity, the “can-do” attitude, when applied at other times with overbearing micro-management, has adversely affected the effectiveness of the profession.

We also suggest that within this quadrant lie the subcultures and sub-ethics of different portions of the Army. The Army has accepted these subcultures both of branches and components as necessary for the conduct of the unique missions that the various sub-elements of the Army must perform for the effective combined arms battle. The culture

of the U.S. Cavalry is a case in point. With its own initiation rights performed during the spur ride, own regalia in the form of Stetsons and spurs, and unique mindset and attitude built around dash, daring, and decisive action, the U.S. Cavalry has carved out a unique niche within the profession. However, whether such a subculture, or those of other branches and components, meshes with the mindset advocated for stability operations as described in FM 3.0 is an unresearched question.

Quadrant 3 is the legal-individual component, the foundations that apply to the Soldier as a professional. Legal documents that form the foundation within the quadrant include the officer's oath of commission, the Standards of Exemplary Conduct, the UCMJ, and ROE. A more recent item is The Soldier's Rules, (below, from AR 350-1 and FM 3-0) which distills the Law of Land Warfare to the ethical and lawful conduct required of each soldier. Such guidelines have been useful to help prevent soldiers from "doing evil." Recently, however, as we will discuss in the next section, soldiers have found it more difficult to apply such seemingly straightforward guidelines.¹⁴

Table 1-4. The Soldier's Rules

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Soldiers fight only enemy combatants.• Soldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them over to their superior.• Soldiers do not kill or torture enemy prisoners of war.• Soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.• Soldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.• Soldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.• Soldiers treat civilians humanely.• Soldiers do not steal. Soldiers respect private property and possessions.• Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.• Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superior.
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Lastly, Quadrant 4 is the moral-individual component, the non legal foundations that apply to the Soldier individually as a human being and as a professional. Such may include the universal understandings of human rights and widely accepted norms for moral human behavior (the Golden Rule, for example). Though at times more amorphous and difficult to analyze, the various creeds and mottos that make up this component—West Point's "Duty, Honor, Country," the NCO's Creed, and the Seven Army Values—are potentially the most inspirational and the most powerful motivators of individual action. The short declarations of the Warrior's Ethos – "I will always place the mission first; I will never accept defeat; I will never quit; I will never leave a fallen comrade" – have been courageously exemplified by countless heroes such as Master Sergeant Gordan and Sergeant First Class Shugart.

These four quadrants are by no means mutually exclusive. These components of the ethic are deeply integrated and changes in one quadrant directly influence the other quadrants as well. As the operating environment continues to increase in complexity, however, it seems to us that the foundations within Quadrants 2 and Quadrant 4 offer the best opportunity for analysis and renewal by the Army. Fortunately, they are also the foundations over which the Army, under its professional autonomy, has the most control.

Admittedly, there has been a reluctance in the past to articulate sharply these moral foundations of the Army's ethic. One reason is the fear that precise articulation of such a moral ethic, particularly for officers, may lead to moral minimalism that seeks more to "avoid evil" than to "do good." A second reason is the recognition that these are not neatly separable things and that efforts to provide too precise a formulation risk inducing legalistic behavior due to overly burdensome rules.¹⁵ A third reason may have to do with the continued disagreement in our society and armed forces on the use and utility of force in the contemporary operating environment.

Whatever the case, the question becomes whether we now need a more precise re-articulation of the Army ethic to better influence the moral behavior and development of individual professionals in the future. In reflecting on the recent moral failings of Army leaders, did they not follow the Army's PME simply because they did not know what it was, or because they were, individually, insufficiently dedicated to follow it? Do we need further articulation of moral-individual ethics to include additional mottos and creeds to guide individual action -- an Officer's Creed, for example? Or is the more important question how and how well Army professionals inculcate even the current PME?

III. Does the recent evolution in Army Doctrine indicate an evolving ethos?

In this section we seek to benchmark the evolution, if any, in the Army's ethic. One way to do so is to look at how the Army speaks to itself about its ethic. For example, the 2001 version of FM 3-0 (Operations) contains one usage of *ethic* in any derivation: "All Army leaders must demonstrate strong character and high ethical standards."¹⁶ Contrast that with the 2008 version which contains six usages, although all within two paragraphs.¹⁷ While the numerical difference is small, the substantive difference is larger. The 2008 version goes well beyond the simple expectation in the earlier version to helpfully explain why ethics are necessary to mission success and to provide The Soldier's Rules that describe how ethical Soldiers and their Leaders behave (printed in full in the previous section of this essay).

The Army has also progressed in emphasizing in an ethical sense the necessity for leaders to be more culturally aware. The 2001 version of FM 3-0 discusses the importance of culture, but only in the context of the Army understanding the culture of allies in unified operations, and such is only mentioned in a few short paragraphs. The 2008 version addresses culture quite differently. In the very first paragraph of the very first chapter, the new doctrine verbalizes the need to understand the complete operational environment: "While they [conditions, circumstances, influences of the operational environment] include all enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems across the spectrum of conflict, they also include an understanding of the physical environment, the state of governance, technology, local resources, and *the culture of the local population*."¹⁸ The remainder of the 2008 version repeats the need to understand local culture as a variable significant to mission success, clearly an ethical implication.

A review of new COIN doctrine (FM 3-24) by a colleague provides similar insights.

As noted earlier, the Army's new capstone doctrine (FM 3.0) describes this new era of "persistent conflict" wherein our military professionals must apply their skills and talents in environments that are "complex, multidimensional, and increasingly fought 'among the people.'"¹⁹ But, if this era's complexity has multiplied the variables that our young leaders must consider while planning missions, so too has it complicated the ethical environment in mission execution. For example, FM 3-24 now espouses two separate "ethics of force"—most force permissible and least force possible. While adding the later distinction greatly increases the Army's ethical "tool kit" and makes it a more adaptable institution, it demands increased discretionary judgment on the part of Army leaders at the point of force application. As our colleague²⁰ recently noted:

The ethics of war and nation-building "among the people" is much more complex than the ethics of performing consolidation and reorganization on a desert objective after a tank battle. The majority of our fine young leaders have adapted well—local populations often bequeath the title of "mayor" onto these talented noncommissioned officers, lieutenants, and captains. Such agility today in Army leaders is, by doctrine, a military obligation: "Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors."²¹

Nonetheless, release in May 2007 of a Military Health Advisory Team (MHAT-IV) survey of fewer than 2,000 Soldiers and Marines who had served in units with "the highest level of combat exposure" in Iraq found that: "approximately 10 percent of soldiers and Marines report mistreating non-combatants or damaging property when it was not necessary. Only 47 percent of the soldiers and 38 percent of Marines agreed that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect. Well over a third of all soldiers and Marines reported that torture should be allowed to save the life of a fellow soldier or Marine. And less than half of soldiers or Marines would report a team member for unethical behavior."²²

Although Army doctrine (FM 3-24) specifies an embedded ethic that "preserving noncombatant lives and dignity is central to mission accomplishment" in counterinsurgency,²³ the survey reported *that between one-third and one-half of Soldiers and Marines who answered the survey dismissed the importance or truth of non-combatants' dignity and respect* (italics added by author).

There are two ways to understand the Army's newly embedded ethic that "preserving noncombatant lives and dignity is central to mission accomplishment." In one sense, this norm of counterinsurgency is utilitarian; i.e., we ought to preserve lives and dignity because "it pays" or "it is in our interest" or "it conduces to mission success." The other way is to view this morality as one of ends rather than means, i.e., that it requires that the soldiers' estimate of the dignity of *the other* during deployments be equal to that dignity possessed individually by the Army warrior's own friends and loved ones back home. Put otherwise, according to our colleague, the American warrior must come to accept no

difference in moral worth between the older taxi driver who lives in the village where he patrols and the warrior's own father back home.

This raises the obvious question for conferees of how the Army should address the moral development of warriors who must now have a sufficiently integrated world-view and strength of personal character as to be able to consistently abide by and enforce this newly embedded ethic.

Turning to FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, the challenge is accurately stated: how to develop leaders that “demonstrate strong character and high ethical standards.” The Army recognizes that “new challenges facing leaders, the Army, and the Nation mandate adjustments in how the Army educates, trains, and develops its military and civilian leadership.” However, FM 6-22 provides little guidance about how such “mandated adjustments” are to occur.²⁴ Again, FM 6-22 is very clear on what leaders are, but does not consider well how to develop them:

“Character, a person’s moral and ethical qualities, helps determine what is right and gives a leader motivation to do what is appropriate, regardless of the circumstances or the consequences. An informed ethical conscience consistent with the Army Values strengthens leaders to make the right choices when faced with tough issues. *Since Army leaders seek to do what is right and inspire others to do the same, they must embody these values.*”²⁵ (italics added by authors)

In fact, current Army doctrine leaves character development to the individual and specifies no role at all for the institution, save its leaders:

“Becoming a person of character and a leader of character is a career-long process involving day-to-day experience, education, self-development, developmental counseling, coaching, and mentoring. While **individuals are responsible for their own character development**, leaders are responsible for encouraging, supporting, and assessing the efforts of their people.”²⁶ (bold added by authors)

Thus, in our view, unlike the evolving training programs stemming from the requirements for cultural awareness within FM 3-0, the Army takes a “hands-off” approach to the moral development of its Soldiers and their leaders. Is this good enough, or does the Army have an institutional need and responsibility to take a more active role in the character development of its Soldiers and their leaders?

IV. Conclusion: The Army’s Challenge – Enabling institutional values (PME) to inform and motivate individual virtues (the Moral Character of the Exemplary Leaders)

This conference is designed to facilitate discussion on the effects that the new era of persistent conflict will have on the Army’s PME and, thus, on its efforts to develop its

Soldiers and their leaders. In essence the Army has initiated the process of re-thinking and re-documenting the profession's "moral-ethical" expert knowledge, one of its four domains of abstract expert knowledge and the one that, clearly, is the least well defined to date.²⁷ In fact, the Army does not have a capstone "moral- ethical" manual, or anything close to it.

We should also note that at the level of scholarship much has been researched and written on this new era and its ethical complexities,²⁸ but that is knowledge of an abstract and diffuse nature.²⁹ All professions, including the Army, have to create their own expert knowledge, in the process selecting from research and scholarship and then refining it by the experience of expert practice to arrive at published "doctrine."

To assist in that process we offer for conferees the following five conclusions to focus their reflection and subsequent discussions and to assist the Army in the development of the needed doctrine.

1. The influences on the Army's PME created by this new era of persistent conflict are largely unexplored and unanalyzed. This has been for some time essentially an un-researched field, yet one resting squarely within the "moral-ethical" domain of expert knowledge of the Army profession, an internal jurisdiction for which the Army alone is responsible. With the sole exception of the recently completed *Study of the Human Dimension of Full Spectrum Operations* (TRADOC, 2008), this has been particularly true of research on the moral, vice legal, components of the PME. Even the Army's Federally Funded Research Center, RAND Arroyo, was apparently directed to skip any analysis of the moral aspects of Army leadership when studying the future leader competencies needed for full spectrum operations.³⁰ It is clear to us that continued reliance on the legal and codified portions of the PME can only take the Army so far in the development of its leaders (aka maintenance of its effectiveness). More important in the new era will be the moral development of individual leaders to better deal with the increasing complexity of the situations of land combat "amongst the people" coupled with the reduced clarity of effects and outcomes of leader/unit actions.
2. The legal components of the Army's PME evolve by a process that is more pluralistic and external to the profession than do the moral components which reside more exclusively within the Army's jurisdictional control. In other words, the Army can make a lot more progress, and do so faster, if it focuses on the moral components of its PME and their development into Army Soldiers and their leaders. Examples of the former include the recent changes in the legal codification of rules for incarceration and interrogation of enemy combatants. For the latter, the moral components of the PME [determining, beyond what is legal, what the Army believes to be "right," the right half of Figure 1] can be changed by the strategic leaders of the Army profession without significant external interference, so long as the Army is viewed by the public and its civilian leaders as a profession and not just a government bureaucracy. Currently, the Army has immense latitude and autonomy to effect such changes.

3. As we discussed in Section I, the macro view of the PME, the Army must remain grounded on values that are fully supported by the American people and which, in turn, support an effective military profession – the Army must be a values-based institution. But it is not clear that the Army currently espouses the right set of values that are sufficiently justified for deep legitimacy,³¹ particularly among formative junior professionals (for just one example, the absence of candor as a value, which they rightfully expect to be manifested in the virtue of “speaking truth to power” by all ranks). Nor, more importantly, is it clear that “values clarification” is the most effective methodology for the profession to create an ethical culture and to develop morally its soldiers and their leaders. As is noted in the literature of moral education in high schools and beyond, values clarification “has largely disappeared from the scene, in part due to generally ineffective scientific evidence.”³² If this is true, then why is the Army still using this approach? What are the alternatives and how carefully has the Army recently investigate them?

Further, beyond the set of values and methodology the Army currently uses is the question at a deeper level of what school(s) of philosophy underlie the Army’s PME and the pedagogy by which it will be taught, inculcated, and practiced. Is the Army’s PME really best thought of as “a set of deontic constraints applied to the fundamentally utilitarian imperative of “mission accomplishment?”³³ What mixture of principle-based, utilitarian, and virtue ethics is to be taught to Army leaders in preparation for ethical decision-making? Is this foundation influenced in any way by the existence of the new “era of persistent conflict?” This is, perhaps, just a worthwhile restatement of the first conclusion—much research is to be done, and urgently so!

4. As has been noted many times in the past decade, both in internal Army studies and in external reviews, the Army does not have a single, consistent model of holistic human development to use across its formations and schoolhouses.³⁴ As depicted in Figure 3 below, the “values to virtues transition” is a vast gap, for which there are, to be sure, isolated programs (e.g., leader mentorship as prescribed by FM 6-22). But there is no overall model of human development, and particularly of individual character, or the moral component. Thus, in particular, the Army cannot have internally a well-informed conversation on how Soldiers and their leaders inculcate the profession’s ethic and develop over time as leaders who are moral exemplars. This void in understanding the critical “values to virtues” developmental phenomena must be corrected very early in any institutional effort to focus on the PME.

In addition to a lack of a model, and at a lower level of analysis, the Army lacks an effectively communicable vision of a moral exemplar in uniform. This is a second void in its vital effort to “move” Soldiers from just an intellectual agreement on a set of values to a personal lifestyle and leader decisions and actions that “walk the talk.” Currently the Army relies on such statements as “living out the Army’s Seven Values in one’s life,” and offers in doctrinal manuals vignettes of physically courageous soldiers, etc. While helpful to a degree, such an approach does not provide a specific moral identity around which Soldiers and their leaders can develop

themselves as they do under the physical and military-technical identity of “Warrior.” Accession level leader development institutions (USMA, ROTC, etc.) historically have used the identity of a “leader of character,” which does move the discussion forward to what moral “character” is, to its role in human decision-making and actions, and on to how those capacities are developed. This has allowed some consideration of newer paradigms of moral development such as self-awareness or human spirituality.³⁵ But the larger Army profession has no such vision of a developmental end-state, the personal moral identity of an exemplary Army soldier.




Figure 3 – The Exemplary Leader

5. Lastly, discussion and analyses of the Army’s PME and its effective implementation is fraught with boundary issues of a type that often go unnoticed. The most basic boundary issue centers on the question of “PME for whom?” If it is to be a “professional” ethic, then the boundary is established by who is certified as an “Army professional.” But the Army has not answered that question. Is it, then, to be one ethic for all - soldiers, civilians, contractors, families...? Or, is the Army to have ethics by oath, (those commissioned), by rank (e.g., the NCO Creed), by component (e.g., the Civilian Creed), or by branch (e.g., the “Cav” culture), etc. Obviously, the codified portions of the PME can be of more assistance here, specifying as they do, the specific applicability of each law. But the larger problem of boundaries for the application of the moral components of the PME remains and must be addressed forthrightly in any effort to evolve and more deeply instill the PME.

Perhaps reflection on these ideas and potential conclusions will assist conferees to help the Army rethink its PME, its implementation as a means of social direction and control, and, thus, the profession’s future effectiveness. Army leaders and their Soldiers will

continue to conduct operations “amongst the people,” practicing the profession’s art by the repetitive use of their discretionary judgment to decide and to act and to lead others to follow. Is the Army preparing them as well as it can to manifest the Army’s PME while doing so?

¹ For the role of a system of ethics in the performance of military professions, see Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap Press, 1957); and Andrew Abbott, “The Army and the Theory of Professions,” chapter 24 in Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (eds.), *The Future of the Army Profession* (McGraw Hill, 2002): 523-536.

² The four domains of expert knowledge of military professions are: (1) the military-technical - how to conduct military operations; (2) the moral-ethical - how to conduct military operations rightly as the client expects; (3) the political-cultural – how to operate in non-military environments; and (4) the domain of human development – how to develop individuals professionals capable to practice with the other three fields of abstract knowledge. See, “The Army as Profession,” chapter 1 in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2d Edition (2005): 3-38.

³ The other two are the maritime profession and the aerospace profession, entities roughly conterminous with the Departments of Navy and Air Force. There is also being observed now the emergence of a fourth military profession, the Joint Military Profession. See, Don M. Snider and Jeffrey D. Peterson, “Defense Transformation and the Emergence of a new Joint Military Profession” chapter 10 in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2d Edition (2005): 237-250.

⁴ See, Gayle L. Watkins and Randi C Cohen, “In their Own Words: Army Officers Discuss Their Profession,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 1st Edition (2002): 77-100.

⁵ Mark Lewis’s article in *Armed Forces and Society* on exodus of the Captains...

⁶ For a new effort, see, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7, *The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full Spectrum Operations 2015-2024* (coordinating draft 18 April 2008).

⁷ Portions of this section appeared earlier in, Don M. Snider, “The Uninformed Debate on Military Culture,” (*ORBIS*, Vol. 43, No 1. Winter 1999): 11-26.

⁸ Edgar H. Schein, “Organizational Culture,” *American Psychologist* 45, No.2 (February 1990): 109-119.

⁹ See, Walter F. Ulmer, Joseph J. Collins, and T.O. Jacobs, “Introduction” to *American Military Culture in the 21st Century* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000: 3-4.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ See RAND study (draft) (pub data)

¹² “Social trustee” professions are those who, on a trust basis, provide for the client (society) what which they can not provide for themselves. The American people trust the Army to provide security to an otherwise defenseless nation. In fact, they trust it so much that they send their sons and daughters for service within it.

¹³ See chapters 2-4 of Anthony E. Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making* (University Press of Kansas, 1989).

¹⁴ Cite 2007 MHAT-IV Study

¹⁵ This is also argument for an ethos that emphasizes the role of individual character—good people instantiating the right traits to deal with the ambiguities and uncertainties of applying rules.

¹⁶ FM 3-0 (Operations), Department of the Army, 14 June 2001, paragraph 4-18.

¹⁷ FM 3-0 (Operations), Department of the Army, 27 February 2008, paragraphs 1-86 and 1-87.

¹⁸ FM 3-0, 2008, para 1-1.

¹⁹ *FM 3-0, Operations*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2008, Foreword.

²⁰ Major Celistino Perez, Ph.D., former Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, USMA, currently serving in Iraq, unpublished manuscript, “The Warrior Morality Embedded in *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, undated.

²¹ *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, Foreword.

²² Gale Pollock, DoD News Briefing with Assistant Secretary Casscells from the Pentagon, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense (Public Affairs) News Transcript, May 4, 2007. Accessed online on 8 July 2008 at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3958>.

²³ *FM 3-24*, paragraph 7-25.

²⁴ FM 6-22, para 1-6.

²⁵ FM 6-22, para 4-1.

²⁶ FM 6-22 para 4-55

²⁷ Each of the other three domains of the Army profession's expert knowledge has recently received newly published doctrine: the "military-technical" domain has a new FM 3-0 *Operations*; the "political cultural" domain as the new FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*; and, the domain of "human development" has a new FM 6-22 *Leadership*.

²⁸ See for just one example, Tony Pfaff, "Military Ethics in Complex Contingencies," in Snider and Matthews (eds.), *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2d Edition (McGraw-Hill, 2005): 409-429.

²⁹ See Christopher R. Paparone and George Reed, "The Reflective Military Practitioner and How Military Professionals Think in Action," (pub data)

³⁰ See, Henry A. Leonard, et.al., *Something Old, Something New* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006).

³¹ For a critique of the core values approach, see: Charles A. Pfaff "Core Values: The Problems of Justification and Motivation," paper presented at the (year) JSCOPS Conference, available at (cite web site).

³² See, Marvin W. Berkowitz, "The Science of Character Education," in William Damon (ed.), *Bringing in a New Era of Character Education*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2002): 56.

³³ Charles Pfaff, "Teaching Military Ethics," (pub data)

³⁴ For the history of this study, see Joe LeBoeuf, "The Army Training and Leader Development Panel," chapter 22 in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 1st Edition (2002): 487-504.

³⁵ For a newly developed model of the role of human spirituality in the development of character, see Patrick J. Sweeney, Sean T. Hannah and Don M. Snider, "The Domain of the Human Spirit," chapter 2 in Snider and Matthews (eds.), *Forging the Warrior's Character...* (OR: Jerico, LLC, 2007): 55-1000.

Building Moral Resources in Leaders for an Era of Persistent Conflict and Beyond

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In the multidimensional, highly complex, and morally ambiguous realm of combat, and counter insurgency operations (COIN) in particular; soldiers and leaders must be tactically and technically proficient, knowledgeable of leadership skills, and able to use these abilities. More importantly however, they must be imbued with strong character to use these abilities to positively and ethically influence their followers and organizations and execute the ethical conduct of war. After their first reenlistment—and often before—every soldier becomes a leader, and it is leaders who are responsible for the moral development of followers as well as the moral culture and climate in their unit. Simply, moral leaders decide and do what is ‘right’, reinforce and role model ‘right’ for others, and develop followers to have similar capability for moral thought and action. We will later discuss, however, that ‘right’ is often an abstract and complex phenomenon.

Based on the nature and strategic importance of our current conflicts, it can be argued that there is a need to accelerate the moral development of leaders in our Army. Historically, our Nation has suffered strategic level consequences when character based leadership was found lacking in leaders and units. My Lai, Abu Ghraib, and Mahmudiya stand out as three of the most obvious examples. However, even the Pat Tillman case serves as an example that leaders at all levels are not immune from the absolute necessity to exhibit character based leadership. We note, however, that the vast majority of soldiers and leaders do the right thing, time and again, and are able to do so under the most challenging of situations. Thus we take a positive perspective and ask not how can we fix the Army, as it is not broken, but how can we harness Army best practices, as well as draw from best practices from academia and other DoD, public and private organizations; and target those practices to accelerate the moral development of the force.

While moral development is central to leadership, as are leaders to the moral development of their units—as noted by Snider and colleagues in an accompanying conference paper—the Army lacks an explicit model or framework to guide such development. Further, from an institutional perspective, what moral and ethical development that occurs has largely been thought of as the domain of lawyers, chaplains, and policy implementation offices (e.g., sexual harassment or equal opportunity). Such efforts often manifest in required training, briefings, policy letters, or other codifications which serve to train or inform, but not to adequately *educate and develop* leaders. While the legal and chaplaincy professions surely play a large role in the developmental process, we argue that moral and ethical development is the purview of leaders and is a responsibility that cannot be delegated or abdicated. Lacking a purposive framework to

inform and guide leaders in this duty, however, most Army moral development occurs through “on the job training”, tacit learning, or through observing exemplar role models. While these processes aid in development, research shows that they do not accelerate development as well as more deliberate and intentional processes. We as an Army intensely train for areas of competence. *Thus, should we not equally focus on domains of character?*

We reinforce that moral development is a life-long journey; thus, entry into the Army should only be looked at as a waypoint and not as a start point or end state. In fact, a study conducted by West Point researchers found that officers in the rank of major, averaging in excess of ten years of service, were still developing morally, and that on average had not yet achieved the higher levels of moral development attainable. We thus must take a holistic view of the force and target development throughout leaders’ Army careers. Such development is critical because when determining a leader’s credibility, followers assess both their character and their competence.

Leader competence entails technical and tactical knowledge, intelligence, decision-making skills, and interpersonal social skills. A leader’s character, conversely, is the combination of values and attributes that define who the leader is as a person. Thus, leaders’ character will influence what their core values are, how they establish a command climate, how they interpret situations, think about their leadership duties and style, what they demand and inspire in followers, the decisions they make, and most importantly, how they behave as leaders. Subordinates will willingly follow the directives of leaders they trust and will put forth extra effort and assume a greater degree of risk to accomplish the mission. On the other hand, subordinates who do not trust their leaders may question orders and perhaps take measures to minimize risks to their personal safety against orders. The bottom line is that in order to lead effectively, especially in extreme situations such as combat, leaders must earn their subordinates’ trust. The latitude that allows the leader to be directive in combat and still gain the commitment of their followers must be built over time and prior to ‘game day,’ through the exercise of consistent and trust-evoking moral leadership. And importantly, in this era of persistent conflict, the time between ‘game day’ and a young private or lieutenant’s ‘start day’, is often very short—emphasizing needed acceleration of moral development processes.

In this paper we make a call to arms for leaders across the Army to start an intense and frank dialog to answer critical questions to guide the force through the current and future conflicts. We are at a critical time in our Army’s history and one that may have transformational effects on the future of the force. We encourage the Army to create and get involved in a vibrant ‘conversation space’ to advance how we might accelerate the education and development of character based leaders. In this paper we present select concepts that might begin to stimulate as well as provide frameworks for parts of the ensuing dialog.

TOWARD ADVANCING AN ARMY FRAMEWORK FOR MORAL-ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT

We start with a multilevel approach to building moral resources for the Army and display this theoretical, yet practical, framework in Figure 1. As shown in the outside circle, as individuals join the force they are socialized through various formal and informal processes with the aim of inculcating and internalizing the beliefs of the profession. These individuals are then embedded in a unit culture and climate established by the unit's leaders. This culture and climate then influences their moral thoughts and behaviors, which is in turn, embedded in a larger strategic level Army culture and climate, which is continually faced by various external pressures (e.g., technology, societal changes, political). As shown by the inner circle, individual members are then held responsible to continually build and reinforce that culture. Leaders at all levels should intentionally focus on developing and nurturing this climate and culture; and this enormous responsibility serves as the focus of this paper.

Through this dynamic process, changes occur in the Army culture and associated beliefs over time. The accompanying conference paper, by Colonel Matthew Moten, indeed discusses the evolutions of the Army's ethic over time. An organization's culture and command climate is critical as it consists of a shared collection of implicit and explicit values and assumptions regarding the appropriate way members should perceive, think, feel, and behave in relation to dealing with each other and their environment to accomplish unit missions and reach unit goals. Thus, the organization's culture has a significant influence on the values, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior of its members.

Multi-Level Approach to PME




Figure 1.

As an Army we currently lack, yet greatly need, a framework to better understand and improve this multilevel process and its effects on the development of individuals and units. Such a framework should account for actions and responsibilities for both the institutional Army (e.g., schoolhouses, training centers), as well as the operational Army. We hold that the advancement of a framework for developing a moral climate and culture in military units requires, 1) highly-developed moral soldiers and leaders at the individual level, that 2) intentionally and thoughtfully interact to further promote moral thoughts and behaviors in their groups and social networks, and that 3) through these positive, moral social interactions a culture and climate will emerge that further strengthens and reinforces the “moral fiber” of the unit, and ultimately the Army.

Our view is that true moral culture and climates cannot be mandated (or taught by stacks of power-point slides) but emerge and are sustained through processes of social interaction and education. Progress along these lines might be made if the Army’s culture adapted such that moral development was conducted as part of the “hidden-curriculum” in everything we do. Further, character based leadership education and development can be more purposively integrated into the fabric of our school houses, training centers, and unit installations. Through such holistic and seamless approaches, we as an Army might never again spend an hour looking at power-point slides for “ethics training”. Leaders may intentionally impact this process by 1) morally developing soldiers and subordinate leaders through education, role modeling and other methods, as well as integrate those *character development* experiences *seamlessly* with *competency training*, 2) setting the conditions for high quality social exchanges between these individuals as well as the psychological safety (e.g., non-attribution) for all unit members to discuss and challenge moral decisions; and at the organizational level, and, 3) establishing systems, rules, and norms that promote, reward, and sustain moral engagement and behavior.

ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT IS A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PROBLEM


As we begin to advance a multilevel framework for building ethical soldiers, leaders, units and organizations, we must also address the complexity of the developmental process. As an Army, we often speak of the “Professional Military Ethic,” or PME. Strictly defined, the PME includes those things that as a profession we believe in and hold dear to our culture and institutional identity. The PME is the focus of the accompanying conference paper by Dr. Don Snider, Major Paul Oh, and Major Kevin Toner. Snider et al, suggest that the values and norms of the profession can be thought of as distinct from the values and norms of the individual professional. We agree and hold that this is because:

1. There is an extensive process of internalizing the PME that may take a matter of years depending upon how effectively that process is accelerated for any individual soldier or leader. Thus at any point in time the individual values, beliefs, ethics and other attributes of any individual will likely not perfectly match that of the profession;

2. Individuals come to the profession with distinct morals, values, beliefs and aspects of the human spirit that they will always hold onto to reinforce those of (or perhaps despite those of) the profession, and;
3. The PME can never envision nor address the full breadth of complex moral dilemmas that individuals will face nor the varying extenuating factors that will be present during any dilemma.

Here we expand upon the thoughts of Snider et al., and encourage an even more refined discussion of those factors, including yet extending beyond the PME, that influence the moral thoughts and behaviors of individuals. Figure 2 displays examples of the dynamic influences that may bear on a soldier or leader at any one time and influence their thoughts and behaviors. These factors range from strict codifications such as laws and regulations, through the more adaptable yet still codified rules of engagement (ROE), the ethics of the profession (PME), unit culture and norms, and extend through to personal morals and beliefs, values, ethics, and aspects of the human spirit. We hold that if we are to accelerate the development of Army soldiers and leaders that any framework for that development must address and serve to build on these varying factors in individuals and units. Further, we suggest that such a multidimensional framework should explicitly address and seek to mitigate potential divergences between the PME of the institution and those of the individual.

Defining the PME “Battlespace”



- Different soldiers may “weigh” the influence of each component differently
- The same soldier may weigh influences differently in different contexts

Figure 2

In Figure 2 we also make distinct beliefs and morals from values and ethics. For example one may *believe* and hold as a *moral* that the unnecessary loss of any human life should be avoided if at all possible, which may lead them to *value* diplomacy, non-kinetic, nonlethal, and proportional use of force, and develop a set of *ethics* that serve as the more distinct rules by which they guide their own and their followers' behavior accordingly. These refined distinctions of terminology are important as we pursue leader development.

As an institution we understandably focus most on professional ethics. If we as conferees and the Army are to conduct a useful discussion of the PME, and how the PME fits with the other factors shown in Figure 2, however, we must first define and develop *what the profession is*. Further, does the Army have a *profession* or *professions*? The answer to that question then further leads to the question of whether in practice we have an *Army ethic* or *Army ethics*? Or perhaps *should* we have an *Army ethic* or *Army ethics*? The Army, like all large institutions organizes itself largely by expertise specialization. Some example institutional Army specializations include science and technology, acquisition, legal, medical, chaplaincy, financial management, education, public works, and public affairs. In the operational Army, skill stratification is based on maneuver, fires and effects (e.g., infantry, armor, or artillery), operations support (e.g., military intelligence and signal), and select force sustainment specialties (e.g., logistician). Further, the total Army force includes active and reserve components, Army career civilian workforce, and a political appointee workforce.

The Army does not require all members of the total force to have the same professional expertise (e.g., the exercise of land power). It is professional expertise, however, that is one of the primary factors defining what a profession is (see paper by Snider, Oh, and Toner). We are not at this point suggesting that the Army be stratified between professionals and non-professionals, but that if we are to advance a PME that it may be useful to identify professional (or sub-professional) boundaries and determine what ethic might best serve the missions and functions of each grouping. For example, only a portion (e.g., doctors, nurses and physician assistants) of the medical community are considered medical professionals, yet other workers, some of which may be considered professionals (e.g., medical lawyers, medical equipment engineers, or insurance processors) operate within the sector and are not held to all of the medical profession's ethics. It may be useful as an Army to ask questions such as whether the creed to "never leave a fallen comrade" is central to all portions of the total force, or whether, for example, a more useful creed to an Army depot professional might be to "never send a soldier to war without the best possible equipment"?

The factor shown in Figure 2 that we as an Army tend to shy most from engaging in development is the domain of the human spirit, perhaps because it is often wrongly equated with religiosity. Yet all soldiers and leaders hold spirit whether they seek to address that spirit through religion or not. It is in seeking an understanding of their evolving spirituality that soldiers and leaders will form and reinforce their self-identity, find their sense of purpose and meaning in life, form their own philosophy for viewing the world, and develop the standards that define for them what it means to live a good

life. Regardless of one's approach to addressing spirituality, whether it is through religion, the study of philosophy or ethics, the arts, nature, or other means, all leaders must establish clear core beliefs and values and uphold those beliefs with conviction to be a moral leader—a leader of character—a leader who brings meaning to his or her missions, soldiers, and organization.

Further, as noted on the bottom of Figure 2, different soldiers may weigh the influence of each of these factors separately. Some soldiers may tend to be guided more by the rules of engagement and laws, while others draw their guidance more from personal values and morals. Others may draw from internal sources of their human spirit, while yet others seek to comply with the norms and expectations of their unit members. Regardless of such weightings, it is clear that a framework for moral development might best take a holistic approach and target a wide set of factors.

MORAL SITUATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND ADAPTABILITY


In Figure 2 we suggested that a variety of factors will influence soldiers' and leaders' thoughts and behaviors in any given situation and/or moral dilemma. Adding further need to take a more refined approach to moral development, we now propose that the same soldier may weight each factor differently in their ethical decision-making across different contexts and situations. For example, one situation may prompt a soldier to base their actions strictly on the ROE while in another he or she may draw more from his or her personal ethics. This differential weighting may be influenced by factors such as, 1) what factors are most present and salient in the context, 2) the level of development of the individual (such that less developed individuals often tend to look for outside guidance and clear rules), or 3) the complexity and dynamics of the situation. Therefore, beyond addressing the multiple factors influencing ethical thoughts and behaviors, it is important that in advancing a framework for development that these three and similar parameters are considered.

The third parameter, the complexity and dynamics of the situation is readily apparent in the current COIN conflict where soldiers are often faced with morally-ambiguous situations and must make immediate decisions, often without the ability to consult with their leaders. We propose that in these situations, the codifications (i.e., ROE, laws, and regulations) are often insufficient or inapplicable. For example, in a recent interview a young leader who refrained in an engagement from using deadly force due to unnecessary risks to non-combatants stated that “we could have killed a hundred of them and still been within the ROE.” This highlights the need for soldiers that are educated and developed along all dimensions displayed in Figure 2.

Figure 3 attempts to portray a simplified example of the effects of situational complexity on those factors influencing soldiers. Labels along the arrow suggest factors that may be sufficient to guide moral decision making and behavior under conditions of increasing complexity. As shown, in conditions where complexity is high, coupled with a low level of clarity over the various situational factors available for use in decision

making, as well as low levels of clarity over the potential effects or outcomes of behaviors, soldiers and leaders must be able to integrate various sources of information and factors and ultimately “self-author” their solution. Conversely, in less complex situations where the factors and effects are clear, codifications may be sufficient to guide decision making and behavior.

Defining the Moral-Ethical “Battlespace”



In sum, what we attempt to make clear is that nowhere are moral development and ethical enlightenment more critical than in our Nation’s Army. To lead in combat, young men and women must have developed a highly accurate “moral compass” in order to manage the constant tension between personal morality and their role as a member of the profession of arms—a profession that must manage violence on behalf of the greater good. The dilemmas faced by soldiers and leaders are like those always faced in battle – morally ambiguous situations where they have to choose between imperfect solutions, all of which may have questionable moral overtones and many of which will have strategic implications. Does a leader expose his soldiers to enemy fire to save an innocent young child? Does the leader order her soldiers to fire on a car filled with a civilian family that does not appear to be slowing for a traffic control checkpoint? Extended to garrison situations, does a leader punish a soldier by reduction of pay knowing that his family already has financial problems? These examples should make clear that it is more important for the Army to focus on educating and developing *how* to think about and resolve such dilemmas than it is to focus on *what* the specific outcome should be. It is more critical to enable leaders to process such ambiguous dilemmas autonomously, without supervision, and to come up with the best moral and ethical solutions. Appropriately, as the philosopher John Stuart Mill stated, “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”

Given tenets of the discussion thus far, in personal conversations LTC Pete Kilner has inquired whether the Army should focus on “principles of conduct” versus strict codifications or ethics. Much like the doctrinal Army principles of the offense or defense allow leaders to adapt implementation to meet the commander’s intent and situational variables, might moral principles be developed that serve as similar guideposts, yet offering room for thoughtful adaptation? Pete suggests that when rules are black and white they no longer serve to guide behavior in the grey. Further, even in a rules-based system often the various factors shown in Figure 2 are in conflict with one another. For example, duty to one’s soldiers or peers (i.e. unit culture and norms) may conflict with the ROE or a regulation. Leaders must be able to sort through and adjudicate such conflicts through the complex evaluative process mentioned earlier.

It would be useful to educate leaders specifically on how to deal with such competing values, yet still stay within certain principles. Specifically, education and development across our Army may focus on moral reasoning, ethical decision making, and behavior processes. It may be useful for example, to prompt soldiers to examine moral issues through three lenses or perspectives: (1) what is right by the laws, rules, norms, or duties (*deontological processing*), (2) what produces the best consequences (*teleological processing*), and (3) what is the most overall virtuous action regardless of norms or outcomes (*areteological processing*). Each one of these three processing “lenses” may in fact produce a separate and distinct moral solution if viewed in isolation. For example, consider a leader deciding whether to open fire on a team of enemy fighters who have placed themselves in and are engaging U.S. forces from the middle of a group of civilian noncombatants. A deontological approach may consider the use of force as allowed under the ROE. A teleological lens may consider the negative potential outcomes such as political fallout as well as increased hostile behaviors by the local population. An areteological lens might focus on the virtue of one’s actions and the taking of unnecessary human life. Would we not want soldiers to consider all three?

Thus soldiers and leaders must learn to simultaneously view moral dilemmas through all three lenses to understand all the dynamics of an issue and determine the overall best course of action. Such holistic processing has also been shown in research to be very effective in moral development, particularly if conducted in a group setting where ideas are exchanged. A culture promoting non-attributional dialogue (not one way conversations) is required for this growth and development to occur. Rigidly employing only one lens is problematic when trying to resolve a moral dilemma and may result in an insufficient solution. More importantly however, a dogmatic technique will often not result in any learning or growth.

For instance, simply stating to a room full of soldiers that “we do not harm non-combatants” is not sufficient as situations may very well pose the very dilemma to leaders where they have to choose between mission accomplishment and/or force protection and non-combatant casualties. A more holistic and pedagogically sound technique would be to *discuss and dialogue* on this subject, *as part of a situational training exercise*, with a focus on the three lenses listed above and across various

permutations of situations. Then leaders will begin to understand the complexities of such moral decision-making. Again, moral education and development is best integrated into the fabric of our school houses, training centers, and operational units, versus conducting stand-alone “ethics classes.” By doing so are we sending a message that “now we are focusing on ethics training, and later we will be training on house-clearing operations -- and there is no overlap between the two”. Bold yet concrete steps at such integration could include adding a 6th *moral factors* paragraph to the operations order, at least for use in training exercises; or adding a standard moral review to the after action review format.

In sum, just as the Army has started to focus on growing adaptive and flexible soldiers and leaders for this new COIN environment, so too must we start to intentionally focus on growing soldiers and leaders to self-author their behavior with a strong moral compass – authentic leaders. The ability for such self-authorship, however, is a developed capacity and is at the heart of what is termed authentic leadership. Authentic leaders are those that are highly developed and self-aware and have the ability and willpower to act in accordance with their core values and beliefs. Thus, it is a tall order to develop soldiers and leaders to the extent that they are in fact able to integrate various factors and grapple with how those factors relate to who they are and their identity. Ultimately, however, such capacity is required at all levels of leadership, and certainly in our most senior leaders; highlighting the need for purposive accelerated development.

LANGUAGE FOR THE DIALOG

Our final point is that to engage in a robust and meaningful dialog as an Army about our Army ethic, our culture, and the moral development of our members, we need a common language so that we may effectively communicate and ultimately create a “common moral operating picture.” We have attempted to offer here some terminology and frameworks that we hope will serve as a starting point for that clarification.

CONCLUSION

Our goal for this paper was to serve as a “think piece” and conversation-starter for conferees, and more ideally, for our Army. In it we offer few solutions yet pose many problems and dilemmas to consider as we pursue advancing the PME of the Army and the moral-ethical development of its soldiers and leaders. We hope that some of the concepts and frameworks discussed here will prompt heated dialog, debates, and ultimately refinement. What is clear is that the Army and its leaders must take a more active and programmatic approach to accelerating the education and development of soldiers and leaders of character. To accomplish this we must develop a framework for and focus more attention and resources toward character development vice competence development. This would require a mental-model and cultural shift across our force.

In closing, stemming from some of the concepts in this paper we offer the below set of seven questions as a starting point to hopefully engage and capture the imagination of the conferees and the Army and generate many more questions and discussions.

1. What do we believe in as an Army (i.e., professional military ethic) and how do those beliefs influence our thoughts and behaviors in both peacetime and war?
2. Why do we have these beliefs and are they applicable and proper for the future of the force?
3. Are there topics in our Army that are explicitly or implicitly “off-limits” to discussion? Why is that? Will we be better off discussing these topics?
4. Do we want to recruit and select members that have the proclivity to inculcate the Army values and beliefs or encourage a broad set of beliefs? How do we recruit such people?
5. By what processes, systems, and methods do we educate and develop members across all ranks and components to inculcate these beliefs?
6. How do we educate and develop members to become authentic leaders who can self-author their behavior and operate in contexts where professional ethics cannot provide clear answers?
7. How do we build unit climates and cultures nested at all levels of the Army that promote the moral development of unit members and provide the moral resources to sustain ethical behavior during protracted conflict?

The Army's Professional Ethic—Past, Present, and Future

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In 2007 the Army established at West Point a Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic. Its purpose was to promote scholarship and education on moral and ethical issues as they apply to the military profession and to assist trainers, educators, and commanders across the Army. At a briefing to outline the mission and vision of the center, Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey, Jr. noted that the first issue may be one of definition: “If you walked around the Army and asked people what the Professional Military Ethic is, you would get a lot of different answers.”¹

The Army's professional military ethic is not codified, although its spirit is resident in a number of documents. During World War II General George C. Marshall commissioned S.L.A. Marshall to write *The Armed Forces Officer*, an inspirational work meant to assist officers with their self-development that has gone through several editions over the decades.² General Sir John Hackett briefly and eloquently chronicled the history of the military profession in *The Profession of Arms*, released as a U.S. Army pamphlet in 1986.³ More recently, Richard Swain has penned an article that details the various sources of the professional military ethic from the Constitution to authorizing legislation to Field Manual 1 *The Army*.⁴ Yet the perceived need that compelled Swain to write such an article points up the absence of a common understanding of the Army's professional military ethic.

Other American professions have clearly promulgated statements of ethics. The American Medical Association's *Code of Medical Ethics* is an updated version of a code that was first published in 1847.⁵ That document, in turn, descends from the Hippocratic Oath. Likewise, the American Bar Association recently published a centennial edition of its *Model Rules for Professional Conduct*, dozens of rules that are regularly amended by the ABA's House of Delegates to codify standards of professional legal behavior.⁶

Even within the Army there are extant statements of ethical responsibility. The NCO Creed has guided non-commissioned officers for many years and, more recently, the Army has adopted the Soldier's Creed. Indeed, we now have an Army Civilian Corps Creed. All of these creeds are clear and precise statements of who their adherents are, what they believe, and what responsibilities they have accepted.

This paper will briefly survey the history of the Army's professional ethic, focusing primarily on the Army officer corps. Then it will assess today's strategic, professional, and ethical environment. Finally, it will argue that a clear statement of the Army's professional ethic is especially necessary in a time when the Army is stretched and stressed as an institution. The Army has both a need and an opportunity better to define itself as a profession, forthrightly to articulate its professional ethic, and clearly to codify what it means to be a military professional.

A Brief History of the Army's Professional Ethic⁷

The Army's sense of itself, its culture and its ethic have grown and developed over four hundred years of American history. In the colonial era most Americans equated military service with citizenship. White males who expected to have a voice in community affairs also understood that they were liable to defend their communities through militia service. Community leaders gained commissions either by appointment or election and led their fellow citizens whenever local crises arose. The militia's purpose was local defense and the duration of service was usually brief. Along with this citizen-soldier tradition, Americans, like their English cousins, maintained a fear of standing armies as oppressors of their liberties. Thus, early American military service was both universal and anti-professional.

The American Revolution bequeathed other traditions. The first, mainly a legacy of General George Washington's sterling example, was strict adherence to a principle of civilian control of the military. Second, despite long-standing fears the new nation found it necessary in the emergency to raise a regular army—local militias were not sufficient to the task, although they proved to be a welcome complement to the Continentals. Third, General Washington attempted to commission men of gentle birth, maintaining the European belief that only gentlemen had the ability to command soldiers. He was unsuccessful in this endeavor because there were too few gentlemen in America to provide all the officers the Continental Army required. Still, professionalism was not yet a component of commissioned leadership.

After the Revolution, American leaders found the Articles of Confederation inadequate to governing the new republic, mainly in providing for the common defense. The Constitution remedied that shortcoming, clearly codifying principles for raising military forces, providing for their leadership, and establishing war powers. Just as clearly, the Constitution divided control of the military between the Executive and the Legislature, creating dual loyalties that govern, and complicate, American civil-military relations to this day.

Over several decades, the new government raised one army after another to respond to various crises. There was little continuity of service, either for officers or enlisted men, and thus little sense of belonging to a distinct profession or of responsibility to the people. For a while, the senior general in the United States Army was also a secret agent of the Spanish crown!⁸ The establishment of the United States Military Academy in 1802 was a halting step in the direction of a national army and a professional officer corps, but many years would pass before it had much effect.

Early national officers, sporadically serving and only partially identifying with military culture, nonetheless affected martial titles in and out of service and mimicked European officers' social customs. Among these was an exaggerated sense of personal honor, a term that had as much to do with appearances and reputation as with integrity. Sensitive to slights, many officers settled their differences with one another by dueling. Although prohibited by law and later by regulation, dueling continued to hamper discipline and retard professionalization until the mid-nineteenth century.

A second war with Great Britain showed that the United States could no longer afford to rely on state militias and hastily raised regulars for its defense. With all its defensive advantages, the country came within a whisker of defeat in the war of 1812. After the war, reformers such as Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, General Winfield Scott, and Colonel Sylvanus Thayer laid the foundations for a standing, regular army with a long-service officer corps. The Army codified regulations, wrote tactical manuals, and established schools of practice to train its units. Thayer reformed the Military Academy, making it both the nation's first engineering school and a reliable source of officers for the new regular force. Military journals sprang up, fostering an exchange of views on professional subjects. Officers began to think of themselves as professionals—competent, apolitical servants of the nation. For the first time, Calhoun pronounced that the purpose of the army was to prepare for war, to stand in readiness to defend the republic. It was a new departure.

The army also served the growing nation in ways that were not strictly military, exploring the western frontier, building roads and canals, and superintending public works. They also built a coastal fortifications system and administered western territories, protecting Indians and settlers from one another, an early peacekeeping mission. Part of this legacy, the removal of Indians from eastern states and territories to reservations in the west, is distasteful to us now, but the Army served as the national government directed.

In the late-1840s, the regular army, augmented with thousands of volunteers, proved its mettle in its first expeditionary war against Mexico. A generation of young West Point graduates demonstrated superb tactical skills, while General Winfield Scott ably led at the strategic and operational levels. The victory came fast and was so complete that finding a Mexican government with which to negotiate terms of surrender was problematic. The resulting peace treaty greatly expanded U.S. territory. If the regular army possessed a high-level of professional skill, its officers also began to develop a prideful disdain for volunteer soldiers. That arrogance would have no place in the next war.

The American Civil War produced two massive, citizen-soldier armies, both led at their highest echelons by the professional officers of the antebellum era. These officers were competent practitioners of the military art, highly dedicated to their duty. By trial and error they learned to lead volunteer soldiers. Yet the fact that almost a third of the U.S. Army's officer corps resigned and defected to the rebel cause pointed up a

critical flaw in the professional military ethic—loyalty to the Constitution and the national government was not pervasive. It matters not that larger proportions of other institutions—the Congress, the Supreme Court, eleven southern states—also chose secession. The Army had been split asunder by a political crisis. Rekindling a sense of national loyalty was of primary importance in the post-war army.

As the Civil War progressed it became more and more brutal, both in terms of tactical destructiveness and in the armies' treatment of noncombatants. A felt need to control the violence led President Lincoln to publish General Order No. 100, a set of rules to guide military actions. Based on religious and philosophical thought, the general order gave the Army its first set of codified ethical guidelines. Thus, the Army's evolving professional ethic now contained elements of military competence, loyalty to the nation, obedience to civilian authority, leadership of citizen-soldiers, and a moral component to govern the employment of armed force.

After a rapid demobilization, the U.S. Army took on the mission of administering southern reconstruction and redeployed to the western territories to fight the Indian wars. The army was too small for these were difficult missions that often presented tactical problems with strategic ramifications, much like the stresses of counterinsurgency today. Military thinkers argued about roles, missions, and organization. Emory Upton advocated a Prussian model army, with a great general staff and long-service conscript soldiers. John Logan promoted a return to a citizen-army, much like the old militia with citizen-officers as well. The nation was still too close to its fears of a standing army to countenance the former prescription, but had learned too much of the hardships and complexities of war to accept the latter. In the late nineteenth century, General William T. Sherman established a school at Fort Leavenworth for the education of officers, a renaissance of Calhoun's seminal idea that an army's purpose is to prepare for war.

After decades of tactical employment in small units across the West, the Army performed abysmally at the strategic and operational levels when it deployed to Cuba for the Spanish-American War. Once there, the Army made short work of its enemy, only to take far more casualties from disease than it had from combat, largely because of logistical failures. On the other side of the globe, the Army invaded the Philippine archipelago, quickly overthrowing the Spanish government, but then finding itself unprepared for a years-long insurgency that varied in tactics and intensity from island to island and from town to town. This was a company commander's war, for which tactical doctrine from the Indian wars and the ethical guidelines of General Orders 100 were equally inadequate. American soldiers committed war crimes because their leaders were tactically and ethically unprepared for the type of war they were fighting.

In response to these shortcomings, Secretary of War Elihu Root began another series of reforms, creating an Army War College, a general staff, and encouraging legislation to raise the readiness standards of the reserve components. When millions of American doughboys entered the Great War a decade later, they mobilized and deployed on the orders of a general staff composed of Leavenworth and War College graduates speaking and writing a common professional lexicon. Likewise, their commanders and

staff officers in the American Expeditionary Forces in France demonstrated the fruits of the Army's officer education system. By war's end America had entered the ranks of the world's great powers, thanks in no small measure to the professionalism of its army.

Another rapid demobilization left that army with a core of veteran professionals. Hamstrung by small budgets and a national sense of having survived "the war to end all wars," the army nonetheless attempted to innovate and develop the technologies that had been born on European battlefields—the airplane, the tank, and the wireless. Those efforts were imperfect and the Army made mistakes, but it continued to go to school, to learn, and to experiment, developing a body of professional expertise that would be the foundation of victory in the Second World War.

The senior Army leadership in that war were well educated, broadly experienced professionals with a strong sense of corporate culture and responsibility to the nation. They led a draftee Army of some eight million soldiers and airmen deployed in theaters around the globe. They were skilled in joint and combined operations, working effectively with the U.S. Navy and Allied forces, and providing strategic advice to the president and his fellow commanders-in-chief at a number of Allied conferences. They managed an immense mobilization of the national economy, turning American industry into the "arsenal of democracy" that equipped not only Americans, but British, French, Russian and other Allied forces as well. And they guided the Manhattan Project, a \$2 billion effort harnessing the finest scientific minds in the world to bring the promise of quantum physics to the dread reality of the atomic bomb.

At Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the most brutal and violent war in human history ended and a deadly new age began. War had approached a Clausewitzian absolute. Six million Jews had been exterminated in the Holocaust. Tens of millions of soldiers and civilians had lost their lives in the fighting. Almost no one on Earth had gone untouched by the war. Atomic weapons seemed to have changed the very nature of warfare. Over the next several years, diplomats and politicians, lawyers and soldiers tried to find a way to step back from the abyss. The United Nations formed. The Geneva Conventions built on the laws of war to further codify rules to limit armed violence.

A new geostrategic reality emerged. The former great powers lay prostrate from years of debilitating warfare. Only the Soviet Union and the United States retained the ability to project military power. Ideologically incompatible, the two superpowers became locked in a forty-five year Cold War, which kept the possibility of mutual annihilation mere minutes away, but ironically fostered an era of relative stability.

The Army demobilized after World War II, but it has never again been a small force. Global responsibilities required an end to the traditional bias against a large, peacetime army. President Truman ordered the armed forces to integrate African-Americans, ending more than a century of official discrimination. A new Uniform Code of Military Justice fostered regularity in a formerly haphazard administration of military law. The non-commissioned officer corps, long the backbone of company-level

formations, grew in size, responsibility, and stature. Within twenty years, commanders at all levels had senior NCOs assisting them in leading a large, regular enlisted force.

In 1950 the Army began a bloody, frustrating, war in Korea for which it was again ill prepared. North Koreans overran the South and almost drove responding American forces into the sea. A daring amphibious envelopment at Inchon reversed fortunes, allowing General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to attack into North Korea in a bid to reunite the nation. Then the Chinese intervened, embarrassing the Eighth Army and driving it back to Seoul.

At this point, chafing under political restrictions fostered by fears of a third, probably nuclear, world war, MacArthur publicly challenged President Truman's strategic direction, violating the Army's long tradition of obedience to civil authority. Truman relieved MacArthur and restored control, but the nation had been awakened to an unsettling possibility. In a nation possessing the most powerful weapons ever known, civilian control of the military had never been more important.

After the Korean War, the Army adjusted fitfully to a new era. President Eisenhower's military budget tightening and emphasis on nuclear deterrence left the Army in an ambiguous position. Land power seemed irrelevant in comparison to the nuclear capabilities wielded by the newly independent U.S. Air Force and its Strategic Air Command. What was the Army's mission? Whither its professional expertise? Another Asian war provided an unsatisfactory answer. Vietnam was not a conventional, "big-unit" war, as much as some tried to make it so. The American army found itself fighting another insurgency halfway around the world. Strategic indirection yielded operational and tactical confusion. The American people grew restive with a war for which they could see little purpose. Racial tension, drug epidemics, and official corruption plagued the Army. Uncertain of its mission, doubtful of victory, torn by internal strife, the Army lost its professional moorings. The criminal tragedy at My Lai was a symptom of a profession that once again needed reform, this time of its values.

After the war in Vietnam, the first unqualified strategic loss in the history of American arms, the Army went into the wilderness. Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams led it out. The draftee army was gone; the all-volunteer force was in. The Army conducted a study of its officer corps and found the profession wanting in its ethics and values. It slowly began to purge itself of its drug culture, expelling soldiers who could not maintain standards of discipline. Abrams commenced a modernization effort, building five new major weapons systems. Senior officers rewrote the Army's operational doctrine to employ those weapons, focusing on a campaign of maneuver against a numerically superior Soviet foe. A training revolution demanded a realistic battle-focus in new centers devoted to tactical planning, rehearsal, and execution against experienced and proficient opposing forces. Startlingly candid after-action reviews forced leaders to confront their mistakes, and then to try again. A new leadership manual propounded the novel idea that those leaders were not born, but could be—had to be—developed. FM 22-100 focused on team building and positive actions to get the best out of the volunteer soldiers who remained in the service.

At the end of the Cold War two brilliant campaigns, Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in southwest Asia, demonstrated how far the Army had come in fifteen years. With two widely different forms of operational maneuver, light and airborne infantry in the first instance and rapid mechanized warfare in the second, the Army quickly enveloped, overwhelmed, and defeated its enemies, and just as quickly withdrew.

Yet the stability provided by the bi-polar Cold War rivalry had given way to a much more fragmented world. In the 1990s the Army found itself 40% smaller and deploying two to three times as often as it had previously done. Forgetting the military history of nearly every decade before 1941, some soldiers complained that they were being asked to take on non-traditional missions, such as peacekeeping and nation-building. Junior officers left the service in high numbers, forsaking professional careers. A series of scandals sent the Army back to basics, focusing on seven core values—Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Courage.

At the turn of the century, Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki led the Army into a thorough transformation, one part focusing on near-term readiness, another on training soldiers and developing leaders, and a third on a long-term modernization campaign to build a force for the future. Simultaneously, a small group of academics and soldiers gathered at West Point to conduct the first in-depth study of the Army profession since 1970. It probed the corpus of Army professional expertise and attempted to map its contours. Defining four principal clusters, the Future of the Army Profession project set about developing and expanding the Army's knowledge about itself, its missions, and its competencies. Those four clusters yielded four facets of an officer's identity—the warrior, the servant of the nation, the leader of character, and the member of a time-honored profession.⁹

Thus, by the summer of 2001 the United States Army had developed a mature professionalism, but one that waxed and waned over time. Wartime crises tended to produce, or perhaps to expose, the profession's shortcomings, which peacetime reformers then sought to correct. The Army's professional ethic embraced national service, obedience to civilian authority, mastery of a complex body of doctrinal and technical expertise, positive leadership, and ethical behavior. It was less healthy in terms of its junior professionals' acceptance of a lifelong call to service and time would show that it was doctrinally unprepared for the trials that lay ahead.

The Army's Professional Ethic—The Present

The attacks of September 11, 2001 punctuated the professional renaissance begun at the turn of the century. Already stretched thin by multiple deployments, the Army soon found itself deployed in two wars on top of an increased homeland defense mission. A strategic decision to deploy too few forces into Iraq exacerbated a lack of planning for post-maneuver operations. Iraq soon descended into civil war and insurgency. Five years into these wars with no discernable end or victory in sight, the Army finds itself a profession that looks eerily reminiscent of its early-1970s predecessor.

Five years of repetitive deployments have left the Army, in the words of the Chief of Staff, General Casey, “stressed and stretched.” The force is exceptionally combat experienced, but it is also fatigued by continuing deployments and training requirements to prepare for them. There is a collective pride in the Army’s accomplishments to date, but also a sense that the Army is at war while the nation is not, that soldiers have done their duty and perhaps it is someone else’s turn. The open-ended commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan create a concern that this high operational tempo is unsustainable without a large buildup of forces. Attrition rates within the junior officer and mid-grade NCO corps, problems before 9/11, are rising again. The Army has been forced to decrease its standards for enlistment and increase its rates of promotion. Some observers think the Army is near the breaking point.

Another concern is the type of warfare the Army is being asked to conduct. Counterinsurgency is one of the most complex forms of war. Tangible accomplishments can seem fleeting. The enemy is hard to identify and so the ways and means of combating him are difficult to determine, as is assessing their effectiveness. Moreover, fighting an enemy who does not abide by the laws of war is morally ambiguous and the resulting stress is enormous. Moral and legal lapses, such as those at Abu Ghraib and Haditha, are partially attributable to these difficulties, but the mere fact of their occurrence harms morale and indicates problems with indiscipline.¹⁰ Of equal concern is that commissioned officers have been involved in every incident that has gained notoriety.

Outside the profession’s control, but impinging on its jurisdiction, some government policies in the Global War on Terror have served to undermine the Army’s ethical principles. A Justice Department finding on the treatment of captured enemies dismissed the laws of war as “quaint.” It shied away from the terms combatant and non-combatant and refused to define the captured as prisoners of war, settling on the term “detainees.” Secret and ambiguous policies on the treatment of these detainees and an unwillingness forthrightly and publicly to define torture left the Army in a doctrinal quandary. These questions are policy matters and they have become political issues, but for the military officer, they are and should be professional concerns because they strike at the heart of the Army’s moral-ethical framework. Officers, above all, must fight to maintain and safeguard the laws of war as a professional jurisdiction.

Since the post-Cold War drawdown the armed forces have chosen to rely more and more heavily on commercial contractors. In many cases, this reliance has been unavoidable and indeed liberating, such as in the manufacture of complex weapons systems. Properly overseen, this military-industrial partnership can be a boon to national security. In many other cases, however, contractors have assumed responsibilities that heretofore were considered inherently military, such as logistical support, protecting installations and high-ranking officials, and developing professional doctrine. An army that depends on commercial enterprise to deliver its food and fuel is subcontracting its lifeblood—an army travels on its stomach. An army that relies on contractors for its doctrine is farming out its professional expertise. And an army that permits civilians to

employ armed force on the battlefield tolerates mercenaries. Today, the Army is selling large tracts of its professional jurisdiction.

Finally, there have been several troublesome developments in the realm of civil-military relations. Many observers have faulted former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others in the Bush Administration for their treatment of senior officers and their general handling of the military. Among the issues raised was Secretary Rumsfeld's choice to interview candidates for numerous flag officer positions, a practice that many saw as tending to politicize the officer corps. While those are matters of concern, as policy choices by civilian leaders they lie outside the scope of the professional military ethic. On the other hand, the behavior of several retired general officers and colonels does not. In 2006, six recently retired Army and Marine generals called for the resignation of Secretary Rumsfeld because of his handling of the wars and treatment of the military. This dissent and the widespread perception that the retired generals "spoke for" their former colleagues still on active duty threatened the public trust in the military's apolitical and non-partisan ethic of service as well as the principle of civilian control. Equally troubling was the recent report that numerous retired officer-commentators on television news programs had parroted without attribution "talking points" provided by the Department of Defense. Some of these former officers also had fiduciary ties to defense industries with contracts in support of the war effort. Those ties had also gone undisclosed. The sense that these retired officers had sold their professionalism to the highest bidder was palpable.

The Case for a Professional Military Ethic

Predicting the future, especially about an enterprise as complex as war, is problematic. However, several trends are evident. Recent history shows that the Army has been deploying more and more frequently since the end of the relatively stable era of the Cold War. Then, the events of September 11, 2001 brought into sharp focus a deadly new type of non-state actor bent on our destruction. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan came about in response to that global threat and they remain of uncertain duration. Most observers expect a "long war" against extremists and terrorists. Furthermore, there are many other potential trouble spots around the world, including Pakistan, Iran, China, and North Korea. Health and environmental catastrophes could present crises in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The scarcity of resources, especially water, may provoke conflict in many less-developed regions of the world. The places and forms of future conflict remain unpredictable, but its likelihood is not. As long as the United States maintains global responsibilities and interests, the American people will expect the United States Army to remain ready to project military power around the world.

As the brief history at the beginning of this essay shows, the Army tends to reform at the end of wars that have demonstrated shortcomings of one kind or another. Now, we are faced with a different situation. Our Army is stressed and stretched, and ethical strains have begun to show. However, we are not at the end of a conflict, but in the midst of what will likely be a long war with no clearly demarcated end. The stresses on the force and their likely continuation in a long period of conflict present both an

opportunity and a requirement to define the Army's ethical standards clearly and forthrightly. The Army must improve and reform itself even as it fights.

The Army Chief of Staff has chosen to focus the Army's attention on the Professional Military Ethic. He has established a Center of Excellence to foster research and education on the topic. That kind of high-level attention has spurred reform in the past and it can do so again.

The essence of the professional ethic needs no radical change. The ethics of a professional officer serving this constitutional democracy have evolved toward a clear understanding of the military's place in and duty to society, a high level of professional expertise, a sense of military service as a full-time occupation and a long-term calling, a subordination to duly elected and appointed civil authority, an ethos of positive and responsible leadership of subordinates, and a moral-ethical compass fixed on the laws of war and the Constitution. While adherence to those values has waxed and waned through history, the common understanding of them as guiding principles has steadily evolved.

Today, there is little debate that military officers must abide by a professional ethic. Yet the ethic has never been clearly and succinctly codified. Several authors have written about the professional military ethic, including S.L.A. Marshall, Sir John Hackett, Samuel P. Huntington, Allan R. Millett, William B. Skelton, and Richard Swain.¹¹ The general impression that one can derive from these works is that the Army's professional ethic is akin to the British constitution—it exists in a variety of forms, but it is hard to get one's arms around it. One scholar, BG (ret.) Anthony Hartle, has attempted to explicate and ramify the professional military ethic. His *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making* (2d edition, revised 2004) is a compact treatise that drew little official notice at the time of its first publication in 1989, yet it is a thoughtful treatment of military professionalism, the provenance of the professional ethic, and the implications of adhering to an ethical standard. From his survey, Hartle develops a "traditional ethic" for the military professions in seven principles. Military professionals:

- 1) Accept service to country as their watchword and defense of the Constitution of the United States of America as their calling. They subordinate their personal interests to the requirements of their professional functions and the accomplishment of assigned missions.
- 2) Conduct themselves at all times as members of an honorable profession whose integrity, loyalty, and moral and physical courage are exemplary. Such qualities are essential on and off the battlefield if a military organization is to function effectively.
- 3) Develop and maintain the highest possible level of professional knowledge and skill. To do less is to fail to meet their obligations to the men and women with whom they serve, to the profession, and to the country.
- 4) Take full responsibility for their actions and orders.

5) Promote and safeguard, within the context of mission accomplishment, the welfare of their subordinates as persons, not merely as soldiers, sailors, or airmen.

6) Conform strictly to the principle that subordinates the military to civilian authority. They do not involve themselves or their subordinates in domestic politics beyond the exercise of basic civil rights.

7) Adhere to the laws of war, the laws of the United States, and the regulations of their service in performing their professional functions.¹²

Hartle acknowledges that his work provokes the question of whether it is wise to codify the professional military ethic. He does not address the question fully, but suggests that each service may require several ethical statements at various levels of responsibility, and “that a variety of codes would de-emphasize the importance of each.”¹³

Does the Army officer corps need such a statement of ethics? My own view is that the matter should at least be open to debate. Hartle’s seven principles provide a good jumping-off point for a discussion about a written code. The Army’s history demonstrates an evolving articulation of the professional ethic, and each year brings more and more research about the values and virtues of professional military service. The Future of the Army Profession project has expanded the Army’s understanding of itself as a profession, its professional expertise, and the identities of a professional officer.

There is some concern that a written code would push the profession toward a legalistic sense of itself. If the code were a list of punishable infractions written in legalese, then that concern would be valid. If the Army is to have a written code, it must focus on the moral and ethical, not the legal requirements of the profession. It should be inspirational, an exhortation to better behavior, rather than a list of offenses. I believe that the Army should set for itself a goal of writing a succinct statement of professional ethics focusing on the roles of commissioned officers. The debate required to produce such a statement would provide impetus for an Army-wide discussion about the profession, its ethical values, and the role that it should play as a servant of American society in an era of persistent conflict.

¹ General George W. Casey made this comment at a briefing on the Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic, West Point, New York, 31 October 2007. The author was present.

² *The Armed Forces Officer*, Armed Forces Information Office, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 1950. The volume, published as official doctrine for the Department of Defense and each of the services, was revised in 1960, 1962, 1975, 1988, and 2007.

³ Lt.-General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., *The Profession of Arms*, CMH Pub 70-18, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC, 1986. A soldier-historian, Sir John originally delivered his thoughts as the 1962 Lee Knowles Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge.

⁴ Richard Swain, “Reflection on an Ethic of Officership,” *Parameters*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, Spring 2007, 4-22.

⁵ American Medical Association, *Code of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions with Annotations, 2006-2007*.

⁶ American Bar Association, The Center for Professional Responsibility, *Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Centennial Edition*, April 2008.

⁷ The following brief history derives from an understanding of hundreds of works of American and European military history. The reader might find several works useful for further study, including: Allan

R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, Revised and expanded edition, New York: Free Press, 1994; Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, *The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500-2000*, New York: Viking, 2005; Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, New York: MacMillan, 1967; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1957; Richard H. Kohn, ed., *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989*, New York: New York University Press, 1991; and William B. Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861*, Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1992.

⁸ Brigadier General James Wilkinson had a colorful and scandalous career in and out of the Army from the Revolution to the War of 1812. He was forced to resign his commission twice and probably conspired with Aaron Burr. Biographies include James Ripley Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior: Major General James Wilkinson*, New York: MacMillan, 1938; Thomas Robson Hay and M.R. Werner, *The Admirable Trumpeter: A Biography of General James Wilkinson*, Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, Doran, and Co., 1941; and Royal Ornan Shreve, *The Finished Scoundrel: General James Wilkinson*, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1933.

⁹ See Don M. Snyder and Gayle L. Watkins, project directors and Lloyd J. Matthews, editor, *The Future of the Army Profession*, Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002; and Don M. Snyder, project director and Lloyd J. Matthews, editor, *The Future of the Army Profession, Revised and Expanded Second Edition*, Boston: McGraw Hill, 2005.

¹⁰ Gale Pollock, DoD News Briefing with Assistant Secretary Casscells from the Pentagon, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense (Public Affairs) News Transcript, May 4, 2007. Accessed online on 8 July 2008 at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3958>.

¹¹ See endnote 7.

¹² Anthony E. Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, 2d edition, revised. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 73-74.

¹³ Hartle, 231.

PREVIOUS SENIOR CONFERENCES 1963 TO 2007

1963 New Nations and Their Internal Defense

Keynote Address: Dr. Walt W. Rostow

1964 Latin American Problems

Keynote Address: Honorable David E. Bell

1965 The Role of the Military in National Security Policy Formations

Keynote Address: Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster

Banquet Address: Honorable Solis Horowitz

1966 United States Security Policy in Asia, 1966-1976

Keynote Address: Honorable U. Alexis Johnson

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster

1967 Support for the U.S. Foreign Policy with Military Resources in Conditions of Internal Violence

Keynote Address: Honorable Thomas H. Hughes

Luncheon Address: Honorable Frank Pace, Jr.

1968 Problems for United States Policy: Tangiers to Tehran

Keynote Address: Honorable Paul Warnke

Banquet Address: Ambassador Charles Yost

1969 No Conference

1970 The Changing Role of the Military in American Life

Keynote Address: Honorable Robert E. Osgood

Banquet Address: Professor Adam Yarmolinsky

1971 The Nixon Doctrine in Asia

Keynote Address: Admiral Thomas Moorer

Banquet Address: Honorable Marshall Green

1972 A Reappraisal of the Future of NATO

Keynote Address: Honorable Robert F. Ellsworth

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowney

1973 The American Army and Changing National Priorities

Keynote Address: Professor Marion Levy

Banquet Address: Honorable Robert F. Froehlke

1974 Educating the Professional Soldier

Keynote Address: Honorable Barry Goldwater

Banquet Address: Professor Morris Janowitz

1975 Changing Security Interests in an Evolving World

Keynote Address: Honorable Paul Nitze

Banquet Address: Professor Graham T. Allison

1976 Arms Transfers

Keynote Address: Dr. John F. Lehman, Jr.

Banquet Address: Professor Geoffrey Kemp

1977 National Compulsory Service

Keynote Address: Dr. David P. Taylor

Banquet Address: Professor Adam Yarmolinsky

1978 Integrating National Security and Trade Policy: The United States and the Soviet Union

Keynote Address: Lieutenant General James M. Gavin

Banquet Address: Dr. Samuel P. Huntington

1979 The Role of the Military in National Security Policy Formulation in the 1980s

Keynote Address: Dr. Walt W. Rostow

Banquet Address: Mr. Richard C. Steadman

1980 Defense Manpower Planning

Keynote Address: Honorable Robert B. Pirie

Banquet Address: Professor Charles Moskos

1981 Industrial Capacity and Defense Planning

Keynote Address: Mr. Norman Augustine

Banquet Address: General Alton D. Slay

1982 The “Military Reform” Debate: Directions for the Defense Establishment for the Remainder of the Century

Keynote Address: Representative Newt Gingrich

Banquet Address: General Edward C. Meyer

1983 The Nuclear Debate: Rationality, Morality, Security, and Stability

Banquet Address: Honorable George Ball

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft

1984 Defense Technology

Banquet Address: Dr. William J. Perry

Banquet Address: Professor John Keegan

1985 Vietnam: Did It Make A Difference?

Banquet Address: Ambassador Robert W. Komer

Banquet Address: Honorable William P. Bundy

Concluding Address: Dr. Robert E. Osgood

1986 The Pacific Basin: An American Strategy for the 1990s

Banquet Address: Mr. Seiichiro Ohtsuka

Banquet Address: Mr. Zhang Jingyi

Concluding Address: General Richard G. Stilwell

1987 NATO at Forty: Change, Continuity, and Implications for the Future

Banquet Address: General Andrew Goodpaster, Retired

Banquet Address: His Excellency Joseph M.A.H. Luns

Concluding Address: Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski

1988 U.S. National Strategy in the 1990s

Banquet Address: Dr. Edward Luttwak

Banquet Address: Dr. Samuel P. Huntington

Concluding Address: Mr. R. James Woolsey

1989 Seeking Conventional Stability in Europe: Force Enhancements and Arms Control

Banquet Address: Major General William F. Burns, Retired

Banquet Address: Honorable M. Benoit d’Aboville

Concluding Address: Dr. Fred Ikle

1990 Decade of Challenges: U.S. Intelligence in the 1990s

Banquet Address: Honorable William E. Colby

Banquet Address: Honorable Frank C. Carlucci

Concluding Address: Professor Loch K. Johnson

1991 Unburdening the Past: Forging America's Army for the 21st Century

Banquet Address: Brigadier General Harold W. Nelson

Banquet Address: General Edward C. Meyer, Retired

Concluding Address: General Gordon R. Sullivan

1992 The United States and the Atlantic Alliance

Banquet Address: Sir Michael Quinlan

Banquet Address: General Edward C. Meyer, Retired

Concluding Address: General John R. Galvin

1993 Coping with Conflict and Change in Central Eurasia

Banquet Address: Honorable Paul Wolfowitz

Banquet Address: Sir Brian Urquhart

Concluding Address: General John R. Galvin, Retired

1994 The Army and Society in the 21st Century

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman

Banquet Address: Admiral William A. Owens

Concluding Address: Lieutenant General William E. Odom

1995 The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly Conflict

Banquet Address: General Gordon R. Sullivan

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose

Concluding Address: Honorable Jack Reed

1996 Faces of Battle: Contending Visions of Future Warfare

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Wesley K. Clark

Banquet Address: Professor John Keegan

Concluding Address: General Barry R. McCaffrey, Retired

1997 Security, Strategy and Statecraft

Banquet Address: Dr. E. Randolph Jayne II

Banquet Address: Honorable William Perry

Concluding Address: Dr. Jane E. Holl

1998 National Military and Civilian Service

Banquet Address: Honorable Dave McCurdy

Banquet Address: Honorable Harris Wofford

Concluding Address: Mr. Steven Waldman

1999 NATO at 50: Perspectives and Prospects

Banquet Address: Honorable Marc Grossman

Banquet Address: General Wesley K. Clark

Concluding Address: Honorable Robert Hunter

2000 Emerging Threats and Their Consequences for U.S. National Security Policy

Banquet Address: General Richard B. Myers

Banquet Address: Ambassador Richard Butler

Concluding Address: Dr. David S.C. Chu

2001 The Future of the Army Profession

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, Retired

Banquet Address: Professor Andrew Abbott

Concluding Address: Brigadier General William G. Webster, Jr.

2002 Special Operations Forces in the 21st Century: Training and Educating for New Roles and Missions

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General William Tangney

Banquet Address: Honorable Robert Andrews

2003 Combating Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities in the Use of Power

Banquet Address: Dr. Bruce Hoffman

Luncheon Address: Honorable Edwin Meese III

Banquet Address: General Wayne A. Downing, Retired

2004 Defense Transformation and the Army Profession

Banquet Address: Major General James M. Dubik

Banquet Address: Honorable James Marshall

Concluding Address: Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck

2005 Special Operations Forces and the War on Terror

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General William G. Boykin

Banquet Address: Major General Herbert Altschuler

Concluding Address: Brigadier General Russell Howard, Retired

2006 Public Diplomacy: Message, Process, Outcomes

Banquet Address: Ambassador Edward Djerejian

Banquet Address: Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt

2007 “American Civil-Military Relations: Fifty Years After The Soldier and the State.”

Banquet Address: Dr. Peter Feaver

Banquet Address: General (Retired) Eric Shinseki

2008 “The Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict.”

Banquet Address: Secretary William J. Perry

Keynote Address: General George W. Casey

Banquet Address: General William S. Wallace

**SENIOR CONFERENCE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES
1963 TO 2008**

1963	CPT Ames Albro
1964	CPT Americo Sardo
1965	MAJ John W. Seigle
1966	MAJ William L. Hauser
1967	MAJ Dana G. Mead
1968	MAJ William E. Odom
1969	No Conference
1970	LTC William M. Wix
1971	MAJ John R. Landry
1972	MAJ James R. Ellis
1973	MAJ Peter H. Ward
1974	CPT Jack H. Jacobs
1975	CPT Roger J. Arango
1976	MAJ Waldo D. Freeman
1977	CPT James R. McDonough
1978	CPT William L. Robinson & CPT Ralph D. Crosby
1979	CPT Gregory D. Vukisch
1980	CPT Eric T. Olson
1981	MAJ Henry A. Leonard
1982	MAJ Peter W. Chiarelli
1983	LTC Jeffrey S. McKittrick
1984	LTC John S. Lilley
1985	MAJ Douglas E. Lute
1986	MAJ Lonnie S. Keene

1987 MAJ David H. Petraeus
1988 CPT David S. Clark
1989 MAJ Jeffrey Long
1990 MAJ Kevin R. Cunningham & MAJ Dennis Lowrey
1991 MAJ Robert L. McClure
1992 CPT Mark D. Smith
1993 MAJ Wally Z. Walters, Jr.
1994 CPT Clemson G. Turregano
1995 MAJ William D. Woolf
1996 MAJ Marc L. Rosen
1997 MAJ Douglas Henry
1998 CPT Grant R. Doty
1999 LTC Mark Fassio & CPT William B. Ostlund
2000 CPT William B. Ostlund
2001 LTC Kevin Dopf
2002 MAJ Charles Miller
2003 MAJ Joanne C. Moore
2004 MAJ Elizabeth Robbins
2005 MAJ Jeffrey C. Denius
2006 MAJ Chris Hornbarger
2007 MAJ David M. Dudas
2008 MAJ Scott Taylor