



MARCH 2008 MINI-CONFERENCE THE FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

SUMMARY OF FUTURES DOCUMENTS

Framing the future strategic environment in an era of persistent conflict is an immense challenge. Unlike the Cold War era, the United States no longer has an overarching paradigm through which it can view the world. Non-state actors and irregular warfare dominate the attention of America as it continues to fight insurgencies while coping with terrorist threats like Al Qaeda. Traditional threats persist in places like the Korean peninsula while the rise of China presents the prospect of a future strategic competitor. Increasingly global forces, whether in economics, environment or health, are having a greater impact on citizens around the world. Domestically, there is uncertainty on how to best structure, fund, and oversee the national security apparatus to meet these future challenges.

The March 2008 West Point Mini-Conference gathers prominent scholars and practitioners in order to discuss these issues and explore the strategic environment American military officers will face over the next 20 years. To focus this discussion, the following questions will be addressed:

- 1) What will the international strategic environment look like in the next 20 years?
- 2) What will the domestic environment look like in the next 20 years?
- 3) What will the technological environment look like in the next 20 years?
- 4) And what do trends in each of these areas suggest about likely demands to be placed upon the Army?

To provide a basis of discussion for the conference, enclosed are brief synopses of several recent top “futures” documents. These papers by various research and governmental organizations in the United States and Europe attempt to peer into the future and describe what this environment might look like. Included are summaries of the following documents:

Global Strategic Trends Programme (DCDC): The British Ministry of Defense Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre assesses the strategic context out to 2036 in order to inform the development of United Kingdom’s Defense Policy. *Strategic Trends* identifies and examines likely patterns in the world for the purpose of providing a probability-based assessment that suggests reasonable broad-order possibilities and potential outcomes.

Forging a World of Liberty Under Law (PPNS): The Princeton Project on National Security outlines a new national security strategy for the 21st century and describes the world that the United States should want to create in the future. The first part of the report details the Grand Strategy needed – *Forging a World of Liberty Under Law*. The second part of the report examines how this strategy might be applied to the various threats and challenges facing the United States.

Joint Operation Environment (JOE): The United States Joint Forces Command seeks to better understand the changes in the international system over the next 8-30 years to allow the United States to properly shape its military forces to meet the emerging challenges. The document provides a framework for the articulation and study of a range of alternative future operating environments. It describes the key elements and key trends, the potential military challenges that ensue from these trends, and a set of military implications resulting from the combination of trends (and possible shocks) that directly affect application of military power.

Mapping the Global Future (NIC): The National Intelligence Council of the United States examines the possible “futures” that the nation may face in the next decade and a half. The report posits that the defining features of the world will be the magnitude and speed of change resulting from a globalized world, the rise of new powers, new challenges to governance, and a more pervasive sense of insecurity, including terrorism.

The New Global Puzzle (EUISS): The European Union Institute for Security Studies examines the global context in which the European Security and Defense Policy will operate in 2025 by assessing the most likely developments in key areas. The first part of the report analyzes major long-term trends in the five key subject areas of demography, economy, energy, environment, and science and technology. The second part of the report applies this analysis in eight regional outlooks.

The conclusion from the Mini-Conference will serve as a stepping stone to the 2008 West Point Senior Conference which will explore the ***Army Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict***. The discussion from the mini-Conference will serve as the basis for addressing these subsequent questions:

1. How will the future strategic environment affect the Army’s roles and missions as well as the knowledge, competencies, and values needed in the Army’s officer corps?
2. How should the Army train and employ officers in the future to best take advantage of their knowledge and abilities to achieve the Nation’s political objectives through the use of land power?
3. And what are the implications of these questions for the Army’s Professional Military Ethic?

The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme: 2007-2036 (DCDC)
British Ministry of Defense Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

Global Strategic Trends Programme is a report by the British Ministry of Defense Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) designed to assess the strategic context out to 2036 in order to inform the development of the United Kingdom's Defense Policy. *Strategic Trends* identifies and examines likely patterns in the world for the purpose of providing a probability-based assessment that suggests reasonable broad-order possibilities and potential outcomes. The report assigns specific probabilities through the following formula: *will* means probability over 95%, *likely/probable* means over 60%, and *may/possibly* means over 10%.

Strategic Trends presents the likely changes to occur during the next 30 years by considering major trend-based outcomes in five dimensions: *Resource, Social, Political, Science and Technology, and Military*. The report analyzes how these trends will likely develop and interact, then presents probable and alternative outcomes. The report also identifies specific "Risks" associated with each dimension to highlight the possible manifestation of more adverse consequences. It then highlights "Defense and Security Implications" associated with the outcomes.

After presenting these outcomes within these dimensions, *Strategic Trends* uses these findings to identify and interpret likely patterns of change over the next 30 years. The report examines three "**Ring Road**" issues that will dominate and affect all human activity: ***Climate Change, Globalization, and Global Inequality***. These strategic trends will change the physical environment and make the planet more tightly integrated, making constant tension between greater interdependence and intensifying competition the defining features during the next 30 years. *Strategic Trends* then provides a framework to further the understanding of possible human responses to these changes by synthesizing possible outcomes and derivatives within four **Key Themes**: *Population & Resources, Identity and Interest, Governance and Order, and Knowledge and Innovation*. A sampling of the report's assessment of the implication of these changes follows.

Population & Resources: Competition for resources of all kinds *will* intensify. There *will* be an increased risk of humanitarian catastrophes. Migration and urbanization *will* increase pressure on infrastructure and governance and *may* destabilize existing communities. Authorities *will* be challenged by changing demographics. Sustained economic growth in developing countries is *likely* to compel societies to reevaluate the role of women, who *will* play an increasing role in generating wealth.

Identity & Interest: While citizenship and physical security *will* remain important, individual loyalty to the state and state institutions *will* become increasingly conditional, based on personal identity and interest. Nationhood and ethnicity in certain countries *will* continue to influence human behaviors and international relations. Diaspora communities and their networks *will* be dynamic and unpredictable features of the political, demographic and economic aspects of globalization. Physical and cultural origin *will* continue to be significant to identity, but will be employed increasingly

selectively. Communities *will* increasingly form around the pursuit of common interests, and *may* dissolve rapidly when no longer relevant. Materialism, secularism, moral relativism, and pragmatism are *likely* to increase, but *will* trigger responses from traditionally defined communities with more rigid religious or ideological belief systems.

Governance and Order: Transnational pressures, competition and globalization *will* challenge the robustness and resilience of governance and social mechanisms. New collaborative institutions, philosophies and mechanisms *will* be required to cope with complex, inter-connected global and regional problems. The exercise of national sovereignty *will* increasingly be expressed in support of collective international action, but regimes and polities *will* continue to act to protect their citizens and sustain their vital interests and stability. The emergence of new supra-national sovereign power is *unlikely*. Gaps and strains in the arrangements for international governance *will* be open to exploitation and abuse.

Knowledge and Innovation: The volume of information *will* challenge decision-support processes which are based on 'ordered' knowledge management and rigid hierarchical organizations. Technology-watch processes and intelligence agencies *will* be challenged by the speed and diversity of innovations. The rate of technological innovation *will* reduce the time available for its 'cultural' assimilation and control. It is *possible* that significant developments in quantum computing could lead to the compromise of some digital cryptology. More effort *will* be required in technical intelligence to provide early warning of unilateral or unexpected technical advantage.

FORGING A WORLD OF LIBERTY UNDER LAW: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (PPNS)

The Princeton Project on National Security

The Princeton Project on National Security seeks to outline a new national security strategy for the 21st century tailored to the present world and the world that the United States should want to create in the future. The first part of the report details the Grand Strategy needed – *Forging a World of Liberty Under Law*. It explains why this is the optimal strategy for making the United States and the world more secure. The second part of the report examines how this strategy might be applied to the various threats and challenges facing the United States.

The Princeton Project defines the basic objective of U.S. strategy as protecting the American people and the American way of life. The report breaks down these basic goals to three more specific goals, to include 1) *a secure homeland*, including protection against attacks on the people and infrastructure and against fatal epidemics, 2) *a healthy global economy*, essential for our own prosperity and security, and 3) *a benign international environment*, grounded in security cooperation among nations and the spread of liberal democracy.

To be successful, the Princeton Project contends that the American strategy for meeting these goals must meet six basic criteria. The strategy must be 1) *multidimensional*, able to deploy different tools for different situations, 2) *integrated*, fusing hard power with soft power, 3) *interest based rather than threat based*, building cooperation based on common interests with other nations rather than insisting they accept our priority for viewing threats, 4) *grounded in hope rather than fear*, 5) *pursued inside-out*, strengthening domestic governance as a foundation of international order and capacity, and 6) *adapted to the information age*.

To accomplish this, the Princeton Project asserts that America must stand for, seek, and secure a world of liberty under law. This strategy involves promoting liberty under law--not only for individual nationals in accordance with their distinctive history, culture, and stages of development, but also for the international system as a whole. There are three subcomponents of this strategy:

1. ***Bringing Governments up to PAR*** - America should assist and encourage *Popular, Accountable, and Rights-regarding (PAR) governments* worldwide. This strategy calls for creating deeper conditions for successful liberal democracies above and beyond holding of elections. To bring government “up to PAR,” the United States should aid in connecting them and their citizens to other government and societies that are already at PAR. Furthermore, the U.S. should help establish and institutionalize networks of government and nongovernmental representatives to help communicate and inculcate values.
2. ***Building a Liberal Order*** - America should reform the outdated post-WWII international institutions *to build a liberal order*. The United States has the largest

stake in fixing the legacy institutions like the United Nations because it is the most powerful nation in the world. Power cannot be wielded unilaterally without breeding resentment, fear, and resistance, and the U.S. needs a system of effective, global institutions to harness cooperation on problems that cannot be solved unilaterally. Concurrently, the United States should revive NATO work to develop a global “Concert of Democracies.” This institution would institutionalize and ratify the “democratic peace,” and become an alternative forum to authorize collective action.

3. ***Rethinking the Role of Force*** - The United States should *rethink the role of force*. Instead of insisting on a doctrine of primacy, the U.S. should aim to sustain the military predominance of liberal democracies. It should also update the doctrine of deterrence, announcing retaliatory action against the source of nuclear materials of weapons in the event of nuclear terrorism. In addition, America should develop new guidelines on the preventive use of force against terrorists and extreme states. Preventative use of force should be very rare, employed as a last resort, and authorized by a multilateral institution.

The second half of the Princeton Project assesses how this strategy might be applied to seven major threats and challenges:

- *Middle East*: Secure a comprehensive two-state solution in Israel and Palestine; ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapons capability; train and support an Iraqi government that is up to PAR while avoiding entanglement in a civil war.
- *Global Terror Networks*: Prevent the formation of a nexus between terror networks and nuclear weapons, destroy the core of terrorists, and peel away terrorist supporters and sympathizers.
- *Proliferation and Transfer of Nuclear Weapons*: Reform and revive the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by allowing non-nuclear weapons states nuclear energy, but not nuclear capacity; reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons; use aggressive counter-proliferation measures.
- *Rise of China and Order in East Asia*: Help China achieve its legitimate ambitions within the current international order as a responsible stakeholder in Asian and international politics; seek creation of an East Asian security institution.
- *Global Pandemics*: Invest more in our public health system; provide adequate resources and training to first responders; build foreign government capacity; create an incentive structure in at-risk countries to take necessary public health measures.
- *Energy*: Decrease our dependence on oil and promote energy alternatives; increase gasoline taxes; seek a politically feasible compromise on the Kyoto Protocol.
- *Building a protective infrastructure*: Strengthen public health systems, communications systems, and public education; de-politicize threat assessments; integrate health and economics with national security policy.

JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT: TRENDS & CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE JOINT FORCE THROUGH 2030 (JOE)

Joint Forces Command, United States

The *Joint Operating Environment* document attempts to better understand the changes in the international system in the period 8-30 years in the future to allow the United States to properly shape its military forces to meet the emerging challenges to the nation's security interests. The document provides a framework for the study and articulation of a range of alternative future operating environments. It first describes the key elements and key trends that will cause changes in the future operating environment. It then describes the potential military challenges that ensue from these trends. Finally, the report concludes by illustrating a set of military implications resulting from the combination of trends (and possible shocks) that directly affect application of military power.

KEY JOE Observations

The future trends portion of the JOE describes a world in which rich and prosperous states represent a smaller and smaller portion of humanity, while the poorest and least economically dynamic societies grapple with rapid population growth, explosive mega-cities, and cultural and environmental change that stresses already-fragile social and political structures. Globalization will lift millions from abject poverty, but its uneven impact will produce social dislocation, and because of raised expectations may produce dissonance & disorder if societies cannot translate gains in global trade into local prosperity. There will be increasing resource competition. As more people around the world have access to markets, trade and travel, these flows become more vulnerable to disruption. Finally, greater complexity in the operating environment and rapid rates of technological change and surprise are changing security paradigms, placing greater emphasis on prevention, and blurring enemies, adversaries, competitors, and friends.

Joint force challenges include enduring and emerging challenges, as well as national security shocks that may potentially change the international playing field in significant and possibly unpredictable ways. Enduring challenges for the future joint force will include familiar military activities, such as defending against attacks on U.S. territory, conflict with other powers, terrorist networks and criminal organizations. Enduring challenges also include dealing with the collapse of functioning states and the use of military forces to deter and prevent conflict around the world.

The joint force will also encounter a number of new and emerging challenges, the outlines of which are just becoming clear. These include the development by states of anti-access strategies and capabilities, the potential emergence of new terrorist ideologies, and groups or states bent on the disruption of global trade and finance. The future joint force will likely be confronted by persistent cyber-conflict and the potential disruption of global information networks. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing nuclear and energy states or mega-cities will challenge the joint force to impose levels of order on highly disordered situations. A final emerging challenge is the potential growth

and development of a global anti-American coalition of opportunistic states, transnational terrorist groups or supranational organizations.

Several national security shocks are identified that are clearly possible that, should they come to pass, would have dramatic effects on U.S. national security and the wider global security environment. These include significant disruptions to energy security or conversely, the development of alternatives to oil. Other shocks include technological surprise, loss of access to the global commons (international air space, high seas, space or internet) or the emergence of man-made or natural pandemic that kills and sickens a significant portion of the world's population. Finally, nuclear attack on one or more of America's cities, or a global depression that disrupts the U.S. economy would overturn the international system and result in wide-ranging and dramatic changes to the U.S. security posture.

The military implications of the future operating environment for the joint force are arranged into five general categories. The implications for these five categories are:

- *Terrain* - an expanded unified global battlespace; heightened importance of influencing human terrain through cultural expertise; and a need for comprehensive approaches that address political, military, economic, and social dimensions.
- *Base* – (defined as the physical or intellectual place that sustains or legitimizes a force's actions) need for new sources of strength as power is diffused; importance of securing access to the global commons; and recognition that there will be no sanctuaries completely safe from attack.
- *Knowledge* - importance of maximizing and protecting our information systems; increasing parity in the availability of information and knowledge to all parties; and need for knowledge-based organizations that well connect intelligence/ information to operations.
- *Force application* - broader definitions of military capabilities to include logistical, political, social, and economic underpinnings; threat from innovative use of emerging technologies; importance of information operations and the media; and relevance of "law of warfare" issues such as proportionality.
- *Command* – greater emphasis on the human, vice technological, aspects of the art and science of war; importance of cultural, organizational, and technological networks; and increased interaction between military and non-military domains.

MAPPING THE GLOBAL FUTURE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL'S 2020 PROJECT (NIC)

National Intelligence Council

In *Mapping the Global Future*, the National Intelligence Council of the United States examines the possible “futures” that the nation may face in the next decade and a half. The report posits that the defining feature of the world will be the very magnitude and speed of change resulting from a globalized world. Other significant characteristics include the rise of new powers, new challenges to governance, and a more pervasive sense of insecurity, including terrorism.

The NIC sees globalization – growing interconnectedness reflected in the expanded flow of information, technology, capital, goods, services, and people throughout the world – as an overarching “mega-trend.” This force will shape all other major trends in the world of 2020. It sees the world economy continuing to grow impressively because of globalization, though the benefits of globalization will not be global. Globalization will most benefit those countries and groups that can access and adopt new technologies. China and India may possibly rise as technological leaders, and more firms may become more global as well as more Asian in orientation. Key uncertainties caused by this trend include the sharper, demand-driven competition for resources.

The NIC also foresees the likely emergence of China and India, as well as others, as new major global players. Their rises will transform the geopolitical landscape in ways similar to the advent of a united Germany in the 19th century and the rise of the United States in the 20th century. How China and India exercise their growing powers and whether they relate cooperatively or competitively to other powers are key uncertainties. Other powers, to include Brazil, Indonesia, an enlarged Europe, and Russia may also grow in international stature. Europe and Japan will be limited by aging populations. How the world in 2020 is mentally mapped will change radically.

Though the NIC sees the nation-state as the dominant unit of the global order, it also foresees enormous new strains on governments due to economic globalization and dispersion of technologies. One such strain will come from new forms of identity politics centered on religious conviction – more specifically political Islam rallying disparate ethnic and national groups and perhaps even creating an authority that transcends national boundaries. At the same time, the NIC sees the possibility of a partial reversal of “third wave” of democratization, particularly among the states of the former Soviet Union and Southeast Asia. With the flux of the international system, the institutions charged with managing global problems may be overwhelmed or rendered obsolete.

Finally, the NIC foresees a more pervasive sense of insecurity by 2020. Though most of the world will grow richer, globalization will shake up the status quo – generating enormous economic, cultural, and consequently political convulsions. The report notes that weak governments, lagging economies, religious extremism, and youth bulge will align to create a perfect storm for internal conflicts in certain regions, which could become safe havens for terrorists or criminal enterprises. The threat of great power

conflict escalating into total war is low. At the same time, nuclear proliferation could continue as countries see neighbors and regional rivals acquire nuclear weapons. The key factors that spawned international terrorism show no sign of abating. The NIC expects that al Qaida will be superseded by similarly inspired Islamic extremist groups, and sees the acquisition of WMDs by such groups as America's greatest concern.

From these trends, the NIC presents four fictional scenarios to describe possible worlds that the United States may be entering. The *Davos World* is one where robust economic growth, led by China and India, reshapes the globalization process while giving it a more non-Western face and transforming the political playing field. *Pax Americana* shows how the United States may survive the radical changes to the global political landscape to fashion a new and inclusive global order. *A New Caliphate* shows a world where global movements fueled by radical religious identity politics could challenge Western norms and values as the foundation of the global system. Lastly, *Cycle of Fear* depicts a possible introduction of an Orwellian world, where concerns about proliferation might increase to a point that intrusive security measures are taken to prevent outbreaks of deadly attacks. These scenarios may unfold in some combination.

The report concludes by stating that the role of the United States will remain an important shaper of the international order in 2020. Although the challenges ahead for America will be daunting, it will retain enormous economic, technological, political, and military advantages, playing a pivotal role across the broad range of issues. Although American military power will remain unrivaled, the possession of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons by various actors will increase the cost of American military action. The terrorist threat will remain and will be best addressed using a strategy that approaches the problem on multiple fronts. In this context, the increasing centrality of ethical issues, such as on the environment, climate change, privacy, biotechnology, cloning, human rights, international law regulating conflict, and multilateral institutions, has the potential to divide worldwide public opinion and challenge U.S. leadership.

THE NEW GLOBAL PUZZLE: WHAT WORLD FOR THE EU IN 2025? (EUISS)
European Union Institute for Security Studies

The New Global Puzzle is a report by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) that examines the global context in which the European Security and Defense Policy will operate in 2025 by assessing the most likely developments in key areas. The first part of the report analyzes major long-term trends in five key areas of demography, economy, energy, environment, and science and technology. The second part of the report then uses this analysis to present eight regional outlooks.

PART I: The Trends

Demography: The world population is expected to increase by 23.4%, with growth concentrated in developing countries. The population of the developed world will remain stable, but demographic trends will differ greatly between the US (+17.4%), the EU (+2%), Japan (-2.6%), and Russia (-10.8%). Ageing will be the main demographic feature, dramatically changing the work forces and the ratio of retired dependent to the working young. Migration rates towards Europe are expected to remain stable. Health care will continue to improve, but epidemics will spread more easily.

Economy: Globalization will continue and deepen; greater openness and new trade powers will enhance competition and increase the pressure to adapt economic and social systems. The dominant triad – the US, the EU and Japan – will probably remain leaders in many high-value markets, but continue to outsource labor-intensive production and business services. Some outsourcing destinations (esp. China and India) will become new powerhouses. Emerging economies in Asia are expected to grow the fastest.

Energy: By 2030, demand for primary energy is expected to be 50% higher than in 2006. Fossil fuels, primarily oil, will continue to be the world's primary energy source, accounting for 81% of demand. The share of nuclear energy is expected to decline in most mature market economies, but to increase in developing countries. Renewable energy will increase, but remain a small share of total energy supply. Developing countries will account for more than 2/3 of the increase in demand. With sufficient investment, energy resources should meet demand growth, but likely at higher prices.

Environment: Global warming is a long-term trend that, for the foreseeable future, can be mitigated, but not stopped. Temperatures are expected to rise worldwide between .4° C and 1.1° C by 2025. Though this would not imply dramatic climate change, impact of global warming will become increasingly noticeable in certain arid and semi-arid areas. Industrialization and urbanization will be the main source of environmental degradation.

Science and Technology: The centrality of IT in daily life is likely to increase. Nanotechnology may radically transform the way goods are assembled and manufactured. Advances in biotechnology may improve our capacity to deal with disease, malnutrition, and pollution. Continued public and private investment in R&D in areas such as nanotechnology will raise the prospects of future breakthroughs.

Part II: The Regions

Eurasia and Russia: Political participation will range from relatively healthy levels in European and some South Caucasus countries to heavy state control in Central Asia. The states will become divided according to economic prosperity, energy wealth or dependence, demographic trends, educational and health opportunities and relationship to globalization. In Russia, there will be a tension between the trend towards increasingly authoritarian centralism and openness to globalization.

Middle East and Africa: The region will be a source of growing instability as democratization is debated, ethnic and sectarian identities intensify, and regimes are toppled, voted out, or pressured internally and externally. The conflict between Israel and Palestine remains a central challenge, as well as the dilemmas stemming from the intertwined efforts of those pursuing democratization and Islamisation.

Sub-Saharan Africa: Poor governance, corruption, low investment, weak infrastructure, and limited internal markets will continue to hamper economic development. Renewed interest in Africa's natural resources will allow leaders to resist the need to develop more democratic systems and to develop their security forces. Poor governance is likely to fuel conflicts in West and Central Africa and the Great Lakes region.

The United States: Although remaining the superpower, aspects of America will change due to the impact of Hispanic immigration, income inequality, the growing role of the state in the wake of 9/11, and the place of religion in politics. In foreign policy, the US will face the waning attraction of America's soft power, a rising China, and energy security challenges. Defining features of American foreign policy will be an emphasis on pragmatism, a permissive attitude towards use of force, and multilateralism *a la carte*.

China: China will be recognized as a pivotal player in the international system as it becomes the largest trading nation and a commercial superpower. Domestically, China will need to address energy security, environmental, and political reforms while maintaining growth and stability. Open questions are China's international role, acceptance of the status quo in global governance, and its acceptance of multilateralism.

India: Constraints to its continued development include energy dependency, population growth, urban overcrowding, inadequate infrastructure, and weak health and education services. It will likely pursue a pragmatic foreign policy with strong ties to the U.S.

Latin America: How the region evolves will depend on internal political developments, its relationship with the US, and its ability to integrate further in the globalization process. Major challenges include the fight against inequality and political violence, organized crime, and terrorism. Latin America will also need to find its own model of development to exploit its considerable potential for economic growth.

The European Union: The EU is likely to remain one of the richest and safest parts of the world, but demographic changes demand reforms in social security systems, labor markets, and education systems. The EU will find itself dependent on energy from and be surrounded by countries prone to instability.

The *three defining questions* of the new global puzzle are the future of the international system, the future of global governance, and the future of democracy. The international system will likely feature a re-emergence of great power politics, a consolidation of regional multilateral frameworks, and a proliferation of weak states. There will be an increased demand for global governance in response to the trends of growing interdependence and growing heterogeneity. There will be tradeoffs between democracy and stability.

Key conclusions:

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Outstanding questions:

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Implications for the Army and Development of Professional Military Ethic (if any):

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