

# THE ARMY'S PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHIC (PME)

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*The purpose of any profession is to serve society by effectively delivering a necessary and useful specialized service. To fulfill those societal needs, professions—such as medicine, law, the clergy, and the military—develop and maintain distinct bodies of specialized knowledge and impart expertise through formal, theoretical, and practical education. Each profession establishes a unique subculture that distinguishes practitioners from the society they serve while supporting and enhancing that society. **Professions create their own standards of performance and codes of ethics to maintain their effectiveness.** To that end they develop particular vocabularies, establish journals, and sometimes adopt distinct forms of dress. In exchange to holding their members to high technical and ethical standards, society grants professionals a great deal of autonomy. (bold added by authors)*

Field Manual 1, 14 June 2005, paragraph 1-40

*“Leadership is a potent combination of strategy and character. If you must be without one, be without the strategy.”*

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

## Introduction

The epigraphs above frame very well this descriptive essay on the Army's Professional Military Ethic (PME). At least four aspects of the PME—each within the focus of this essay—are clearly noted in them.

First, we should note from Field Manual (FM) 1, the Army's capstone doctrinal manual, the purpose of the ethic. It is “to maintain [the Army's] effectiveness.” The implication is as clear as it is true—without such an ethic the Army cannot be effective at what it does. As is well documented in the literature of professions, their ethics provide the primary means of social direction and control over their members as they perform their expert duties, often under chaotic conditions.<sup>1</sup> For the Army profession, its evolving expert knowledge in the “moral-ethical” domain is what enables the profession to develop individual professionals—Soldiers and their leaders—to fight battles and campaigns “effectively and rightly,” as expected by the client the profession serves.<sup>2</sup> Without such “good, right and just” application of their expertise, the Army will lose its lifeblood—the trust of the American people!

Second, we must note that the PME is uniquely the ethic of a profession, the Army Profession, which produces sustained land power for use under Joint Command, one of three military professions currently serving the Republic.<sup>3</sup> Thus, it is not the ethic of a bureaucracy or of a business, though the Army has aspects of bureaucracy within it.

This highlights one of, if not the, major challenge currently facing the strategic leaders of the profession, the Colonels and General Officers: how to lead the Army in such a manner that its culture, ethic, and behavior is that of a profession, even though it is organized in many aspects as a hierarchical bureaucracy. The most insightful conclusion drawn from over four years of study of the Army as profession (2000-2004) rings as true today in the latter stages of the Iraq deployments as it did when published initially in 2002.<sup>4</sup> It is the lament of middle grade Soldiers and their leaders when their strategic leaders do not conform the Army and its subcultures into the behavior of a profession—“How can I be a professional, if there is no profession?”<sup>5</sup>

Reflecting on this lament, we should all be reminded of what at least one articulation of the PME currently states, “I am an expert and I am a professional,” (the ninth statement of The Soldier’s Creed). But how can they be “an expert and a professional” if there is no profession; rather, just a bureaucracy? Clearly, then, the maintenance of the profession’s ethic is one of the most precious and vital privileges of those who are the stewards of the Army on behalf of the Republic.

Thirdly, FM 1 makes clear that the ethic is about culture—it is integral to it. The PME is the core of moral principles, values and beliefs within the center of the culture “that distinguishes practitioners from the society they serve while supporting and enhancing that society.” But Army culture is a topic little understood and even less studied by the Army.<sup>6</sup> So we will treat it in some detail in this essay, both to inform about its basic character and to open a professional discussion as to its dysfunction as well as, in the case of the PME, its absolutely vital aspects.

And fourth, the comment by General Schwarzkopf reminds us succinctly that the PME is ultimately about individual character as manifested in the decisions and actions of all who are considered leaders within the profession, be they commissioned, non-commissioned, or civilian. Unless the profession’s ethic is manifested integrally in the personal lives and official actions of its leaders, and through them its Soldiers, the Army is simply not a profession at all, and its effectiveness as even a bureaucracy will be greatly impaired.

The purpose of this essay, then, is to provide a framework with which scholars and practitioners can discuss the various aspects of the Army’s PME. Such discussion is especially challenging because we lack common models and language for communication. Current Army doctrine and scholarly research do not provide a construct to examine the PME, nor do they analyze how the PME changes with cultural shifts, evolving wars, or other external shocks. When professionals discuss their PME, for example, are they analyzing the ethic of the profession or that of the individual professional; is the ethic they are discussing defined in legal or moral terms, etc. To preclude such “talking past each other,” this essay offers a proposal for the missing constructs and language with which we can more carefully examine the Army’s Professional Military Ethic.

This paper is structured in four sections. The first section places the Army's PME in its macro context, which is the profession's culture. It examines the three major, long-term influences on that culture and its core ethos, and thus how it evolves over time. It is our contention that in this era of persistent conflict, we are witnessing changes within these three influences that are impacting the Army's PME. In order to analyze these influences we introduce in the second section a more disaggregated framework, one in which we propose that the PME can be divided first by its legal and moral components, then by application at the institution and the individual level. Given a two by two matrix of components, this provides four "quadrants" within which to discuss different sources of the PME: legal-institutional, moral-institutional, legal-individual, moral-individual. In the third section, turning from description to analysis; we examine whether recent doctrinal adaptations by the Army (FM 3-0, 3-24, and 6-22, etc.) indicate actual evolution in the profession's ethos. Then in the fourth and concluding section, we present what we believe to be the most significant developmental challenge facing the Army profession – the moral development of Army Leaders, moving them from "values to virtues" in order that Army professionals can match consistently their renowned military-technical competencies with the high quality of their moral character. In this section, we conclude with a set of specific issues which we believe conferees should discuss.

## **I. The Army's Professional Culture and Its Ethos, a Macro View<sup>7</sup>**

For the purposes of this discussion, the most useful starting point is the broad definition for any organizational culture offered by Edgar Schein:

We must first specify that a given set of people has had enough stability and common history to have allowed a culture to form. This means that some organizations will have no overarching culture because they have no common history or have frequent turnover of members. Other organizations can be presumed to have strong cultures because of a long shared history or because they have shared important intense experiences (as in a combat unit). But the content and strength of a culture have to be empirically determined. They cannot be presumed from observing surface cultural phenomena. Culture is what a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration. Such learning is simultaneously a behavioral, cognitive, and an emotional process. . . .


Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore, (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, or feel in relation to these problems.<sup>8</sup>

Schein's classic definition accords with the implications drawn from FM-1 in the introduction of this essay. Military culture is the deep structure of organization that is drawn from the Army's past successes and from its current interactions with the present environment. It is rooted in the prevailing assumptions, values, and traditions which collectively, over time, have created shared individual expectations among the members of the Army profession. Meaning is established through socialization to a variety of identity groups (e.g., Army branches and components, etc.) that converge in the operations of the organization. Professional culture includes both attitudes and behavior about what is right, what is good, and what is important, often manifested in shared heroes, stories, and rituals that promote bonding among the members. It is, in short, the "glue" that makes the profession a distinctive source of identity and experience that, in turn, informs the character of its individual members. Thus, a strong culture exists when a clear set of norms and expectations -- usually as a function of leadership -- permeates the entire organization. It is essentially "how we do things around here."<sup>9</sup>

Closely associated with an organization's culture is its climate. In contrast to culture, organizational climate refers to environmental stimuli rooted in the organization's value system, such as rewards and punishments, communications flow, and operations tempo, which determine individual and team perceptions about the quality of working conditions. It is essentially "how we feel about this organization."<sup>10</sup> Climate is often considered to be alterable in the near term and largely limited to those aspects of the organizational environment of which members are aware.

Climate and culture are obviously related in complex ways, climate being an observable and measurable artifact of culture, and considered by many to be one of the major determinants of organizational effectiveness. For the purposes of this essay, such definitions would seem to establish from the outset that those who seek to understand the Army's PME, must look deeply within its culture.

## Influences on the Culture and Ethic



**Figure 1** – *Influences on Army Culture and Ethos.*

Figure 1 depicts the three major categories of influences on the Army's professional culture: (1) the functional imperatives of the profession, 2) America's culture, values, beliefs, and norms, and 3) international laws and treaties of which the United States are a party. It is our contention that operating in the era of persistent conflict has and will continue to bring about changes in all three of these influences on the Army's culture and ethos.

In this new era we are witnessing globalization, wide-spread environmental changes, the rise of non-state actors, and the regionalization of persistent conflict – all trends that have already profoundly impacted America's security posture and strategy to confront evolving threats. The U.S. Army, for its part, will most likely continue in expeditionary type missions to extremely hostile and unstable environments. It will likely operate “among the peoples” in areas where government is either weak or failed and where non-state adversaries have access to increasingly destructive weapons, and asymmetric advantages such as language and cultural awareness. Operating in such an environment has already placed new demands on the Army and its ethic, and we anticipate that such will continue for the foreseeable future.

For example, the functional imperatives that inform the profession's PME are already changing. Whereas “we don't do nation-building, we only do BIG wars” was documented a decade ago as a long standing cultural norm<sup>11</sup>, the Army has recently sought aggressively to re-master the competencies of counterinsurgency and nation-building. Such is reflected in the equal footing now given to stability operations in the Army's new FM 3-0.

Second, our national culture, values, beliefs, and norms are evolving, partially due to 9/11, but also due to generational change within our increasingly immigrated population. The tolerance for security over civil liberties, for example, is greater now than a decade ago. Though debate continues, suspension of habeas corpus for enemy combatants, increases in government surveillance, and use of military tribunals is at least tolerated. Lastly, prevailing views of international laws and treaties are evolving. The use of harsh interrogation techniques and status of enemy combatants given to those we capture are departures from the norms followed throughout the pre-9/11 era.

Understanding how these changes in operating environment, type of warfare, and nature of the threats will affect the Army's PME is a daunting undertaking, one well beyond the scope of this brief review essay. It is, however, an essential task to be tackled before the Army can determine how best to develop moral leaders capable of dealing with the ethical challenges imposed by this new era of persistent conflict.

One question that this macro framework does raise for conferees is: what is the boundary between the Army's culture and its ethos? In other words, just what aspects of Army culture are truly ethos that is so revered for its positive influence on mission effectiveness that it must be documented and passed on to future generations of leaders? Clearly “taking care of your soldiers and their families” is ethos; but what else qualifies? This

would appear to be a major area for urgent research in any effort to explicate the Army’s PME.

We believe one way to get at this question, and others, is a more disaggregated framework that begins to examine the different elements within the Army’s PME. The following section is an introduction of such a framework.

## II. A Framework for Dialogue on the Army’s PME

Here we present a common framework and language for the study of Army’s system of ethics. We submit that the Army’s professional military ethic is a shared system of beliefs and norms, both legal (codified) and moral (non-legal), which define the Army’s commitment to serve the nation. There are multiple sources for the Army’s PME, derived from documents as diverse as our founding Constitution, the Just War traditions, oaths of office, the Army’s Seven Values, and the NCO Creed. The beliefs and norms of behavior stemming from these documents guide the performance of our service as a profession as well as the performance of individual professionals.

### A Framework of the Army’s PME




Figure 2 – Framework of the Army PME

This framework first makes delineation between legal and moral foundations. The legal foundation is codified, and stems from various legal documents starting with the Constitution. The moral foundation has no legal basis, but has been learned over time as providing for mission success and for fulfilling service within a “social trustee” profession.”<sup>12</sup> In one sense the separation of the PME into these components reflects the importance of the profession and its leaders adhering to the higher Western ethic of not only avoiding evil (as defined by the law), but also of doing good (as defined in terms of

interpersonal relations by which humans can flourish [one definition of what is moral]). In the murky environment of persistent conflict, what is legal may not necessarily be moral, and our leaders may, on occasion, have to rely on moral guidelines to conduct good and right actions.

Second, the PME can be further divided into values and norms that guide the performance of the collective Army as institution versus those that are more clearly directed at the decisions and actions of the individual professional. These divisions produce four different quadrants we can use to analyze the Army's PME: the legal-institutional, moral-institutional, legal-individual, and the moral-individual.

Quadrant 1 is the legal–institutional, the legal and codified foundation of our ethic that guides the behavior of the Army as a Profession. Without doubt, the primary source of this component of our ethic is the U.S. Constitution, which institutionalizes the aptly described “invitation to struggle” among the branches of our government.<sup>13</sup> The legal placement of the military under the equal purview of both Congress and the President is a basic feature of American civil-military relations and, as noted in the previous section, strongly influences the norms that the Army has adopted for participation in such relationships, particularly by senior officers. As noted in the figure, other legal codes that the military ethos is influenced by include the various treaties to which the United States is a party, Status of Forces Agreements, and the evolving Law of Land Warfare.

There exists in this quadrant also those legal-institutional ethics that apply only to the Army. The section of Title 10, U.S. Code that applies directly to the Army, for example, stipulates that the Army be “organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.” The code states that the Army is primarily “responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war.” The emphasis on sustained land combat and prosecution of war has over the years influenced Army culture towards large, conventional, army-on-army conflicts.

Quadrant 2 is the moral-institutional component, the moral, non legal foundation that is applied to the Army as a Profession. Sources of the moral-institutional ethic include the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the Just War traditions, to mention just two. One example of this type of component of our ethic is the traditional Army cultural preference to fight the “Big War.” Another is the understanding that the real lifeblood of the Army is its relationship of trust held by the American people and their leaders. A third example is the Army's “can-do” attitude. While a positive cultural norm that has enabled the Army to prevail repeatedly over adversity, the “can-do” attitude, when applied at other times with overbearing micro-management, has adversely affected the effectiveness of the profession.

We also suggest that within this quadrant lie the subcultures and sub-ethics of different portions of the Army. The Army has accepted these subcultures both of branches and components as necessary for the conduct of the unique missions that the various sub-elements of the Army must perform for the effective combined arms battle. The culture

of the U.S. Cavalry is a case in point. With its own initiation rights performed during the spur ride, own regalia in the form of Stetsons and spurs, and unique mindset and attitude built around dash, daring, and decisive action, the U.S. Cavalry has carved out a unique niche within the profession. However, whether such a subculture, or those of other branches and components, meshes with the mindset advocated for stability operations as described in FM 3.0 is an unresearched question.

Quadrant 3 is the legal-individual component, the foundations that apply to the Soldier as a professional. Legal documents that form the foundation within the quadrant include the officer's oath of commission, the Standards of Exemplary Conduct, the UCMJ, and ROE. A more recent item is The Soldier's Rules, (below, from AR 350-1 and FM 3-0) which distills the Law of Land Warfare to the ethical and lawful conduct required of each soldier. Such guidelines have been useful to help prevent soldiers from "doing evil." Recently, however, as we will discuss in the next section, soldiers have found it more difficult to apply such seemingly straightforward guidelines.<sup>14</sup>

Table 1-4. The Soldier's Rules

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Soldiers fight only enemy combatants.</li><li>• Soldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them over to their superior.</li><li>• Soldiers do not kill or torture enemy prisoners of war.</li><li>• Soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.</li><li>• Soldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.</li><li>• Soldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.</li><li>• Soldiers treat civilians humanely.</li><li>• Soldiers do not steal. Soldiers respect private property and possessions.</li><li>• Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.</li><li>• Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superior.</li></ul>
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Lastly, Quadrant 4 is the moral-individual component, the non legal foundations that apply to the Soldier individually as a human being and as a professional. Such may include the universal understandings of human rights and widely accepted norms for moral human behavior (the Golden Rule, for example). Though at times more amorphous and difficult to analyze, the various creeds and mottos that make up this component—West Point's "Duty, Honor, Country," the NCO's Creed, and the Seven Army Values—are potentially the most inspirational and the most powerful motivators of individual action. The short declarations of the Warrior's Ethos – "I will always place the mission first; I will never accept defeat; I will never quit; I will never leave a fallen comrade" – have been courageously exemplified by countless heroes such as Master Sergeant Gordan and Sergeant First Class Shugart.

These four quadrants are by no means mutually exclusive. These components of the ethic are deeply integrated and changes in one quadrant directly influence the other quadrants as well. As the operating environment continues to increase in complexity, however, it seems to us that the foundations within Quadrants 2 and Quadrant 4 offer the best opportunity for analysis and renewal by the Army. Fortunately, they are also the foundations over which the Army, under its professional autonomy, has the most control.

Admittedly, there has been a reluctance in the past to articulate sharply these moral foundations of the Army's ethic. One reason is the fear that precise articulation of such a moral ethic, particularly for officers, may lead to moral minimalism that seeks more to "avoid evil" than to "do good." A second reason is the recognition that these are not neatly separable things and that efforts to provide too precise a formulation risk inducing legalistic behavior due to overly burdensome rules.<sup>15</sup> A third reason may have to do with the continued disagreement in our society and armed forces on the use and utility of force in the contemporary operating environment.

Whatever the case, the question becomes whether we now need a more precise re-articulation of the Army ethic to better influence the moral behavior and development of individual professionals in the future. In reflecting on the recent moral failings of Army leaders, did they not follow the Army's PME simply because they did not know what it was, or because they were, individually, insufficiently dedicated to follow it? Do we need further articulation of moral-individual ethics to include additional mottos and creeds to guide individual action -- an Officer's Creed, for example? Or is the more important question how and how well Army professionals inculcate even the current PME?

### **III. Does the recent evolution in Army Doctrine indicate an evolving ethos?**

In this section we seek to benchmark the evolution, if any, in the Army's ethic. One way to do so is to look at how the Army speaks to itself about its ethic. For example, the 2001 version of FM 3-0 (Operations) contains one usage of *ethic* in any derivation: "All Army leaders must demonstrate strong character and high ethical standards."<sup>16</sup> Contrast that with the 2008 version which contains six usages, although all within two paragraphs.<sup>17</sup> While the numerical difference is small, the substantive difference is larger. The 2008 version goes well beyond the simple expectation in the earlier version to helpfully explain why ethics are necessary to mission success and to provide The Soldier's Rules that describe how ethical Soldiers and their Leaders behave (printed in full in the previous section of this essay).

The Army has also progressed in emphasizing in an ethical sense the necessity for leaders to be more culturally aware. The 2001 version of FM 3-0 discusses the importance of culture, but only in the context of the Army understanding the culture of allies in unified operations, and such is only mentioned in a few short paragraphs. The 2008 version addresses culture quite differently. In the very first paragraph of the very first chapter, the new doctrine verbalizes the need to understand the complete operational environment: "While they [conditions, circumstances, influences of the operational environment] include all enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems across the spectrum of conflict, they also include an understanding of the physical environment, the state of governance, technology, local resources, and *the culture of the local population*."<sup>18</sup> The remainder of the 2008 version repeats the need to understand local culture as a variable significant to mission success, clearly an ethical implication.

A review of new COIN doctrine (FM 3-24) by a colleague provides similar insights.

As noted earlier, the Army's new capstone doctrine (FM 3.0) describes this new era of "persistent conflict" wherein our military professionals must apply their skills and talents in environments that are "complex, multidimensional, and increasingly fought 'among the people.'"<sup>19</sup> But, if this era's complexity has multiplied the variables that our young leaders must consider while planning missions, so too has it complicated the ethical environment in mission execution. For example, FM 3-24 now espouses two separate "ethics of force"—most force permissible and least force possible. While adding the later distinction greatly increases the Army's ethical "tool kit" and makes it a more adaptable institution, it demands increased discretionary judgment on the part of Army leaders at the point of force application. As our colleague<sup>20</sup> recently noted:

The ethics of war and nation-building "among the people" is much more complex than the ethics of performing consolidation and reorganization on a desert objective after a tank battle. The majority of our fine young leaders have adapted well—local populations often bequeath the title of "mayor" onto these talented noncommissioned officers, lieutenants, and captains. Such agility today in Army leaders is, by doctrine, a military obligation: "Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors."<sup>21</sup>

Nonetheless, release in May 2007 of a Military Health Advisory Team (MHAT-IV) survey of fewer than 2,000 Soldiers and Marines who had served in units with "the highest level of combat exposure" in Iraq found that: "approximately 10 percent of soldiers and Marines report mistreating non-combatants or damaging property when it was not necessary. Only 47 percent of the soldiers and 38 percent of Marines agreed that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect. Well over a third of all soldiers and Marines reported that torture should be allowed to save the life of a fellow soldier or Marine. And less than half of soldiers or Marines would report a team member for unethical behavior."<sup>22</sup>

Although Army doctrine (FM 3-24) specifies an embedded ethic that "preserving noncombatant lives and dignity is central to mission accomplishment" in counterinsurgency,<sup>23</sup> the survey reported *that between one-third and one-half of Soldiers and Marines who answered the survey dismissed the importance or truth of non-combatants' dignity and respect* (italics added by author).

There are two ways to understand the Army's newly embedded ethic that "preserving noncombatant lives and dignity is central to mission accomplishment." In one sense, this norm of counterinsurgency is utilitarian; i.e., we ought to preserve lives and dignity because "it pays" or "it is in our interest" or "it conduces to mission success." The other way is to view this morality as one of ends rather than means, i.e., that it requires that the soldiers' estimate of the dignity of *the other* during deployments be equal to that dignity possessed individually by the Army warrior's own friends and loved ones back home. Put otherwise, according to our colleague, the American warrior must come to accept no

difference in moral worth between the older taxi driver who lives in the village where he patrols and the warrior's own father back home.

This raises the obvious question for conferees of how the Army should address the moral development of warriors who must now have a sufficiently integrated world-view and strength of personal character as to be able to consistently abide by and enforce this newly embedded ethic.

Turning to FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, the challenge is accurately stated: how to develop leaders that “demonstrate strong character and high ethical standards.” The Army recognizes that “new challenges facing leaders, the Army, and the Nation mandate adjustments in how the Army educates, trains, and develops its military and civilian leadership.” However, FM 6-22 provides little guidance about how such “mandated adjustments” are to occur.<sup>24</sup> Again, FM 6-22 is very clear on what leaders are, but does not consider well how to develop them:

“Character, a person’s moral and ethical qualities, helps determine what is right and gives a leader motivation to do what is appropriate, regardless of the circumstances or the consequences. An informed ethical conscience consistent with the Army Values strengthens leaders to make the right choices when faced with tough issues. *Since Army leaders seek to do what is right and inspire others to do the same, they must embody these values.*”<sup>25</sup> (italics added by authors)

In fact, current Army doctrine leaves character development to the individual and specifies no role at all for the institution, save its leaders:

“Becoming a person of character and a leader of character is a career-long process involving day-to-day experience, education, self-development, developmental counseling, coaching, and mentoring. While **individuals are responsible for their own character development**, leaders are responsible for encouraging, supporting, and assessing the efforts of their people.”<sup>26</sup> (bold added by authors)

Thus, in our view, unlike the evolving training programs stemming from the requirements for cultural awareness within FM 3-0, the Army takes a “hands-off” approach to the moral development of its Soldiers and their leaders. Is this good enough, or does the Army have an institutional need and responsibility to take a more active role in the character development of its Soldiers and their leaders?

#### **IV. Conclusion: The Army’s Challenge – Enabling institutional values (PME) to inform and motivate individual virtues (the Moral Character of the Exemplary Leaders)**

This conference is designed to facilitate discussion on the effects that the new era of persistent conflict will have on the Army’s PME and, thus, on its efforts to develop its

Soldiers and their leaders. In essence the Army has initiated the process of re-thinking and re-documenting the profession's "moral-ethical" expert knowledge, one of its four domains of abstract expert knowledge and the one that, clearly, is the least well defined to date.<sup>27</sup> In fact, the Army does not have a capstone "moral- ethical" manual, or anything close to it.

We should also note that at the level of scholarship much has been researched and written on this new era and its ethical complexities,<sup>28</sup> but that is knowledge of an abstract and diffuse nature.<sup>29</sup> All professions, including the Army, have to create their own expert knowledge, in the process selecting from research and scholarship and then refining it by the experience of expert practice to arrive at published "doctrine."

To assist in that process we offer for conferees the following five conclusions to focus their reflection and subsequent discussions and to assist the Army in the development of the needed doctrine.

1. The influences on the Army's PME created by this new era of persistent conflict are largely unexplored and unanalyzed. This has been for some time essentially an un-researched field, yet one resting squarely within the "moral-ethical" domain of expert knowledge of the Army profession, an internal jurisdiction for which the Army alone is responsible. With the sole exception of the recently completed *Study of the Human Dimension of Full Spectrum Operations* (TRADOC, 2008), this has been particularly true of research on the moral, vice legal, components of the PME. Even the Army's Federally Funded Research Center, RAND Arroyo, was apparently directed to skip any analysis of the moral aspects of Army leadership when studying the future leader competencies needed for full spectrum operations.<sup>30</sup> It is clear to us that continued reliance on the legal and codified portions of the PME can only take the Army so far in the development of its leaders (aka maintenance of its effectiveness). More important in the new era will be the moral development of individual leaders to better deal with the increasing complexity of the situations of land combat "amongst the people" coupled with the reduced clarity of effects and outcomes of leader/unit actions.
2. The legal components of the Army's PME evolve by a process that is more pluralistic and external to the profession than do the moral components which reside more exclusively within the Army's jurisdictional control. In other words, the Army can make a lot more progress, and do so faster, if it focuses on the moral components of its PME and their development into Army Soldiers and their leaders. Examples of the former include the recent changes in the legal codification of rules for incarceration and interrogation of enemy combatants. For the latter, the moral components of the PME [determining, beyond what is legal, what the Army believes to be "right," the right half of Figure 1] can be changed by the strategic leaders of the Army profession without significant external interference, so long as the Army is viewed by the public and its civilian leaders as a profession and not just a government bureaucracy. Currently, the Army has immense latitude and autonomy to effect such changes.


3. As we discussed in Section I, the macro view of the PME, the Army must remain grounded on values that are fully supported by the American people and which, in turn, support an effective military profession – the Army must be a values-based institution. But it is not clear that the Army currently espouses the right set of values that are sufficiently justified for deep legitimacy,<sup>31</sup> particularly among formative junior professionals (for just one example, the absence of candor as a value, which they rightfully expect to be manifested in the virtue of “speaking truth to power” by all ranks). Nor, more importantly, is it clear that “values clarification” is the most effective methodology for the profession to create an ethical culture and to develop morally its soldiers and their leaders. As is noted in the literature of moral education in high schools and beyond, values clarification “has largely disappeared from the scene, in part due to generally ineffective scientific evidence.”<sup>32</sup> If this is true, then why is the Army still using this approach? What are the alternatives and how carefully has the Army recently investigate them?

Further, beyond the set of values and methodology the Army currently uses is the question at a deeper level of what school(s) of philosophy underlie the Army’s PME and the pedagogy by which it will be taught, inculcated, and practiced. Is the Army’s PME really best thought of as “a set of deontic constraints applied to the fundamentally utilitarian imperative of “mission accomplishment?”<sup>33</sup> What mixture of principle-based, utilitarian, and virtue ethics is to be taught to Army leaders in preparation for ethical decision-making? Is this foundation influenced in any way by the existence of the new “era of persistent conflict?” This is, perhaps, just a worthwhile restatement of the first conclusion—much research is to be done, and urgently so!

4. As has been noted many times in the past decade, both in internal Army studies and in external reviews, the Army does not have a single, consistent model of holistic human development to use across its formations and schoolhouses.<sup>34</sup> As depicted in Figure 3 below, the “values to virtues transition” is a vast gap, for which there are, to be sure, isolated programs (e.g., leader mentorship as prescribed by FM 6-22). But there is no overall model of human development, and particularly of individual character, or the moral component. Thus, in particular, the Army cannot have internally a well-informed conversation on how Soldiers and their leaders inculcate the profession’s ethic and develop over time as leaders who are moral exemplars. This void in understanding the critical “values to virtues” developmental phenomena must be corrected very early in any institutional effort to focus on the PME.

In addition to a lack of a model, and at a lower level of analysis, the Army lacks an effectively communicable vision of a moral exemplar in uniform. This is a second void in its vital effort to “move” Soldiers from just an intellectual agreement on a set of values to a personal lifestyle and leader decisions and actions that “walk the talk.” Currently the Army relies on such statements as “living out the Army’s Seven Values in one’s life,” and offers in doctrinal manuals vignettes of physically courageous soldiers, etc. While helpful to a degree, such an approach does not provide a specific moral identity around which Soldiers and their leaders can develop

themselves as they do under the physical and military-technical identity of “Warrior.” Accession level leader development institutions (USMA, ROTC, etc.) historically have used the identity of a “leader of character,” which does move the discussion forward to what moral “character” is, to its role in human decision-making and actions, and on to how those capacities are developed. This has allowed some consideration of newer paradigms of moral development such as self-awareness or human spirituality.<sup>35</sup> But the larger Army profession has no such vision of a developmental end-state, the personal moral identity of an exemplary Army soldier.



**Figure 3 – The Exemplary Leader**

5. Lastly, discussion and analyses of the Army’s PME and its effective implementation is fraught with boundary issues of a type that often go unnoticed. The most basic boundary issue centers on the question of “PME for whom?” If it is to be a “professional” ethic, then the boundary is established by who is certified as an “Army professional.” But the Army has not answered that question. Is it, then, to be one ethic for all - soldiers, civilians, contractors, families...? Or, is the Army to have ethics by oath, (those commissioned), by rank (e.g., the NCO Creed), by component (e.g., the Civilian Creed), or by branch (e.g., the “Cav” culture), etc. Obviously, the codified portions of the PME can be of more assistance here, specifying as they do, the specific applicability of each law. But the larger problem of boundaries for the application of the moral components of the PME remains and must be addressed forthrightly in any effort to evolve and more deeply instill the PME.

Perhaps reflection on these ideas and potential conclusions will assist conferees to help the Army rethink its PME, its implementation as a means of social direction and control, and, thus, the profession’s future effectiveness. Army leaders and their Soldiers will

continue to conduct operations “amongst the people,” practicing the profession’s art by the repetitive use of their discretionary judgment to decide and to act and to lead others to follow. Is the Army preparing them as well as it can to manifest the Army’s PME while doing so?

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<sup>1</sup> For the role of a system of ethics in the performance of military professions, see Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap Press, 1957); and Andrew Abbott, “The Army and the Theory of Professions,” chapter 24 in Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (eds.), *The Future of the Army Profession* (McGraw Hill, 2002): 523-536.

<sup>2</sup> The four domains of expert knowledge of military professions are: (1) the military-technical - how to conduct military operations; (2) the moral-ethical - how to conduct military operations rightly as the client expects; (3) the political-cultural – how to operate in non-military environments; and (4) the domain of human development – how to develop individuals professionals capable to practice with the other three fields of abstract knowledge. See, “The Army as Profession,” chapter 1 in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2d Edition (2005): 3-38.

<sup>3</sup> The other two are the maritime profession and the aerospace profession, entities roughly conterminous with the Departments of Navy and Air Force. There is also being observed now the emergence of a fourth military profession, the Joint Military Profession. See, Don M. Snider and Jeffrey D. Peterson, “Defense Transformation and the Emergence of a new Joint Military Profession” chapter 10 in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2d Edition (2005): 237-250.

<sup>4</sup> See, Gayle L. Watkins and Randi C Cohen, “In their Own Words: Army Officers Discuss Their Profession,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 1<sup>st</sup> Edition (2002): 77-100.

<sup>5</sup> Mark Lewis’s article in *Armed Forces and Society* on exodus of the Captains...

<sup>6</sup> For a new effort, see, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7, *The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full Spectrum Operations 2015-2024* (coordinating draft 18 April 2008).

<sup>7</sup> Portions of this section appeared earlier in, Don M. Snider, “The Uninformed Debate on Military Culture,” (*ORBIS*, Vol. 43, No 1.Winter 1999): 11-26.

<sup>8</sup> Edgar H. Schein, “Organizational Culture,” *American Psychologist* 45, No.2 (February 1990): 109-119.

<sup>9</sup> See, Walter F. Ulmer, Joseph J. Collins, and T.O. Jacobs, “Introduction” to *American Military Culture in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000: 3-4.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> See RAND study (draft) (pub data)

<sup>12</sup> “Social trustee” professions are those who, on a trust basis, provide for the client (society) what which they can not provide for themselves. The American people trust the Army to provide security to an otherwise defenseless nation. In fact, they trust it so much that they send their sons and daughters for service within it.

<sup>13</sup> See chapters 2-4 of Anthony E. Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making* (University Press of Kansas, 1989).

<sup>14</sup> Cite 2007 MHAT-IV Study

<sup>15</sup> This is also argument for an ethos that emphasizes the role of individual character—good people instantiating the right traits to deal with the ambiguities and uncertainties of applying rules.

<sup>16</sup> FM 3-0 (Operations), Department of the Army, 14 June 2001, paragraph 4-18.

<sup>17</sup> FM 3-0 (Operations), Department of the Army, 27 February 2008, paragraphs 1-86 and 1-87.

<sup>18</sup> FM 3-0, 2008, para 1-1.

<sup>19</sup> *FM 3-0, Operations*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2008, Foreword.

<sup>20</sup> Major Celistino Perez, Ph.D., former Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, USMA, currently serving in Iraq, unpublished manuscript, “The Warrior Morality Embedded in *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, undated.

<sup>21</sup> *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, Foreword.

<sup>22</sup> Gale Pollock, DoD News Briefing with Assistant Secretary Casscells from the Pentagon, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense (Public Affairs) News Transcript, May 4, 2007. Accessed online on 8 July 2008 at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3958>.

<sup>23</sup> *FM 3-24*, paragraph 7-25.

<sup>24</sup> FM 6-22, para 1-6.

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<sup>25</sup> FM 6-22, para 4-1.

<sup>26</sup> FM 6-22 para 4-55

<sup>27</sup> Each of the other three domains of the Army profession's expert knowledge has recently received newly published doctrine: the "military-technical" domain has a new FM 3-0 *Operations*; the "political cultural" domain as the new FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*; and, the domain of "human development" has a new FM 6-22 *Leadership*.

<sup>28</sup> See for just one example, Tony Pfaff, "Military Ethics in Complex Contingencies," in Snider and Matthews (eds.), *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2d Edition (McGraw-Hill, 2005): 409-429.

<sup>29</sup> See Christopher R. Paparone and George Reed, "The Reflective Military Practitioner and How Military Professionals Think in Action," (pub data)

<sup>30</sup> See, Henry A. Leonard, et.al., *Something Old, Something New* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006).

<sup>31</sup> For a critique of the core values approach, see: Charles A. Pfaff "Core Values: The Problems of Justification and Motivation," paper presented at the (year) JSCOPS Conference, available at (cite web site).

<sup>32</sup> See, Marvin W. Berkowitz, "The Science of Character Education," in William Damon (ed.), *Bringing in a New Era of Character Education*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2002): 56.

<sup>33</sup> Charles Pfaff, "Teaching Military Ethics," (pub data)

<sup>34</sup> For the history of this study, see Joe LeBoeuf, "The Army Training and Leader Development Panel," chapter 22 in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 1<sup>st</sup> Edition (2002): 487-504.

<sup>35</sup> For a newly developed model of the role of human spirituality in the development of character, see Patrick J. Sweeney, Sean T. Hannah and Don M. Snider, "The Domain of the Human Spirit," chapter 2 in Snider and Matthews (eds.), *Forging the Warrior's Character...* (OR: Jerico, LLC, 2007): 55-1000.