their lives, was rewarded in such a manner as seemed most appropriate to his position and the particular circumstances of the case.

That the Arab, with his strangely subtle mind—a being so vain, so given to exaggerate, and so susceptible to propaganda, in spite of the fact that he is credited with believing only what he sees—is extremely difficult for a European to understand, will probably be admitted even by those who know him best. One of them, an Arab of Arabs, Ibn Saud, Sultan of Najd, in a letter which I read some time ago and noted, remarked, "As regards the tribal leaders and notables of Iraq from whom you want the improvement of the country, they do not wish that the people of Iraq should be quiet, and that there should be law and order in the land. It is impossible to change their nature, as this has been their policy of old and continues so to-day. Their whole idea in life is to stir up the people in order to gain profit from the Government. It may be accepted as an uncontrovertible fact that it will be impossible to manage the people of that country except by strong measures and military force. Never forget that the feelings which animate them are expressed in the saying, 'He who even dips his pen in an inkstand on behalf of a Christian, that man becomes a Kafir.' "

The writer of this letter may possibly be prejudiced in some degree, but his words contain much that will be admitted to be true.

The future of Iraq is not a matter easy to foresee, and apart from my ignorance of Arabic, my experience of the country is too short to warrant the expression of an opinion. That future, as we should say, lies on the knees of the gods, or, as the Arabs would put it, "Wa Allah 'alam," which, being interpreted, means "God is all-knowing."

APPENDIX I.

MESOPOTAMIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

ORDER OF BATTLE.—1st JULY 1920.

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief—Lieut.-General Sir Aylmer Haldane, K.C.B., D.S.O.
Brig.-General, General Staff—Brig.-General J. H. K. Stewart, D.S.O.
Brig.-General, i/c Administration—Brig.-General P. O. Hambro, C.B., C.M.G.

17th DIVISION.

General Officer Commanding—Major-General G. A. J. Leslie, C.B., C.M.G.

34th Infantry Brigade.

Commander—Brig.-General A. G. Wauchope, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O.

2nd Bn. Royal Irish Rifles.
1/99th Deccan Infantry.
108th Infantry.
114th Mahrattas.

51st Infantry Brigade.

Commander—Brig.-General F. E. Coningham, C.M.G., D.S.O.

*2nd Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment.
2/6th Jat Light Infantry.
1/80th Carnatic Infantry.
1/10th Gurkha Rifles.

52nd Infantry Brigade.

Commander—Brig.-General H. W. Wooldridge, C.M.G.

4th Bn. Royal Fusiliers.
45th Sikhs.
1/94th Russell's Infantry.
1/113th Infantry.

* In Persia as reinforcements to N.P. Force.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS.

19TH BRIGADE R.F.A.
39th, 96th, 97th, 131st (How.) Batteries.

13TH PACK ARTILLERY BRIGADE.
13th (British), 31st, 45th, 49th (Indian) Batteries.

17TH DIVISIONAL SIGNAL COY.
9th, 61st, 64th, 67th Field Coys. 2nd Sappers and Miners.
1/32nd Sikh Pioneers.
17th Machine-Gun Battalion (less one Coy.).

Attached: 5th Cavalry (less 2 Sqns.), 32nd Lancers (less 2½ Sqns.), 37th Lancers (2 Sqns.).
6th and 7th Lt. Armd. Motor Batteries.

18TH DIVISION.

General Officer Commanding—Major-General T. Fraser, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G.

53RD INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Commander—Brig.-General G. A. F. Sanders, C.M.G.

2nd Bn. Manchester Regiment.
8th Rajputs.
86th Carnatic Infantry.
1/87th Punjabis.

54TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Commander—Brig.-General M. R. W. Nightingale, C.I.E., C.M.G., D.S.O.

2nd Bn. Northumberland Fusiliers.
1/39th Garwhal Rifles.
52nd Sikhs, F.F.
1/7th Gurkha Rifles.

55TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Commander—Brig.-General G. M. Morris, C.B., D.S.O.

1st Bn. Rifle Brigade.
3/9th Bhopal Infantry.
*13th Rajputs.
1/116th Mahrattas.
1/3rd Gurkha Rifles.

* Relief stopped.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS.

13TH BRIGADE R.F.A.
2nd, 8th, 44th, and 160th (How.) Batteries.

2ND PACK ARTILLERY BRIGADE.
14th (British), 25th, 34th, 40th, and 50th (Indian) Batteries.

18TH DIVISIONAL SIGNAL COY.
2nd, 6th, and 8th Field Coys. 1st Sappers and Miners.
106th Hazara Pioneers.
17th Machine-Gun Bn. (1 Coy.).

Attached: 11th Lancers and 35th Scinde Horse (2 Sqns.).
8th and 14th Lt. Armd. Motor Batteries.
30th Squadron R.A.F. (1 flight).

7TH CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Commander—Brig.-General H. G. Young, D.S.O.

1st King's Dragoon Guards.
7th Dragoon Guards.
16th (Composite) Machine-Gun Squadron.
8th Field Troop 2nd S. & M.

HEADQUARTERS, R.A.F.

6th Squadron R.A.F.
30th Squadron R.A.F.

ARMY TROOPS.

5th Battery R.G.A.; 9th Co. 2nd S. & M.; 132nd, 133rd, and 138th Railway Construction Coys.; 7th Lt. Armd. Motor Battery; 1st Ry. Armd. Motor Battery, and some Signal and Bridging units.

BAGHDAD DEFENCES.

2/9th Delhi Regiment.
2/119th Infantry.

RIVER AREA.

Line of Communication Troops.

Commander—Brig.-General H. E. C. B. Nepean, C.S.I., C.M.G.

37th Lancers (less 2 Squadrons).
83rd Wallajahbad Light Infantry.
2/125th Napier's Rifles.
2/129th Baluchis.
124th, 134th, and 140th Ry. Construction Coys.

REINFORCEMENTS FROM INDIA AFTER 1ST JULY 1920.

6TH DIVISION.

General Officer Commanding—Major-General G. N. Cory, C.B., D.S.O.

74TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Commander—Brig.-General A. le G. Jacob, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O.

2/7th Rajputs.
1/15th Sikhs.
3/123rd Outram's Rifles.

75TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Commander—Brig.-General G. A. H. Beatty, C.M.G., D.S.O.

2/96th Infantry.
2/116th Mahrattas.
3/70th Burma Rifles.

76TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Commander—Brig.-General G. I. R. Glasfurd, C.M.G., D.S.O.

3/23rd Sikhs.
2/89th Punjabis.
2/117th Mahrattas.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS.

"F" Battery R.H.A.
17th Brigade R.F.A.
26th, 92nd, and 10th (How.) Batteries.
11th, 63rd, and 69th Coys. 2nd S. & M.
1/12th Pioneers.
8th Machine-Gun Bn. (2 Coys.).

ADDITIONAL UNITS.

2nd Bn. East Yorkshire Regiment.
2nd Bn. Duke of Cornwall's L.I.
1st Bn. Yorkshire L.I.
3/153rd Rifles.
2/5th Gurkha Rifles, F.F.
2/11th Gurkha Rifles.
Kapurthala Infantry.

77TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Commander—Brig.-General B. C. Dent, C.M.G., D.S.O.

63rd Palamcottah L.I.
3/124th Baluchistan Infantry.
3/8th Gurkha Rifles.
1/11th Gurkha Rifles.

Note—As stated in the narrative of operations, the brigade organisation of infantry units from India was not adhered to in Mesopotamia.

NORTH PERSIAN FORCE.

36TH INDIAN (MIXED) BRIGADE.

Commander—Brig.-General H. F. Bateman-Champain, C.M.G.

"A" Battery (The Chestnut Troop) R.H.A.
Guides Cavalry.
31st Indian Pack Battery.
*1st Bn. Royal Berkshire Regiment.
*2nd Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment.
1st Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers.
1/42nd Deoli Regiment.
†1/67th Punjabis (2 platoons).
122nd Rajputana Infantry.
1/2nd Gurkha Rifles.
19th Co. 3rd S. & M.
48th Div. Signal Coy.
15th Lt. Armd. Motor Battery.
Attached : 30th Squadron R.A.F. (1 flight).

PERSIAN L. OF C.

Commander—Colonel J. H. F. Lakin, 7th Gurkha Rifles.

2/26th Punjabis.
64th Pioneers.
79th Carnatic Infantry.
7th, 52nd, and 65th Coys. Sappers and Miners.

---

* Sent as reinforcements from Mesopotamia.
† At Tabriz.

APPENDIX II.

ADVENTURES OF OFFICERS.

Capture of Flying Officers G. C. Gardiner and Herbert.

As these officers were returning to Baghdad on the 14th July, after taking part in a bombing raid, they were forced to land near Dagharah, which is in what was at that time a thoroughly hostile area. Five minutes later some fifty Arabs arrived, attempts to keep off whom failed owing to the Lewis gun becoming damaged when it was hastily forced from its mounting on the aeroplane. The officers were overpowered and stripped of their arms and other possessions, and roughly handled by women who plucked at their throats. After paying them a good deal of unpleasant attention the mob next occupied themselves with the machine. Two apparently well-disposed Arabs, taking advantage of the distraction, dismounted and made the officers understand that if they remained where they were they would be drastically treated. These Arabs made signs to the officers to mount their horses, and all four galloped off for some miles to the tents of a section of the Albu Sultan tribe. Here the Shaikh Faris al Jaryan, hearing that the officers had been ill-treated, rode off with some forty horsemen and recovered their arms and other belongings, but refused to allow them to return to the aeroplane.

Next day the officers were escorted at dawn on horseback thirty-five miles to the house of the shaikh's brother, who is the paramount shaikh of the Albu Sultan. He treated them well and sent them by motor-car to Hillah.

Capture of Flying Officers G. R. Gowler and H. G. W. Locke, R.A.F.

About 8 A.M. on the 12th October 1920, these officers were obliged, through engine trouble, to make a forced landing near Kifl, which is not far from the at that time invested Kufah.

Almost immediately some twelve horsemen and two armed Arabs on foot arrived on the scene and demanded bakhsheesh. The officers' personal belongings and coats were taken from them, and they showed their captors the printed card in Arabic and Persian, signed by the High Commissioner, offering a money reward—approximately £500—in return for their safety being ensured. This card each officer of the Royal Air Force in Mesopotamia carries when flying as a safeguard, but it has not always proved efficacious. The officers tried to explain that if taken to Kufah the Political Officer there would give a reward, and the Arabs seemed to understand. An argument followed among the Arabs, who by this time numbered fifty to sixty, as to who should take charge of the officers, and while this was going on their helmets, shoes, and socks were removed.

They were next each tied to the head of a horse, which started off at a trot in a south-westerly direction. After running about a mile and suffering considerable pain and discomfort from the camel-thorn which covered the ground over which they passed, they were both tied to the same horse, and the pace was changed to a sharp walk until Kifl was reached. For the last three miles of their journey they skirted north of Kifl and just east of some date gardens. Thence the inhabitants emerged and brandished, and prodded them with, their knives, some hitting them on the head and striking them with rifles. In this unpleasant horseplay the women and children bore a leading part, spitting in their faces and throwing stones at them, while the horsemen made no attempt to interfere on their behalf.

About 1.30 P.M. Kifl was reached, and they were led before Shaikh Umran, the chief of the Bani Hussain, who immediately ordered the ropes which tied them to the horse's head to be undone. He then took them to the bazaar and sent for a Hebrew interpreter, who remained with them until they were removed from Kifl. Umran offered the officers food, gave them tea and cigarettes, and inquired what had become of their helmets, shoes, and socks. On the crowd, who were looking on, being asked if they had any of the missing articles, a helmet was at once produced, and a man was ordered to take off his shoes and give them to F.O. Gowler, for whom a pair of socks of Government pattern was shortly produced from the bazaar. The officers showed Umran their printed cards offering a reward, but these he treated with apparent contempt. The interpreter thereupon explained that Umran had said that he did not want a reward from the Government, but that his own reputation, which was worth more than any money, would ensure their safety, and added that the shaikh was a very rich and influential man.

Umran next suggested that they should inform the commander at Hillah that they were safe and well cared for, and this was done by letter. Later in the day he said that he had decided not to keep them at Kifl, but would take them to his own house, where

they were transferred. On the 14th they were pushed out of the hut in which they were by the Arab guard, the door was locked from inside, and they made their way to Kifl, where they joined the troops of the 55th Brigade column who had arrived there.

Capture of Flying Officers Bockett Pugh and Macdonald at Khidhr.

On the 22nd September 1920, these two officers were in an aeroplane which was shot down from a height of a few hundred feet. These officers with others were engaged in trying to drop supplies for the British and Indian personnel on board the defence vessel *Greenfly*, which was aground in the Euphrates. Their plane crashed in the river about one mile above Khidhr and turned over. An observer of another machine noticed the occupants, neither of whom had apparently suffered damage, scramble out on to the bank. It was also observed that, when the machine came down to within a few hundred feet of the ground to see if it were possible to help, neither of the two officers who had crashed looked up. Arabs state that on reaching the shore one of the two officers was shot at once by insurgents of the Juwabir tribe. As regards the other officer, it is said that he offered a large sum of money provided he were given safe conduct to the *Greenfly*, but the headman of some villages in the vicinity came on the scene and shot him.

Officers of the Royal Air Force think that the bomb-racks, to which the rations were attached, failed to act, for the aeroplane continued to fly for some time at a low altitude, thus offering an easy target for the insurgents.

Adventures of Four Officers of the Royal Air Force.

On the 1st November 1920, after leaving Hillah to carry out a reconnaissance of the railway towards Diwaniyah, one of two machines of the 55th Squadron began to leak. The pilot, F.O. P. D. Maxwell, after watching to see if the water continued to escape, and finding that it did so, decided that it would be wise to turn back. He was by this time about twelve miles from Hillah, and the water, having probably all run out, had ceased to flow from the leak, the engine had become noisy, the revolutions were decreasing, and clouds of smoke were coming from the exhaust. As the engine appeared to be on the point of "seizing," he landed far from any signs of habitation and as much to the west as he could manage to go. The other machine, piloted by F.O. D. Lloyd-Evans, M.C., D.F.C., which was following, observed F.O. Maxwell turn back and fly in a north-westerly direction, and when the latter landed, the former, who believed that the area in which they were was hostile, did so also, and ran

his machine to a position near that of his companion, so as to be able to pick up, if necessary, both him and the observer, F.O. Groom.

As it was not certain whether the area was unfriendly or not, and as for a single machine to start in the soft sand and lift four passengers presented considerable risk, the pilot decided to wait, while a good look-out was kept in all directions, which was possible as the country was level.

Meantime, about ten minutes after landing, F.O. Groom was endeavouring to remove the Lewis gun from his machine, which was about a hundred yards from the other, when a mounted Bedouin appeared round the corner of a bank some three hundred yards distant. F.O. Groom had only time to put the Lewis gun out of action by removing a portion of it, after which he ran to F.O. Lloyd-Evans's machine, during which time he was fired at by the Bedouin, who was followed by some twelve more mounted Arabs. F.O. Groom at once climbed into the back seat of the sound machine, joining there Aircraftsman Hughes, F.O. Lloyd-Evans's observer, while F.O. Maxwell lay down on the port lower wing alongside the fuselage.

Regardless of the difficulty of starting a machine on soft sand, and accepting the very apparent risk of a crash with so heavy a load, the courage and skill of F.O. Lloyd-Evans saved the situation. The machine took off well from the ground in spite of its heavy freight, and the leading Bedouin, who was only about twenty yards away, did not fire again, probably because his horse shied. F.O. Lloyd-Evans was able to bring back his machine in safety to Hillah, and made an excellent landing with his heavy freight.

Shortly afterwards a report came in from a pilot of another squadron that he had seen F.O. Maxwell's machine in flames as he passed over the spot where it had landed. It had been set on fire by Arabs, which caused the bombs it was carrying to explode and inflict casualties among the onlookers.

The courage shown by F.O. Lloyd-Evans, for which he received the immediate reward of a bar to the Distinguished Flying Cross, probably saved the lives of two flying officers at the risk of his own and that of his observer, for in the area where the machines landed the chance of being made prisoners and not being murdered was small.

It is interesting to note that during a bombing expedition to Rowanduz on the borders of Kurdistan on the 5th May 1921, the machine which was being piloted by F.O. Maxwell, and which also carried an Assistant Political Officer, Captain Dickinson, was shot down near Batas in hostile country. On this occasion F.O. V. E. Groom, D.F.C., who with an observer was also taking part in the operation, seeing what had occurred, at once landed and rescued the two officers from the disabled machine. For this gallant action he received the immediate reward of a bar to the Distinguished Flying Cross.

APPENDIX III.

RESPONSIBILITY OF OFFICERS.

13th August 1920.

On two recent occasions, on the advice or recommendation of a political officer, risks quite unwarrantable from a military point of view have been taken by officers in command of troops. Unfortunate results have followed, not only as regards the losses incurred, but in increasing our difficulties at the present juncture and in greatly encouraging the rebels in their hostile attitude, and so leading to the spread of the rebellion.

The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief impresses on all officers in command of troops the responsibility which they incur should they act in a manner not strictly in accordance with sound military principles, more especially in a country such as Mesopotamia, where the climate is in itself our greatest enemy. Political like other information is often untrustworthy and must not be blindly accepted; and to keep his division quiet at all costs is with the political officer a natural and paramount instinct.

The G.O.C.-in-C. does not wish in any way to cramp the initiative of officers, but there is a wide distinction between initiative and rashness. The present situation is such that the least set-back must have harmful results, and it is every officer's duty to reflect before acting, and realise how great a responsibility he accepts if he is not certain in his own mind that he can fully justify his action.

APPENDIX IV.

STRENGTH OF TROOPS IN MESOPOTAMIA AND PERSIA.

	British.	Indian.	Followers.
Total strength (approx.)	12,000	61,000	60,000
Non-combatants	3,000	23,000	60,000
Balance of combatants	9,000	38,000	
Deduct—			
Sick	700	1,000	
In transit	600	1,000	
In Persia	3,500	6,000	
Total reduction	4,800	8,000	
Balance of combatants in Mesopotamia	4,200	30,000	
Composed of—			
Sabres	...	2,900	
Bayonets	2,900	23,700	
Gunners	1,300	3,400	
	4,200	30,000	
Non-combatants consisted of—			
R.A.S.C. and S. & T. / Ordnance / Works	1,800	20,000	
Med. Vet. Remounts / Accounts, Mil. Police / Camps and Depots, and / Miscellaneous	850	2,400	
Labour	200	580	
I.W.T.	150	20	
	3,000	23,000	
Followers include—			
R.A.S.C.	8,600		
Medical	7,000		
Ordnance	1,100		
Works	7,000		
Veterinary	700		
Remounts	1,600		
Labour	17,500		
I.W.T.	11,000		
Regimental and miscellaneous	5,500		
	60,000		

APPENDIX V.

LETTER FROM THE CAPTAIN OF THE *GREENFLY*.

D.V. *Greenfly*,
Septr. 30th, 1920.

POLITICAL OFFICER,
NASIRIYAH.

SIR,—I am in receipt of your communication dated 20th instant. You will no doubt have seen my letter to the G.O.C., which was sent to the G.O.C. by Shaikh Wannas of El Bab, and left yesterday.

Food is the great question on board; but if your arrangements are successful, I expect we shall be able to hang on. The condition of the crew is really very good considering the very severe shortage of rations that we have all experienced. Our spirits are still "up," altho' at times we have felt very depressed. To get your letter and to know that things are happening helps us all very much indeed. I have lost one Indian and I have one B.O.R. (British Other Rank) severely wounded; besides these casualties I have one Indian wounded and 3 or 4 men sick owing to weakness—lack of food. Since I have been on board I have only been able to procure 4 bags of rations and 2 small packets of biscuits dropped from aeros. This has lasted us for the 34 days on board. And these were got on board under very heavy fire, and all praise is due to the men who volunteered to go and procure what little rations we have received. Sniping from the left bank has been continuous during my stay here. The last two days no shots have been fired.

Small attacks have been made occasionally, but nothing serious has happened; only we've practically all received slight flesh wounds. One point I would like to say, and that is that we have no medical stores on board. At times, and at present, my port side is practically on a dry bank, and this is separated from the land by only a stretch of water a few feet deep (2 or 3).

My letter of yesterday suggested, and I hope explained, the condition of things on board; and I would again like to point out that we are all here to hold on as long as it is possible, but we must have food.

There are 31 Indians, and you know the number of B.O.R.'s on

board. Give us rations and we will have the heart and spirit to stick out until the last.

My G.O.C.'s (Brigadier-General Hughes, Inland Water Transport) esteem is highly appreciated by all on board, and in return we wish to thank him for his appreciation of our duties and to confirm the fact that what we have endured in the past can be endured in the future until the troops arrive. It's very pleasing to know that help is on the way.

Send us rations by aeros more often if possible, as we only get 25 per cent of what is dropped; and I should like to state that rations should be dropped at our stern, so as to float down on us.

You have probably interviewed Shaikh Wannas of El Bab to-day, and you will know what to make of his idea as regards *Greenfly* better than I; but there is something at the back of it all I feel certain. Only, if we can be sure of Shaikh Wannas of El Bab as our friend, then we shall feel better. Try and win him over for us; he holds a lot of power in this district. I spoke him yesterday and he seemed to be quite friendly. El Bab promised us some food yesterday, but it has not arrived, and will not be sent until S. K. (shaikh) returns with the G.O.C.'s orders for me. This to me seems extraordinary, as, if he intended to give us food, there's no need to await his return from Nasiriyah before he does this kind action.

I don't know if your agents have got to work already, but I have managed to get in touch with an Arab on shore, and he has brought me a little—only it means my baksheeshing him heavily. If I knew the agent, this would not be quite so necessary.

We can still hold on (and more so if El Bab are our friends) provided we get food and no heavy casualties; and I would again like to say that we are all willing, and have both spirit and heart (although perhaps not strength at present) to stick out as long as possible—and that is to the very last.

We all thank the garrison for its kind feeling, and hope we shall see you all soon. This is a great strain of watching and waiting. I have painted signals "Rations" 6 ft. letters on my canvas, but I don't think they have been seen. Tell aeros I will also use No. 1 Signal Book and exhibit signal on my barge alongside.

Thanking you for your cheerful letter, and again assuring you of our all performing our duties to the best of our ability.

I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

ALFRED C. HEDGER.

Note—Shaikh Wannas al Sachit is the chief of the Juwabir tribe whose following were responsible for the attack on *Greenfly* and shooting down an areoplane, which was followed by the murder of the two officers who were with it.

APPENDIX VI.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE SHOWING TOTAL STRENGTHS, BY AREAS, OF TRIBES WHICH PARTICIPATED IN 1920 INSURRECTION.

Area.	Date.	Number of armed men.	Rifles.		Remarks.
			Modern.	Old but serviceable.	
Lower Euphrates .	30/6/20	2,500	500	1,000	
"	2/7/20	16,300	2,500	6,200	
Middle Euphrates	20/7/20	16,500	2,200	6,000	
"	24/7/20	48,100	4,630	19,795	
"	30/7/20	16,270	800	3,000	
Lower Euphrates .	30/7/20	4,350	680	1,600	
Diyalah Division .	9/8/20	1,600	200	100	
Baghdad - Fallujah-Mufraz Area	12/8/20	7,500	900	2,050	
Diyalah Division and Kirkuk-Kifri Area	12/8/20	14,300	2,800	2,990	
Samarrah Division .	24/8/20	600	175	75	
"	30/8/20	3,000	1,245	365	
Grand Totals .		131,020	16,630	43,175	

APPENDIX VII.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING DISARMAMENT.

1. In the operations conducted in this country since the 1st July, the principle of concentration of force as opposed to dispersion has been rigidly and successfully followed.

The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief proposes to adhere to this principle until those tribes at least who have been, or may still be, hostile to us are completely disarmed.

Because disarmament may be difficult, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief is none the less determined to enforce the policy to the last rifle and round of ammunition, and if all ranks are animated by the same firm purpose the process of depriving the tribes of their weapons will be considerably facilitated and the stay of troops in the country proportionately shortened. The onus and odium of carrying out this policy lie with the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and his subordinates, and it must be understood that except in so far as to help in carrying it out, Political Officers have no voice in the matter.

2. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief intends to operate as follows:—

(*a*) Area of maximum force.
(*b*) Areas of minimum forces.

(*a*) Area of Maximum Force. *

In such an area the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief will concentrate every atom of force which he can spare from other areas. It will be the duty of the Divisional Commander in that area to apply the force allotted to him in such a way as to bring about disarmament as quickly as possible. The inhabitants in that area will be informed by proclamation or otherwise that having borne arms against the government, it has been decided that they are no longer to possess arms; that the military forces will remain in that area until such time as all rifles and ammunition are handed in; that the inhabitants will be held individually and collectively responsible that rifles and ammunition are handed in, and that if, hereafter, any individual is found with a rifle or round of ammuni-

tion in his possession, not only will he be dealt with with the utmost severity, but the village where he resides will be destroyed.

The number of rifles demanded should fully cover the number of all kinds that tribes are believed to possess.

£T/20 per rifle and 1/- per round may be accepted as a security for the subsequent surrender of any short paid in within a specified period. The object is to obtain rifles, not money.

The date by which rifles and ammunition are to be handed in will be fixed by the Military Commander, and if by that date effect has not been given to his orders the area concerned will be treated as rebellious. Thereupon military action will be taken deliberately, villages will be razed to the ground, and all woodwork removed. Pressure will be brought on the inhabitants by cutting off water-power and destroying water-lifts; efforts to carry out cultivation will be interfered with, and the systematic collection of supplies of all kinds beyond our actual requirements will be carried out, the area being cleared of the necessaries of life.

Trees—except as a last resort, and if definitely belonging to insurgents and where they interfere with view as regards defence work—will be spared; the Royal Air Force will be available for bomb-dropping both by day and by night. During these proceedings roads should as far as possible be improved, so as to facilitate the rapid movement of small columns for punitive work.

(*b*) Areas of Minimum Forces.

Such areas are those where only sufficient force can be left to maintain pressure upon the inhabitants, who having been hostile during the insurrection have since submitted. Here the carrying out of the policy of disarmament will continue so far as resources will allow. The Royal Air Force will assist with such aeroplanes as can be spared from the area in which maximum force is being applied. The principles guiding the collection of arms and ammunition will be the same as in area (*a*).

As regards proclamations, their nature will be to inform the tribes what is required from them, and that non-compliance will result in treatment similar to that meted out in area (*a*).

5th November 1920.

APPENDIX VIII.

BRITISH AND INDIAN CASUALTIES.

From 2nd July to 17th October 1920.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Died of Wounds.	Missing.	Prisoners of War.	Died while Prisoners of War.
British officers . .	19	43	2	5	—	—
British other ranks .	28	57	5	136	79	1
Indian officers . .	7	39	4	4	—	—
Indian other ranks .	243	1040	100	278	74	—
Followers	15	49	2	28	11	—
	312	1228	113	451	164	1

Grand Total, 2269.

Most of the missing were killed, a few only rejoining.

Arab Casualties.

It is impossible to give the Arab casualties with any approach to exactitude, but they have been estimated at 8450 killed and wounded. Careful and conservative estimates based on the number of dead counted, reports from various sources, hostile and other, and the register of burials at the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, were made. It was ascertained that 3500 free burials were registered at Najaf, and it is probable that a considerable portion of these were killed in action. Shaikh Abdul Wahid, of the Fatlah tribe, who remained hostile to the last, estimated that 2000 corpses of men who fell during the insurrection were buried at Najaf. As this Shaikh fought against us, it is improbable that he exaggerated the Arab loss.

At Karbala 167 corpses, which are known to be those of insurgents who were killed in action, were given free burial, but near that city there was no fighting such as took place in the neighbourhood of Najaf.

In areas other than those of the Upper and Middle Euphrates the Arab casualties have been estimated to be 550.

APPENDIX IX.

NOTES ON MODERN ARAB WARFARE BASED ON THE FIGHTING ROUND RUMAITHAH AND DIWANIYAH, JULY-AUGUST 1920.

Characteristics.

The Arab is most treacherous. He will overpower a small detachment, and when a larger force appears he will put up white flags and be found working peacefully in his fields—incidentally with his rifle within easy reach. It is sometimes of advantage to let him continue this rôle of peaceful cultivation, as, for instance, when a large convoy is proceeding with a small guard; but the fact must always be remembered that he will become an active enemy directly he sees his chance. The white flags and peaceful cultivator's rôle must not prevent the enemy from being punished later at our convenience.

The Arab insurgents may be met with in any number up to 10,000. Between Hillah and Rumaithah in the recent fighting 5000 have been the maximum numbers. One in four are usually mounted, and one in three armed with modern rifles. The remainder represent the supply and medical services of a regular army, bringing up ammunition, food and water, and removing the dead and wounded; they also act as a reinforcement, as they take over the rifles of the wounded and dead.

They flock to the banner of their Shaikh and then to the sound of the guns, moving and collecting with a rapidity little short of marvellous. A large concentration consists of a great number of banners each with its group of followers. When they intend to attack they work themselves up to the necessary pitch of frenzy, with much shouting and waving of banners.

In the present rising they are directed by skilled brains, well versed in the power of the modern rifle (their weapon) and in the limitations and weak points of our modern army. They make very skilful defensive dispositions, and show considerable cunning in the selection of time and place to interfere with water supply, railway, or line of march.

However, owing to their lack of organisation and discipline they can rarely alter plans once made or make new ones to meet a new

situation, unless it is one which visibly appeals to each man individually, such as the withdrawal of our forces, when each independently would swarm after them. During the relief of Rumaithah, finding that in their plans for a direct endeavour to stop our advance they had undertaken more than they liked, they dispersed during the night and early morning and made no attempt to harass our flanks and transport, which might have successfully delayed our march.

Their ammunition is limited, and each round purchased costs them about eight annas. They are consequently very careful in its use, and seldom fire unless it is a target they have a very good chance of hitting and from which they hope to gain something. It is a pity a practical scheme cannot be evolved under which our own men pay for their ammunition or some share of it; it would improve the fire discipline of some units beyond recognition. The Arabs boldly risk their lives to strip our dead of rifle and ammunition while a fight is still going on; these therefore should be removed if possible. They must be considered good shots. The comparative immunity of a large camp from sniping may be put down to their shortage of ammunition, and to the fact that they have nothing to gain by it personally in the shape of loot of rifles or ammunition.

Although there have been exceptions, prisoners and wounded cannot safely be left in their hands. They are liable to be tortured and murdered.

They are ever on the look-out for a chance of wiping out an isolated detachment or odd man in the hope of getting rifles, ammunition, and loot. They seem to appear from nowhere with astonishing rapidity.

They have an inherent dislike of getting killed, though some of their attacks show they can still be worked up to a state of fanatical frenzy—probably on promises of much loot.

Like all semi-savages, they will boldly follow up a retiring force and take any opportunity of closing with it such as afforded by the dust (raised by the column itself) in the case of the Rumaithah relief column on the 22nd July, and by the darkness in the case of the Manchester column on the 25th July.

They have shown a great dislike to artillery. On the 30th July, 3rd August, and 5th August, very large concentrations advancing to attack were completely dispersed by gun fire.

A large concentration cannot maintain itself for more than three or four days, but must disperse for more food and ammunition if there has been any fighting. Except for the bolder spirits, they are loth to fight far from their own villages, particularly in another tribal area. This was very noticeable in the withdrawal from Diwaniyah; at the boundary between the Diwaniyah and Hillah divisions the tribes of the former stopped dead and the fighting was continued by the tribes of the latter.

It was very noticeable that the Arab liked his night's rest and afternoon siesta.

Country.

In the area of recent operations the country is dead level, but intersected at varying intervals by irrigation channels which are occasionally serious obstacles impassable for all arms except at regular crossings. They run to a width of 90 feet, a depth below ground level of 15 feet, and a bank of 35 feet above ground level. They form natural positions for the Arab, out of which he can only be turned by a flanking movement or heavy expenditure of gun ammunition. They interfere with the movement of guns and transport on a wide front, and when met with, in order to avoid undue lengthening of the column, a halt must be made while the transport is brought up and packed on the near side, passed over the canal, and packed again on the far side,—this may mean an hour's delay.

Villages are scattered about irregularly and are favourite haunts for snipers. When shelled the latter take cover in the irrigation channels.

There are many shrines which form the usual assembly centres when the local inhabitants go out to war.

The river is lined in places with palm groves dotted with villages and intersected by high walls. They are best dealt with by bombs and rifle grenades.

Generally speaking, apart from the palm gardens and the bigger canals, the country is, or can easily be made, passable for all arms. During the withdrawal from Diwaniyah the road was only followed for the first ten miles. During the hot weather it cuts up into very fine dust, which rises in clouds, forming a serious handicap to any column by limiting the visibility. After rain the country may be considered impassable off the roads, which themselves become very heavy.

Water is limited to the river and irrigation channels. The latter can very easily be bunded by the Arab, as has been done on several occasions, which may leave a force in a precarious position, particularly as he will do his best from the opposite bank to prevent the river being made good.

Principles.

These are the same as in dealing with any savage tribes. Security first and self-confidence are the secrets of success. But the former is of course purely passive, and the latter, unless combined with the former, is a sure road to disaster.

However peaceful the situation may seem, and however deserted the landscape, precautions must never be relaxed. All-round defence is essential.

In deciding on a course of action, every possible way in which it can go wrong should be considered and measures taken accordingly. In dealing with savage tribes, regrettable incidents or failure to complete what one sets out to do have political effects out of all proportion to their military importance. "Legitimate Gambles" are not to be thought of; a sound straightforward course of action should be followed, even though promising less brilliant results.

The golden rule is to keep the men well in hand, whether at rest or on the march. Long extended lines are a danger and should be avoided.

It is essential to success that the men should have full confidence in their superiority, and feel that they are individually and collectively more than a match for the Arab.

Formation Adopted.

Bearing the above principles in mind and the characteristics of the Arab given earlier, the following formations were adopted by the Rumaithah Relief Column and during the withdrawal from Diwaniyah, on each of which operations a railway train formed part of the column.

At rest by night.

The protection of the long train made a proper continuous perimeter impossible.

Every use was of course made of any natural cover and natural obstacles, and the transport was always parked on the least exposed side of the train.

In the open, in the absence of any modifying features of ground, piquets were normally posted on the perimeter of the camp at about fifty to hundred yards' interval, consisting each of a platoon. The number of course varied, and on occasions admitted of no reserve being kept in hand.

This method of strong concentrated piquets ensured the men being well in hand under the eye of a responsible commander, and gave them the extra confidence to withstand any sudden rush. Unless properly entrenched and wired small piquets are a danger; they can be easily rushed, and the men are liable to get their nerves shaken. It is better to have gaps and strong piquets which can support each other with cross fire, and can be relied on to hold their own than be weak everywhere.

Any canal bank or other point offering snipers a good opportunity was treated in two ways. Either the camp was put right on the top of it so that it formed part of the perimeter, or else the camp was moved sufficiently far away to counteract its value as a sniping post.

Detached piquets are a weakness, particularly when situated on the rear side of the camp in a withdrawal. It is better to face being sniped within reason than to have to extricate a piquet in the morning.

On the night of 5/6th August, when three detached piquets appeared essential, two on a canal bank were made two companies strong; the third in a village was only one company strong, but was closely supported from the perimeter.

Night lines were invariably laid out by the artillery in every direction whence attack or heavy sniping was probable.

Machine-guns were also in position where they could best deal with any serious attack.

Little or no notice should be taken of sniping. If it becomes unpleasantly hot a couple of shells from a howitzer usually stops it.

At rest by day.

It was found that guns were sufficient to keep the Arab at arm's-



length. All that is required, therefore, is that the surrounding country should be thoroughly watched. This may require certain important points to be held; these detached posts, even though they may have only to find two sentries, should be sent out in the first instance strong enough to hold their own without calling on the main camp for more than artillery support; two companies is a reasonable strength.

In a dust-storm night dispositions must be adopted.

Dispositions on the march: Column Formation.

With five or more battalions a diamond formation was invariably adopted, whether advancing or withdrawing, with the train and transport in the centre. One battalion formed each point of the diamond, and the balance was left in reserve in the centre.

With only four battalions, as in the first day of the withdrawal from Diwaniyah, a triangular formation was adopted with the base



towards the most threatened face, in this case the rear. A central reserve is essential, and if the diamond formation had been adhered to, could only have been obtained by breaking up battalions.

Under normal conditions the distance of these outer battalions from the main body was laid down so as to be not more than five hundred yards from the outer edge of the main body to their inner point; but this distance had to be varied to suit the ground,—for instance, on the 5th August when approaching Jarbuiyah the left

battalion, which had to follow the Hashimiyah Canal, was more than a mile from the main body; and in several cases owing to the proximity of the river to the railway, the river battalion had to close right up to the main body.

Battalion Formation.

The formation to be adopted by the battalions was left to the discretion of Battalion Commanders, on whom the necessity was impressed of keeping their men in hand and working them in groups. This also admits of supporting fire from behind.

Flank Guards.

Owing to the length of the column, flank guards were frequently called upon to protect a distance out of all proportion to their strength. The danger of being weak everywhere in an attempt to watch this whole length had to be avoided. Under these conditions battalions moved in self-supporting groups of companies, covering the intermediate ground between groups by fire—in fact, as mobile piquets. These companies moved by platoons in either diamond or square formation of about 250 yards side, and only the other platoon or platoons should be split up into section groups, unless heavy sniping compels otherwise. (*See* Diagram A.)

Advanced Guard and Rearguard.

Both diamond and square formations of about 500 yards side are suitable, though preference is given to the latter as leaving a larger reserve in the Battalion Commander's hand. Only the companies nearest the enemy should open out further, unless compelled by heavy sniping, and a formation as detailed under flank guards is recommended. Similarly only outer platoons should be further split up. (*See* Diagram A.)

Artillery.

Half the guns were normally placed at the head of the main body and half at the rear. The Mountain Battery normally marched parallel to the main body on the exposed flank.

Machine-guns.

These were invaluable on the armoured train accompanying the rearguard during the withdrawal. The train remained behind at each canal or bund until the infantry was well clear, and then rapidly overtook it.

Other machine-guns were placed at each end of the main body either on the train or on pack mules. They could thus deal with any enemy coming in between the advanced guard or rearguard and the flank guards.

A sub-section with A.G. or R.G. when available is also of great value.

Cavalry.

Cavalry was normally employed with the advanced guard and flank guards, particularly after the experience of the 22nd July, when the correct rapid withdrawal of the cavalry to the next position contributed towards the temporary confusion of the infantry. This rôle in the withdrawal from Diwaniyah was played by the armoured train.

Sappers and Pioneers.

Invariably accompanied the advanced guard to open up and improve communications.

Dispositions in Action.

These can best be exemplified by actual examples. Two will be chosen:—

(*a*) The attack on Jarbuiyah on the 5th August.
(*b*) The actual withdrawal from Diwaniyah on the 30th July.

Attack on Jarbuiyah, 5th August.

The column with five battalions was advancing in the usual diamond formation, except that the left flank battalion, reinforced by a squadron of cavalry and mountain battery, was one mile from the main body following the line of a canal, vitally important tactically.

As soon as the Advanced-guard Commander reported the enemy in position ahead in strength greater than he thought he could deal with, the two flanking battalions were ordered to move up their H.Q. and two companies on the flanks of the advanced guard, their other two companies to close up towards the front half of the flanks they were protecting; the rearguard battalion was ordered to take over protection of the rear half of the flanks.

The whole attacking line then pushed forward steadily to within 1000 yards of the enemy's position, under cover of the guns, which had all come into action.

From this point patrols were sent forward and reported the enemy to be in no great strength.

The whole attacking force then advanced in lines of skirmishers, and marched, with few casualties, without another halt straight into the line held by the Arabs.

An attack on an Arab position differs little from the usual form, but is handicapped by the necessity of making the guns and transport secure from every direction during its progress, thus preventing full use being made of the available infantry.

Withdrawal from Diwaniyah, 30th July.

Four battalions and an armoured train were available.

The operation was divided into two distinct periods—

Period A, getting clear of the town itself; period B, the subsequent withdrawal.

Period A consisted of three phases :—

(1) Getting transport, &c., out into the open while the town was held on each bank by one battalion.

(2) Withdrawing battalion from left bank under protection of battalion on right bank.

The battalion from the left bank then moved into a position to

(3) cover the final withdrawal of the right bank battalion—greatly assisted by the armoured train.

When successfully withdrawn the right bank battalion formed up and became the reserve for period B.

During period B the work of the rearguard was made easy by the armoured train, which remained at each successive position, keeping the Arabs back until the infantry was well clear. Then the armoured train rapidly rejoined the infantry.

A proportion of artillery was always ready to give the rearguard immediate assistance.

A very large concentration which later threatened one of the flanks was kept off by gun fire assisted by machine-guns from the train ; the flank guard was temporarily reinforced by two companies from the reserve battalion.

In the absence of the armoured train, as small a detachment as possible, supported by guns, machine-gun and rifle fire, was left to cover the withdrawal, and itself then rapidly withdrawn under cover of gun, machine-gun, and rifle fire.

Conclusion.

In conclusion, attention is drawn to the following excellent advice in "Notes on Warfare against Arabs in Mesopotamia," issued by 17th Indian Division, May 1919 :—

"Do not get rattled by his unexpected appearance.

Keep your eyes open, and your men in hand and ready for action.

Control your fire and look after fire discipline.

Keep your (lines straight) formation regular and with proper intervals and distances.

So long as the troops are well disciplined and remain steady, there is nothing to be feared from the Arabs as an enemy. But if the men become excited and unsteady when the Arabs collect and attack in overwhelming numbers, a disaster may easily occur."

NOTES ON DEALING WITH VILLAGES.

The main principles are :—

Firstly—To provide for the safety of your own flanks.

Secondly—Envelop the flanks of the village.

Thirdly—Advance scouts from your centre straight towards or into the village, being careful to provide for strong covering fire for these scouts in case of necessity.

Fourthly—Provide for a strong assaulting force to be ready to attack the village without delay, and under all covering fire possible, if the scouts are fired on.

Fifthly—Cover withdrawal as strongly as possible and from flanks.

Apparent hesitation or delay encourages the Arab, and a few men in the average village could inflict many casualties on attacking troops.

The troops should therefore be allotted their tasks and formed up into suitable formations at a long distance, out of rifle range if possible, from the village, and then advance as quickly as possible.

For the purpose of outflanking the village, and as scouts to approach it at first, cavalry is the most suitable arm.

It can gallop back out of range if the enemy suddenly opens fire, but infantry should be detailed to take up these duties if the cavalry is so checked.

Artillery should work at close range, 1500 to 2000 yards. There is usually no time for the laying of telephone lines, and unless the movements of our cavalry and infantry can be clearly observed from the battery positions the guns cannot assist with accurate fire.

Infantry should be in groups (platoon groups seem most suitable). This formation helps the artillery and others to distinguish our men from the enemy. It assists covering fire, enables the cavalry to retire through the infantry without masking the latter's fire and without breaking the latter's formation. Above all, it has a very steadying effect in case of a surprise attack by the enemy.

The assaulting troops must pass right through the village and take up a covering position beyond it.

Separate parties should be detailed for firing the houses, digging up and burning the grain and bhoosa, looting, &c.

The main difficulty usually is caused by the gardens and palm groves which often surround the villages.

To work in these cavalry must dismount.

When such enclosed ground is met, mixed groups are useful to form the outflanking parties. The cavalry finds out whether the gardens or groves are held, while the infantry, supported by guns if necessary, penetrates and holds them.

In the case of villages on or near a river the flanking groups, if they push forward to the river bank quickly enough, can often catch the enemy trying to escape across the river at the last moment.

Rifle bombs are of great value. The Arabs hate them, and the infantry acts much more boldly when it can fire a bomb or two into a village, house or fort, or into a piece of thick cover.

The first men who get into such places are always nervous, and more so if they have been fired at from them.

During recent operations the enemy has never done more than fire a few sniping shots from villages attacked by infantry and guns. Thereafter he ran away.

Twice he stood up to cavalry alone. In each case resistance ceased as soon as the cavalry had got machine-guns well round each flank and well into action.

At Mahmud Effendi the cavalry acted in this manner and caught 40 to 50 enemy crossing the river under close machine-gun fire and caused 20 to 25 casualties.

In dealing with villages as advocated above it is impossible to avoid dispersing one's force. This cannot be helped, and must be accepted. One must simply try to ensure that every group of infantry can be supported on its flanks by the effective fire of other groups of infantry or cavalry.

Cavalry must always be prepared to clear away rapidly if in serious trouble beyond support, but it has the right to expect the infantry or its own Hotchkiss guns to cover its rear and give it a rallying-point.

When it is a question of entering palm groves or thick gardens the troops concerned must look after themselves, but provision must be made for covering their exit should they have to evacuate under attack.

Burning a village properly takes a long time, an hour or more according to size from the time the burning parties enter.

When small groups of troops are hidden in thick cover and firing is going on and no reports can be obtained, this long wait is trying to a commander's nerves. However, it is no good trying to hurry the operation.

The Officer Commanding the cavalry with the column in the recent operations lays special stress on the advantages which can be gained by utilising the mobility of the cavalry to the full. It can scout far forward and to the flanks, and if it meets with serious opposition can gallop out of the enemy's range.

Infantry must, however, understand this manœuvre, and not allow itself to be shaken by the cavalry riding hard back on to its support.

APPENDIX X.

DEMANDS FOR REINFORCEMENTS.

(Summary of Telegrams sent to the War Office and repeated to India.)

1920.

8th July.	An infantry brigade and a field battery required to be ready for despatch to Basrah.
15th July.	Despatch as soon as possible troops asked for on 8th July. A full division will probably be required.
18th July.	A full division required, but should not be embarked till demanded.
25th July.	Despatch of troops urgent. They should (brigade first asked for), to save delay, embark without transport.
26th July.	A second division may be required.
30th July.	Full division should be despatched at once, and preparations made to send a second division.
3rd August.	If second division is not available, request large drafts for divisions now in Mesopotamia, and earliest possible despatch of full proportion of British units. (The British units of the division were, owing to danger of moving them through the Persian Gulf in summer, being withheld temporarily.)
13th August.	A fourth Indian battalion should be sent for each reinforcing brigade. (The brigades would then have one British and four Indian battalions.)
17th August.	The three British battalions destined for the relief of similar units in Mesopotamia should now be sent.
28th August.	War Office warned that under certain circumstances reinforcements considerably exceeding those ordered to be sent might be required. (This demand was cancelled after Samawah was relieved.)

APPENDIX XI.

STATEMENT OF COMBATANT REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED FROM INDIA.

Unit.	Total Combatant Strength.	Date of arrival.	Where sent to on Disembarkation.
2/7th Rajputs	807	6th Aug.	Baghdad
2/123rd Rifles	642	10th Aug.	Nasiriyah
1/15th Sikhs	618	10th Aug.	Baghdad
10th Howitzer Battery	164	16th Aug.	Nasariyah
1/12th Pioneers	736	17th Aug.	Kut-Baghdad L. of C.
2/96th Infantry	782	17th Aug.	Kut-Baghdad L. of C.
3/23rd Sikh Infantry	699	18th Aug.	Nasiriyah
2/117th Mahrattas	649	20th Aug.	Nasiriyah
11th Field Coy.	183	23rd Aug.	Baghdad
63rd Field Coy.	160	23rd Aug.	Baghdad (but sent back to Basrah)
69th Field Coy.	169	23rd Aug.	Nasiriyah
2/116th Mahrattas	511	25th Aug.	Baghdad
2/89th Punjabis	750	26th Aug.	Baghdad-Kut L. of C.
3/70th Burmans	540	31st Aug.	Basrah
"C" & "D" Coys. 8th M.G. Bn.	330	2nd Sept.	Baghdad and Nasiriyah
13th Battery R.F.A.	143	7th Sept. and 14th Sept.	H. Q. 17th Brigade R.F.A. and 1 battery ordered to Nasiriyah. Two 18-pdrs. to Baghdad (subsequently retained Basrah)
26th Battery R.F.A.	140		
92nd Battery R.F.A.	145		
1st Bn. K.O.Y.L.I.	574	8th Sept.	Nasiriyah
"F" Battery R.H.A.	210	9th Sept.	Baghdad
2/153rd Rifles	780	18th Sept.	Basrah
63rd Palamcottahs	635	18th Sept.	Basrah
3/124th Baluchis	730	18th Sept.	Nasiriyah
2nd D.C.L.I.	673	23rd Sept.	Basrah
2nd East Yorkshire Regt.	707	23rd Sept.	Baghdad
3/5th Gurkhas	656	24th Sept.	Samawah relief column
3/8th Gurkhas	495	24th Sept.	Samawah relief column
1/11th Gurkhas	570	24th Sept.	Samawah relief column
2/11th Gurkhas	826	28th Sept.	Reserve for Samawah relief column
Kapurthala Infantry	410	29th Sept.	Basrah

INDEX.

Abadan island, 7.
Abbott, Colonel L. H., 127.
Abdul Wahid, Shaikh, 331.
Abu Hawa, blockhouse construction, 166.
Abu Jisrah, affair at, 164; attacked, 166.
Abu Sukhair, garrison of, 177; strengthened, 178; withdrawn, 178; occupied, 264.
Adler, Major B. I. H., 14; at Kingarban, 245.
Aerodrome, defence of, at Baghdad, 16.
Aeroplanes, 55; over Sharaban, 165; over Kufah, 189; rescue Political Officer, 214; at Samawah, 234, 244; from Constantinople, 262; available for columns, 277; carry wounded shaikh, 308.
Afaj, 20, 130.
Ahwaz, 54.
Albu Kamal, 10, 33.
Albu Sultan joins insurgents, 129; defeated, 151.
Aleppo, 19.
'Ali, 30; tradition regarding, 176.
Ali Sulaiman, Shaikh, loyalty of, 105.
Altun Keupri, occupation of, 19.
Amarrah, 9.
Anah, 20, 33.
Anglo-Persian Agreement, Arab suspicion of, 27.
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, works of, 7; visit to works of, 309; medical help from, 309; efficiency of, 310.
Anizah, 33.
Aquaidat, 33.
Arabs, thefts by, 12; classes of, 22, 23; qualities of, 27, 28, 89, 309, 311, 313; efficiency as labourers, 108; exaggerative habits of, 115; dislike of strong places, 199; mobility of, 219; dislike of Assyrians, 243; notes regarding, 332 *et seq.*
Arbil, disorders at, 157.
Area, river, events in, 193 *et seq.*
Areas of command, 11.
Armenians, expense of, 58; safety of, 72; sent to Basrah, 236; vicissitudes of, 236 *et seq.*; camp of, 240.
Arms, tribes with, 257; handed in, 271, 298.
Army Council, 60; congratulations from, 297.
Assyrians, expense of, 58; losses in camp, 156; truculency of, 157, 244; vicissitudes of, 236 *et seq.*; camp of, 240; repatriation of, 241; adventure to, 242; defeat Surchi, 247.
Atkinson, Major-General H. de V., 112; commands Samawah relief operations, 221; arrangements of, 223; joins force at Ur, 224.

Baghdad, 10, 11, 12; hostile meetings at, 35, 36; disturbed country north of, 241.
Baiji, 11; raid on, 43.
Baku, 48.
Bani Hachaim murder two R.A.F. officers, 22, 73; negotiate at Samawah, 229.
Bani Hassan, 22, 31.
Bani Lam remains loyal, 106.
Bani Rabia remains loyal, 106.
Balad Ruz, column visits, 272; Young's column reaches, 274.
Balad station, attack on, 241.
Baqubah, 146; railway cutting at, 152; in danger, 154; refugee camp near, 240.
Barbuti bridge, attack on, 198.
Barclay, Lieut.-Colonel P. C. R., calls for reinforcements, 252; alarm of, 252.
Barlow, Major J. E., murdered, 42.
Basrah, extent of, 8, 10, 12, 15.
Bateman-Champain, Brig.-General H. F., troops under, 46; at Enzeli, 47, 51, 55; orders troops to retire seventy miles, 252; anxiety to advance, 253; invalided, 254, 319.
Bazian Pass, 14.
Beatty, Brig.-General G. A. H., commands column, 163, 168, 169; troops with, 179; operations in Diyalah area, 272 *et seq.*, 318.

Bedouins, 22.
Berry, Major, 234.
Birs Nimrud, 191.
Bisitun, 49.
Blockhouses, at Baghdad, 112; organisation for, 148; begun on Kut line, 162; on Quraitu line, 166; at Baqubah, 169; to Musayib, 170; to Fallujah, 174; Kut line completed, 175; to Nahr Shah Canal, 182; to Tuwairij, 185; ordered for Nasiriyah line, 219; ordered to be made north of Ur, 224; fewer held, 273; to Barbuti bridge, 278.
Bockett-Pugh, Flying Officer, murdered, 322.
Bolsheviks, 13, 27; land at Enzeli, 47; fighting value of, 253.
Bovill, Major W. J., 212.
Boyle, Major C. A., Inspector-General of Levies, 125; good services of, 302.
Bragg, Captain H. V., commands at Rumaithah, 75.
Bradford, Captain, killed, 164.
Bridging train, 162, 186, 267, 270.
Brooke-Popham, Air Commander, rescues wounded shaikh, 308.
Brooking, Major-General, 287.
Buchanan, Captain, killed, 165.
Buchanan, Mrs, prisoner, 165.
Bunting, Major T. E., 54.
Burnett, Wing Commander C. S., excellent work of, 300.
Burn-Murdoch, Major I., 51; areoplane adventure, 55.
Burrard, Colonel H. G., deals successfully with supply problem, 117.
Butcher, Captain W. H., gallantry of, 287.

Campbell, Major R. N. B., makes gallant charge, 280.
Carey, Lieut.-Colonel A. V., energy of, 112.
Carey, Lieut.-Colonel P. G., visits *Greenfly*, 226.
Cars, armoured, at Tel Afar, 40, 41; unsuitability of, 69, 158; Sharaban garrison and, 165; engaged, 185, 186.
Caspian Sea, 10.
Cash extracted from tribes, 298.
Casualties, British, Indian, Arab, 331.
Cavendish, Lieutenant, joins force, 110.
Chai Khana bridge, column reaches, 275.
Chaldari, camp site at, 112, 113, 114.
Chelmsford, Rt. Hon. Lord, interview with, 6.
Christie, Dr, at Mukden, 310.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. W. S., interview with, 13; telegrams from, 215 *et seq.*; congratulations from, 229.
Coningham, Brig.-General F. E., 57; commands Rumaithah relief force, 81; as a leader, 83; attacks insurgents, 85; serious situation of, 86; effects relief, 87, 88; tactics of, 89; isolation of force under, 97; ordered to march, 130; at Jarbuiyah, 134, 135, 136, 139; marches to relieve Jarbuiyah, 150, 151; his force assembles, 5th September, 162; ordered to command Samawah relief force, 223; reconnoitres Imam Abdullah bridge, 278; advances, 280; commands Shatt-al-Hai column, 290, 291; takes force to Suq-ash-Suyukh, 297, 315.
Connop, Major H. E., gallantry of, 102.
Cory, Major-General G. N., arrives, 260; orders to, 277, 318.
Cowans, General Sir John, hints from, 3.
Cox, Sir P. Z., at Teheran, 45, 51; arrives at Baghdad, 186; views on disarmament, 259, 295.
Crawford, Captain W. F., ambushed, 214.
Crops, survey of, 29, 30; measuring of, 30, 31, 216.
Cunliffe-Owen, Lieut.-Colonel F., recovers ammunition, 156; in charge of refugees, 240.

Dair-al-Zaur, 13, 20, 32, 33, 50.
Daly, Major C., 73, 74.
Daurah cantonment, 113, 114.
Davies, Brig.-General P. W. L., commands column, 270.
Deering, Sergeant A. V., gallantry of, 102.
Defence vessels, condition of, 109; lost, 201.
Deli Abbas, column visits, 273.
Deltawah, column sent to, 168; detachment left at, 168.
Dent, Brig.-General B. E. C., commands column, 265, 291, 293 *et seq.*, 319.
De Roebeck, Lieutenant, gallantry of, 102.
Devlin, Lieutenant J. A. H., good work of, 241.
Dhari, Shaikh, murders Lieut.-Colonel Leachman, 170; his fort razed, 174.
Dhawalim, 73, 74.
Dickinson, Captain, adventure of, 323.
Ditchburn, Major, 211.
Disarmament, instructions regarding, 260; High Commissioner and, 259, 295; Memorandum on, 329, 330.
Distances, 10, 14, 16, 37, 45, 70.
Diwaniyah, 20, 36, 73; stores at, 123; reoccupied, 268.
Diyalah bridge, 146.
Diyar-albu-Said village occupied, 135.
Dohuk, supply of, 43.
Dojman, Beatty's column reaches, 275.
Dowling, Captain D. M., commands Kufah garrison, 177; opinion of, 178.
Dulaim, arrangement made with, 105.

Eadie, Major J. I., wisdom of, 106; valuable work of, 171.
Economy of force, exemplification of, 329.
Edwards, Major D. B., reaches Khanikin Road, 158; his column, 159.
Effendi, 23, 24, 25, 26.
Enzeli, 10, 27, 45; Bolsheviks at, 47.
Euphrates, 10; operations on, 13; raids on, 35; as irrigation canal, 120; peculiarity of, 305.
Extravagance, 65, 66, 67, 68.
Extremists, attempted arrest of, 172.

Fadghami, forces at, 39.
Fahad Beg, Shaikh, loyalty of, 33, 105.
Faisal, H.M. King, 26; opinion on disarmament, 310; kingdom of, 311.
Fallujah, isolation of, 171; communications to, reopened, 174; columns meet at, 266.
Families, soldiers', 59; number of, 72; arrangements for, 61, 167; removal of, 248.
Fao, 10.
Faris-al-Jaryan, Shaikh, magnanimity of, 320.
Fathah, 117.
Fatlah tribe, village destroyed, 184.
Firefly, at Kufah, 178; sunk, 189.
Fires at Baghdad, 122.
Fleming, Lieutenant H. N., 203, 205.
Foster, Captain T. A., 242.
Fraser, Major-General T., view *re* Zakho, 57; ordered to send troops, 79; small force of, 231; lays down bounds, 232, 315.
Frost, Colonel F. B., Director of Labour, 108.

Gowler, Flying Officer G. R., adventure of, 320.
Gardiner, Flying Officer G. C., adventure of, 320.
Garnons-Williams, Lieutenant R. F., 234.
Garrisons, security of, 16; of Mesopotamia, 64, 105, 106, 107; relief of, 141, 143.
Gaskell, Lieut.-Colonel H. S., column under, 159; bold action of, 160.
Glasfurd, Brig.-General A. I. R., commands section of communications, 225, 318.
Goltz, General von der, 10.
Gorringe, Major-General, 287.
Grayfly attempts to refloat *Greenfly*, 195.
Greenfly, sent to Samawah, 194; runs aground, 195; murder of British crew of, 225; part of native crew rejoins, 281; story of captain of, 282, 283; letter from captain of, 326.
Greer, Lieut.-Colonel F. A., commands operations, 160; forward move of, 161; in touch with Coningham, 166; moves to Kingarban, 169.
Grehan, Lieutenant S. A. J., 4, 48.
Groom, Flying Officer V. E., adventure of, 323; gallantry rewarded, 323.
Guchan, 129; isolated train at, 131, 132; halt near, 133.
Gun, captured, used, 189; recovered, 192, 277.

Hadithah, 19.
Hamadan, 48, 49, 54, 55.
Hambro, Brig.-General P., 9; arrangements for families by, 61; arranges supplies, 117, 315.
Hammond, Major T. E., athletic accomplishments, 55.
Hammar Lake, 295, 296, 306.
Hanna, Lieutenant A. L., gallantry of, 233.
Hanna, Captain J. R. M., commands armoured train, 194.
Hanwell, Captain J. C., 233.
Haqqi, Ismail, captured, 19.
Hardat, sepoy, gallantry of, 77.
Hardcastle, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel R. N., commands column, 94, 95, 98; retires force, 100; difficult situation of, 103.
Harper, E. W., gallantry of, 77.
Hashimiyah canal, 135.
Hay, Major A. S., commands at Samawah, 194, 206.
Hay, Major (Political Officer), at Rowanduz, 246.
Healey, Lieutenant J. J., 74.
Hedger, Alfred C., letter from, 327.
Henderson, Major G. B., proceeds to Arbil, 247.
Henderson, Captain G. S., gallantry of, 101.
Herbert, Flying Officer, adventure of, 320.
Hewett, Sir John, information from, 3, 306.
Hillah, 11, 36, 37, 124; attack on, 127; garrison of, 143; train reaches, 148; defence of, 148, 149; operations around, 182, 183, 184.
Hinaidi, 10; roads at, 68, 113; nature of cantonments, 114.
Hindiyah Barrage, 17; erection of, 142; recapture of, 145; defences of, 145.
Hinxman, Sergeant E., gallantry of, 102.
Hit, regular garrison replaced at, 179.
Holmes, Lieut.-Colonel E. W., commands column, 268.
Huddlestone, Lieut.-Colonel, commands column, 278.
Hughes, Brig.-General R. H. W., head of Inland Water Transport, 29.
Hughes, Aircraftsman, adventure of, 323.

Humaisaniyah canal, insurgents at, 186.
Hunt, Major R. S., commands at Citadel, 111.
Hunter, Lieutenant J. H. D., gallantry of, 160.
Husainiyah canal, 146; head of, blocked, 170.
Hyatt, Lieutenant P. T., 73, 74; good sense of, 84.

Ibn Ali reached, 132.
Ibn Saud, Sultan of Najd, letter of, 314.
Iman Hamzah reached, 78, 82; Paley's column and 6th Division meet at, 268.
Inland Water Transport, 9, 119.
Iraq, explanation of name, 19; impatience in, 26; tribes of, 27; future of, 314.
Irrigation, question of, 305, 306.
Ironside, Major-General Sir Edmund, arrives, 254; proceeds to Kasvin, 254; effect of presence on troops, 255.

Jaarah occupied, 264.
Jabal Hamrin, 117; traversed by Greer's column, 166.
Jacob, Brig.-General A. le G., commands section of communications, 225; punishes Juwabir tribe, 279, 318.
Jarbuiyah bridge, importance of, 105; defence of, 106, 132, 133, 136; post at, 150; line repaired to, by 12th December, 268.
Jarjiyah canal, 145, 149; opposition at, 184.
Jeffreys, Major J. F. D., influence of, 291.
Jones, Commander C. H., joins force, 109; commands floating defences, 110.
Juwabir tribe, treachery of, 195, 283.

Kabur river, 39.
Kadhimain, Shiah holy city, 26, 27, 109.
Kapurthala, H.H. Maharajah of, sends troops, 107.
Karaghan, relief of, 159, 160.
Karbala, Shiah holy city, 26, 37; water supply of, 146, 147, 170; submits, 186.
Karind, visit to, 45, 48, 61; soldiers' families' camp at, 60; description of, 61, 62; safety of, 161.
Kasvin, situation of, 37; isolation of, in winter, 45; headquarters of British forces at, 46, 51.
Kemmis, Lieut.-Colonel A. W. M., good work of his regiment, 203.
Kermanshah, 48, 55.
Khalis canal, head guarded, 166.
Khan, H.H. the Agha, travel with, 4; remarks of, 31.
Khan, Agha Hamid, rescued, 185; his care of prisoners, 190.
Khan Hiswah, 148.
Khan Jadwal, rations at, 129.
Khan Mahawil canal, 149.
Khan Nasiriyah, camp at, 145.
Khan Nuqtah, murder at, 170; column from, 266.
Khanikin Road station, 158; insurgents near, 159.
Khayun-al-Obaid, character of, 220, 290.
Khidhr railway station lost, 172; situation of, 194; description of, 196; hostile concentration near, 196; order to evacuate, 196; attack on, 197; vacated, 197.
Khirr depot, 109.
Kiernander, Major, engaged with insurgents, 74.
Kifl, 91.
Kifri, disturbances at, 244; arrival of troops at, 246.
Kingarban, railway to, closed, 152, 159; situation of, 245.
Kirkuk, 11, 14, 37; disorder at, 157.
Kitching, Captain, 211.
Kizil Robat, 160.
Kufah, 'Ali assassinated at, 30; detachment at, 91; rations at, 141, 143; relief of deferred, 161; arrangements for relief, 168; relief of, 176 *et seq.*; founded, 176; description of, 176; plan of march to, 181; relieved, 187; garrison of, 187; attack on camp, 262.
Kut-al-Amarah, 9, 11; supply depot at, 118; railway to, 119.
Kurdistan, 11, 13, 14, 35.
Kurds as labourers, 108.

Labour Corps, 108; holds blockhouses, 169.
Lakin, Colonel J. H. F., troops under, 46; energetic action of, 157; sends out column, 158; arrival of, at Quraitu, 159, 319.
Lawlor, Mr, murder of, 42.
Leachman, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald, murder of, 171; serious loss, 171.
Leslie, Major-General G. A. J., commanding 17th Division, ordered to go to Hillah, 105; ordered to send column to Deltawah, 168; commands Kufah and Tuwairij operations, 184; replaced by Brig.-General Sanders, 260, 315.
Levies, 78; good work of, 125, 126, 127, 150, 151, 190, 197, 198, 246; at Sharaban, 165; at Khidhr, 197, 198; with Paley's column, 267; with Davies' column, 270; staunchness of, 301, 302; losses of, 303; rewards earned by, 303.
Littledale, Captain, gallantry of, 246.

Lloyd, Captain, prisoner, 168.
Lloyd-Evans, Flying Officer D., adventure, 322; gallantry rewarded, 323.
Locke, Flying Officer H. G. W., adventure of, 320.
Lubbock, Major, good work of, 132.
Lukin, Colonel R. C. W., 93.
Lutyens, Sir E., 6.

Macdonald, Flying Officer, murdered, 322.
Macintyre, Major F. P., 51.
MacMunn, Major-General Sir G., 5.
Mahmudiyah, 148; columns meet at, 266.
Maidan-i-Naftun, visit to, 309.
Manchester Column, 94; transport carts recovered, 263.
Manjil Pass, strength of, 47, 52, 53, 54; Bolsheviks near, 48; visit to, 51; exaggerated reports of movement against, 252.
Mann, Captain J. S., killed, 188; gallantry of, 188.
Marriott, Lieutenant, attacks Albu Hassan, 75.
Marut, 153; blockhouse construction near, 166.
Masters, Captain O., 135.
May, Major C. D., takes detachment to Samawah, 194.
McCausland, Major E. T. W., relieves Samarrah, 234.
McGowan, Major T., commands a column, 266.
McNally, Captain J. V., 211, 212.
M'Vean, Lieut.-Colonel D. A. D., resolution of, 78, 132.
Maxwell, Flying Officer P. D., adventures of, 322, 323.
Medill, Major R. M., commands a column, 160.
Mendali, Young's column moves to, 273.
Merriman, Lieut.-Colonel A. D. N., assists rearguard, 90.
Mezlaq Channel, 306.
Mirjanah occupied, 162.
Mitchell, Major H. S., commands at Jarbuiyah, 134.
Molloy, Major N. F. C., relieves Tuz and Kingarban, 245.
Moore, Captain J. B., 160.
Morris, Brig.-General G. M., 316.
Mortality of children, 307.
Mosul, 11, 35, 38, 39, 43; supply of, 234; suggested evacuation of, 235.
Mudlark, 296.
Muhammad Mirza Taqi, son arrested, 147; declares Jihad, 214.
Muhammad Sadr, 233.
Muhammarah, Shaikh of, 54.
Munro, General Sir C., visit to, 5; offer of, 107.
Muntafiq, 106; propaganda among, 148; armed men among, 215; march through country of, 285 *et seq.*
Musayib, importance of, 142; column advances on, 143; occupied, 145; advantage of, 146; blockhouse line to, 170; operations near, 263.
Mutter, Company Sergeant-Major, care of prisoners, 191.

Nahr Shah Canal, blockhouses to mouth of, 182.
Nahr Umar, port at, 8.
Najaf, holy city, 26, 27, 36; 'Ali buried at, 176; half-company sent to, 177; half-company withdrawn, 178; submits, 190; fine paid, 262; display of force at, 264; terms read, 264.
Nalder, Colonel, sagacity of, 57.
Nasiriyah, 11, 36; troops at, 193; important situation of, 219; Samawah relief column at, 224.
Nepean, Brig.-General H. E. C. B., commands River Area, 193, 317.
Nesbitt, Instructor of Levies, killed, 164.
Newton, Sergeant-Major, killed, 164.
Nightingale, Brig.-General M. R. W., 316.
Nisibin, 38.
Norbury, Major P. FitzG., foresight of, 141; urgent representations of, 177.
Norman, Major A. C., commands a column, 173.
Norman, H., H.B.M.'s minister at Teheran, 50.
Norris, Commodore D., arrives at Kasvin, 54, 110.
Norton, Captain C. E., 229.
Nuttall, Flight-Lieutenant, killed, 57.

O'Donovan, Captain M. J. W., 54.
Officers, military, responsibility of, 324.
Onslow, Lieutenant, joins force, 110.
Organisation, brigade, departed from, 225.

Paley, Brig.-General A., carries out punitive operations, 226; rescues isolated Assyrians, 242; his column marches to Diwaniyah, 267; difficulties encountered, 267.
Petros, Agha, leader of Assyrians, 237.
Persia, 13, 27, 37; distances in, 45; withdrawal from, 55.
Physicians, necessity for, 307.
Pigeon, Captain J. W., 203, 205; self-sacrifice of, 209.
Platt, Captain A., 295; escapes, 296.
Political Officers, inexperience of, 20, 21, 25, 29; efforts of, 35; interviews with, 36.
Prisoners, British and Indian, number of, 102; movements of, 190; surrender of, 190; treatment of, 190, 191.
Prisoners, Turkish, guards for, 11, 72; number of, 58; shipped to Constantinople, 107.

Proclamation to Diyalah tribes, 163.
Propaganda, 174, 185.
Pulley, Major, urges military action, 93.
Pusht-i-Kuh, 9.

Qalat Sikar, 20.
Qislah at Sharaban attacked, 164; captured, 165.
Quiyarah, ambush near, 44.
Quraitu, 37, 45, 48; train service to, 152.

Railways, inefficiency of, 11, 70, 71, 80; shortage of rolling-stock, 162; reopened to Quraitu, 167; reopened to Kingarban, 169; siting of stations, 200; Hillah-Kifl line repaired, 263; repairs on main Basrah line begun, 268; repaired north of Samawah, 278; good work of personnel, 303, 304; loss of personnel, 304.
Ramadhan, 43, 56.
Ramadhan-al-Shallash, 32.
Ramadi, troops at, 11; operations near, 13; isolation of, 171; communication with, restored, 174.
Raqqa, in Aqaidat country, 32.
Refugees. (See "Assyrians" and "Armenians.")
Regulators on rivers, 142, 166, 174, 305, 306.
Reinforcements, demands for, 343; received, 344.
Resht, Bolsheviks at, 48; reoccupied, 254.
Roads, nature of, 14, 15, 69; at Hinaidi, 68; Baiji-Shergat, 116.
Robertson, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel D. E., attacks ambushed Arabs, 44.
Robinson, Flight-Lieut. F. L., adventure of, 55.
Rowanduz, occupation of, 20.
Royal Air Force, strength of, 70; assists Rumaithah garrison, 77; raid by, 80; assists at Samarrah, 234; assists columns, 131, 132, 136, 137, 138, 185, 227, 275; excellent work of, 300, 301; rescues wounded shaikh, 308; prestige of, 309; rewards offered by, 321.
Rumaithah, outbreak at, 73; submission of, 283.
Russell, Captain O., defends railway post at Samawah, 203, 205; gallant conduct of, 209, 210; killed, 210.
Rustumiyah canal, camp on, 98.

Saklawiyah canal, blockhouse at head of, 174.
Salmon, Captain G. H., murdered, 246.
Samarrah threatened, 234; Beatty's column at, 276.
Samawah, disturbance at, 73; isolated, 172; troops at, 193; defence of, 199, 200; supplies sent to, 201; attack on begins, 202; relief of, 227; garrison during siege, 228; attacked again, 244.
Sanders, Brig.-General G. A. F., in charge of blockhouse scheme, 148, 174; commands Tuwairij column, 180; appointed to command 17th Division, 260, 316.
Sarel, Lieut.-Colonel G. B. M., commands a column, 43.
Sar-i-Mil, 36, 48; headquarter camp at, 62; safety of, 161.
Sarim-ud-Daulah, Prince, 48.
Scott, Lieut.-Colonel H. L., initiative of, 86, 89, 135; commands a column, 140, 143, 147, 149.
Scott-Ruffle, Captain, relief of, 160.
Seaton, Lieut. G. H., killed, 147.
Sha'alan Abu, arrest of, 73, 84.
Shamiyah, visit to, 264.
Shammar, 40; give trouble, 232.
Sharaban, affairs near, 164; reached, 164; massacre at, 165; punishment of, 166; Beatty's column leaves, 272.
Shattrah, 20; bad reputation of, 215, 216.
Shergat, road to, 15; capture of, 19, 35, 37, 39.
Shiah, origin of, 30.
Shurufah occupied, 135.
Simpson, Lieut. C. E., arrives at Ur, 194; arrives at Khidhr station, 197.
Sindiyah, detachment at, 169.
Stevenson, Lieut.-Colonel K. L., 293.
Stewart, Colonel A. C., commanding Guides Cavalry, 53.
Stewart, Brig.-General J. H. K., senior G. S. officer, 48, 51; value of, 104, 139, 315.
Storey-Cooper, Captain E. S., gallantry of, 206.
Stuart, Captain, murdered, 42.
Suffolk, Captain W. H., Inland Water Transport, gallantry of, 202.
Sulaimaniyah, 14.
Sunni, origin of, 30.
Supplies, 117, 118, 119.
Suq-ash-Suyukh, column sent to, 297.
Surchi, disturbances among, 35, 246; attack Rowanduz, 247; attack Assyrians, 247.
Sweet, Lieut.-Colonel E. H., commands at Manjil Pass, 52.
Syria, 19, 26.

Tabriz, troops at, 54.
Tak-i-Girrah Pass, 48.
Tanks, suitability of Iraq for, 15; asked for, 70.
Taq-i-Bostan, 49.
Teheran visited, 14, 46, 48, 51.
Tekrit, garrison of, 11.
Tel Afar occupied, 20; incident at, 38, 39, 40, 172; column reaches, 43, 50.
Temperature, 63, 98, 138, 144, 218, 266, 300.

Thomas, Captain B. S., good work of, 220, 293.
Tigris, 11; delta of, 15, 43; main artery, 119, 120, 305.
Townshend, Major-General Sir C., 2, 285.
Tozer, Captain, accompanies Manchester Column, 96, 97.
Trains, armoured, patrol, 195; two lost, 198; lost at Samawah, 205; isolated, 242.
Transport, natures of, used, 271; shortage affects operations, 278.
Tribes engaged, 124; Diyalah, characteristics of, 163; Diyalah surrender, 168; Kurdish, restless, 216; presence of troops, effect of, 294; gratitude of, 309; characteristics of, 312; magnanimity of, 313; strength engaged, 328.
Troops, endurance of, 299; strength of, 325.
Turumah occupied, 271.
Tuwairij, movement on, 184; bridge saved at, 185; garrison left at, 185.
Tuz isolated, 225.

Umma, excavations at, 293.
Umm-al-Barur, prisoners at, 178.
Umran, Shaikh, magnanimity of, 321.
Units—
British Cavalry:—
1st King's Dragoon Guards, 80, 152.
7th Dragoon Guards (Princess Royal's), 80, 152, 273, 269.
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars, 273.
Indian Cavalry:—
5th Cavalry, 105, 173, 179, 180, 265, 292.
10th Duke of Cambridge's Own Lancers (Hodson's Horse), 203, 209, 210, 224, 226, 278.
11th King Edward's Own Lancers (Probyn's Horse), 43, 44, 247.
32nd Lancers, 126, 140, 147, 162, 169, 247, 272, 275.
35th Scinde Horse, 54, 93, 94, 98, 101, 102, 140, 162, 168, 180, 187, 273.
37th Lancers (Baluch Horse), 54, 78, 81, 131, 135, 137, 143, 150, 170, 180, 264, 267, 279, 290.
Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides (Lumsden's), 46, 52, 53.
British Artillery:—
"A" Battery R.H.A. (Chestnut Troop), 46, 53, 152, 153.
"F" Battery R.H.A., 272, 273.
2nd Battery R.F.A., 180, 267.
8th Battery R.F.A., 247.
10th (How.) Battery R.F.A., 224, 279.
13th Battery R.F.A., 224, 279.
26th Battery R.F.A., 279.
39th Battery R.F.A., 93, 94, 99, 100, 102, 150, 170, 180, 270.
44th Battery R.F.A., 232.
92nd Battery R.F.A., 279.
96th Battery R.F.A., 173.
97th Battery R.F.A., 81, 86, 131, 140, 162, 168, 265, 269.
131st (How.) Battery R.F.A., 126, 131, 137, 140, 150, 170, 180, 265, 292.
132nd (How.) Battery R.F.A., 81, 131, 143, 162, 180, 267.
5th Battery R.G.A., 146.
13th Pack Battery R.G.A., 159, 161, 169, 272, 275.
45th Pack Battery R.G.A., 78, 81, 131, 135, 137, 140, 163, 169, 180, 267.
50th Pack Battery R.G.A., 153, 292.
British Infantry:—
4th Batt. The Royal Fusiliers, 247.
2nd Batt. The East Yorkshire Regiment, 181, 185, 264, 265.
2nd Batt. The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 290.
1st Batt. The Royal Berkshire Regiment, 53.
1st Batt. The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 224, 226, 227, 268, 279.
2nd Batt. The Manchester Regiment, 79, 94, 98, 104, 126, 140, 145, 146, 180, 187, 264.
2nd Batt. The York and Lancaster Regiment, 53.
2nd Batt. The Royal Irish Rifles, 78, 81, 83, 90, 126, 144, 150, 170, 180, 183, 264,
1st Batt. The Royal Irish Fusiliers, 53, 161, 179, 272, 292.
1st Batt. The Rifle Brigade, 110, 153, 154, 264, 267, 268.
Indian Artillery:—
40th Pack Battery, 179, 265, 290.
Engineers:—
9th Coy. 2nd Queen Victoria's Own Sappers and Miners, 163, 168, 181, 267.
11th Coy. 2nd Queen Victoria's Own Sappers and Miners, 174, 275.
61st Coy. 2nd Queen Victoria's Own Sappers and Miners, 81, 131, 180, 265, 292.
65th Coy. 2nd Queen Victoria's Own Sappers and Miners, 159, 160.
67th Coy. 2nd Queen Victoria's Own Sappers and Miners, 126, 150, 173, 180, 276.
69th Coy. 2nd Queen Victoria's Own Sappers and Miners, 224.
26th (Railway) Coy. Sappers and Miners, 279.
Indian Infantry:—
2/6th Royal Jat Light Infantry, 173.

2/7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs, 141.
8th Rajputs, 126, 127, 140, 145, 180, 183, 184, 270.
3/9th Bhopal Infantry, 163, 181, 267.
1/12th Pioneers, 162, 163, 168, 181, 267.
13th Rajputs, 148, 181, 185, 267, 268.
1/15th Ludhiana Sikhs, 146, 156, 162, 168, 180, 184, 187, 264.
3/23rd Sikh Infantry, 224, 226, 278, 279, 280.
1/32nd Sikh Pioneers, 93, 101, 131, 134, 137, 140, 150, 180, 265, 269, 270.
1/39th Royal Garhwal Rifles, 44.
45th Rattray's Sikhs, 57, 78, 79, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88, 90, 131, 135, 144, 150, 162, 179, 265, 292.
52nd Sikhs (Frontier Force), 247.
1/67th Punjabis, 54.
3/70th Burma Rifles, 268.
79th Carnatic Infantry, 159, 161.
86th Carnatic Infantry, 131, 135, 151.
87th Punjabis, 79, 81, 90, 131, 137, 180, 186.
1/89th Punjabis, 162.
1/94th Russell's Infantry, 153, 154, 160, 161, 179, 245, 292.
2/96th Infantry, 162, 270.
1/99th Deccan Infantry, 75, 77, 78, 81, 131, 135, 140, 150, 162, 179, 273, 275.
106th Hazara Pioneers, 234.
108th Infantry, 126, 131, 134, 180, 187, 265.
1/113th Infantry, 245.
1/114th Mahrattas, 74, 75, 76, 77, 131, 135, 140, 193, 227, 277.
1/116th Mahrattas, 79, 81, 86, 87, 126, 135, 137, 140, 150, 170, 180, 186, 267.
2/117th Royal Mahrattas, 268, 275, 277.
2/119th Infantry, 163, 168, 169, 179.
122nd Rajputana Infantry, 163.
3/124th Duchess of Connaught's Own Baluchistan Infantry, 290.
2/125th Napier's Rifles, 193, 194, 290.
2/129th Duke of Connaught's Own Baluchis, 194.
3/153rd Rifles, 279, 290.
2nd King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles, 52.
1/3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles, 116, 234, 241, 244.
3/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force), 224, 226, 277, 278, 279, 280.
3/8th Gurkha Rifles, 224, 226, 278, 290.
1/10th Gurkha Rifles, 80, 81, 83, 86, 87, 88, 131, 135, 137, 140, 150, 162, 179, 265, 292.
1/11th Gurkha Rifles, 224, 279, 280.
2/11th Gurkha Rifles, 272, 275.

Van Straubenzee, Major A. W., commanding Chestnut Troop, R.H.A., 53; routs Bolsheviks, 253.

Walker, Brig.-General H. A., commands a column, 140, 170; recaptures Barrage, 146, 149; exerts pressure in Hillah area, 170; returns to Hillah, 170; commands Kufah relief column, 180.
Walker, Sergeant, murder of, 42.
Waunas-al-Sachit, Shaikh, 327.
Water, dominating question, 17; Kufah column and, 181; carried on trains, 225.
Webb, Captain W. F., escape of, 130.
Willcocks, Sir Wm., associated with Hindiyah Barrage, 142; his irrigation scheme, 305.
Williams, Lieut.-Colonel J., destroys villages, 153, 154, 155.
Williams, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel L. G., despatches convoy of vessels, 172.
Willis, Sergeant J., gallantry of, 102.
Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. T., Acting Civil Commissioner, 10; his task, 24, 25; anticipates trouble, 36, 37, 50, 51, 56, 160; replaced, 186.
Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir H., congratulations from, 229.
Woods, Lieut. A. W. H., escorts convoy, 113.
Wooldridge, Brig.-General H. W., 315.
Wright, Mr and Mrs, visit to, 49, 55.
Wrigley, Captain, killed, 164.

Young, Brig.-General H. G., commands a column, 152, 153, 154, 155, 273, 317.
Young, Dr M. Y., excellent work of, 309.
Yusuf-al-Suwaidi, 233.
Yusufiyah canal, march to, 266; Holmes's column camps on, 269.

Zakho, 10, 39, 43, 50.
Zingan, 54.
Zoba tribe revolts, 170; murders Lieut.-Colonel Leachman, 170.

Printed in Great Britain by
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.