2Nathanael Greene, "Document #1: Letter from Nathanael Green to Samuel Huntington, President of the Continental Congress, 28 December 1780," Primary Source Reference Book for the 1781 Battle of Cowpens, (West Point, Department of History, 1 August 2000), 3.

Camp at the Cheraws on the east side of Pedee, 28 December 1780

"…Soon after my arrival I was fully convinced that the Army could not be subsisted for any length of time at Charlotte; the whole country being in a great degree laid waste. No position afforded me the least prospect of support in the impoverished condition of the Country except this. . . .

…Previous to my marching from Charlotte I made a detachment from the Army to operate on the West side of the Catawba under the command of General Morgan consisting of between 3 and 400 chosen Infantry and Lt. Colonel Washington’s regiment of Dragoons; which I expect will be joined by 300 Militia horse under the command of Genl Davidson and near 400 Militia that were lately with General Sumter and Colonel Clarke. His instructions are to act upon the offensive or defensive as occasion may warrant. But to take every precaution to guard against a surprize. The object of the detachment is to straighten the Enemy’s limits upon that quarter, keep up the spirits of the people, give protection to the well affected and collect the provision and form it into magazines. The detachment is organized so as to move with great celerity; most of the Militia being on horse back and in a great measure unencumbered with baggage or stores.

…certain it is we have but very incompetent supplies…the whole department is in deplorable condition…"

Camp at the Cheraws on the east side of Pedee, 28 December 1780

"…Our force is so small, and so badly provided, that it is of the highest importance that reinforcements come forward as fast as they can be equiped fit for service. And what renders it more necessary at this time, is the enemy have received a large reinforcement and our force is divided; One part of the Army being with me at this place and the other with General Morgan on the west side of the Catawba River. This disposition was made partly from choice and partly from necessity. I soon found after my arrival at Charlotte that we could not be subsisted there; and the Country has been so generally ravaged that no position offered so favorable a prospect as the one I have made choice of, nor could I fix upon one better calculated to straighten the Enemy’s limits and give repose to our troops for improving their discipline; and can assure you no Army ever wanted it more."

Camp at the Cheraws on the east side of Pedee, 29 December 1780

"…I have at this moment received intelligence that General Leslie has landed at Charles Town, and is on his march to Camden. His force is about 2000; perhaps something less. I also am informed Lord Cornwallis has collected his troops at Camden. You will watch their motions very narrowly, and take care and guard against a surprize. Should they move in force this way you will endeavor to cross the river and join us. Do not be sparing of Expresses but let me know as often as possible of your situation. I wish to be fully informed of your prospect regarding provisions, and also the number of Militia that have joined you."

Camp on the Pedee, South Carolina, 3 January 1781

"I am not a little impatient to hear from you, not knowing where, or in what condition you are. It is of importance that I should be informed as minutely as possible, of your strength, situation, state of provisions and means of transportation, all which I beg you to give me an account of as early as you can; and to report it once in five or six days, whether any material changes happen or not; and to give immediate information of all changes of disposition or circumstances either in your own army or the Enemy’s.

A few days since I wrote you that Genl Leslie had arrived at Charles Town, and was on his march to join Lord Cornwallis. The last accounts I had of him was at Nelson’s Ferry.

It is my wish that you form as many small magazines in your rear as possible, to be in readiness should we have it in our power to form a junction and operate in that Quarter.

Genl Leslie is a very active enterprising officer, and will no doubt endeavour to give you a stroke; therefore keep a good look out. Trust not to common guards; but endeavour, if possible, to have spies continually hanging round the Enemy’s Camp, and post persons that are not likely to be much suspected, on the roads at twenty or thirty miles distance from your camp, to give you the earliest possible precaution to guard against a surprize. The militia you know are always unsuspicious; and therefore the more easily surprised. Don’t depend too much upon them.

…Fix upon some proper place of rendezvous to collect at, in case of a defeat, and make the same known to your principal Officers."

Camp on at Kershaw’s Ferry on the Pedee River, 8 January 1781

"Colonel Malmady arrived here yesterday with your letter…

I have maturely considered your proposition of an expedition into Georgia and cannot think it warrantable in the critical situation our Army is in. I have no small reason to think by intelligence from different quarters that the enemy have a movement in contemplation; and in all probability it will be this way, from the impudence of the tories who are collecting in different quarters in the most inaccessible swamps and morasses. Should you go into Georgia and the enemy push this way your whole force will be useless…

If you employ detachments to intercept supplies going to Ninety-Six and Augusta, It will perplex the enemy much. If you think Ninety-Six, Augusta or even Savannah, can be surprised, and your force will admit of a detachment for the purpose and leave you sufficiency to keep up a good countenance you may attempt it…

I must repeat my caution to you to guard against a surprise…

I cannot pretend to give you any particular instructions respecting a position. But some where between the Saluda and the north branch of Broad River appears the most favourable for annoying the Enemy, intercepting their supplies and harassing their rear if they should make a movement this way…"

Camp on the Pedee River, South Carolina, 10 January 1781

"When I was appointed to this command I expected to meet with many new and singular difficulties; but they infinitely exceed what I apprehended. This is really carrying on a war in the enemy’s Country: For you cannot establish the most inconsiderable Magazine or convey the smallest quantity of Stores from one part to another, without being obliged to detach guards for their security. The division among the people is much greater than I imagined and the Whigs and Tories persecute each other, with little less than savage fury. There is nothing but murders and devastations in every quarter.

The loss of our Army at Charlestown, and the defeat of General Gates, has been the cause of keeping such shoals of Militia on foot, and their service has been accompanied with such destruction and loss as has almost laid waste the whole Country. Nothing has been more destructive to the true interest of this Country, than the mode adopted for its defence. Two misfortunes happening one after the other may have rendered it unavoidable the last season; but should it be continued, the Inhabitants are inevitably ruined, and the resources of the Country rendered incapable of affording support to an Army competent to its defence. Government here is infinitely more popular [democratic] than to the Northward; and there is no such thing as National character or National Sentiment. The Inhabitants are from all quarters of the globe; and as various in their opinions projects and schemes, as their manners and habits are from their early education. Those in office from a vanity to be thought powerful join in the measure of imposing upon the public respecting the strength and resource of these Southern States; and while Congress and the Minister of France are kept under this fatal delusion I fear little support will be given to this department. The Inhabitants are numerous but they would be rather formidable abroad than at home. They are scattered over such a vast extent of Country that it is difficult to collect and still more difficult to subsist them. There is a great spirit of enterprise among the back people; and those that come out as volunteers are not a little formidable to the enemy. There are also some particular Corps under Sumpter [Thomas Sumter] Marion [Francis Marion] and Clarke [Thomas Clark] that are bold and daring; the rest of the Militia are better calculated to destroy provisions than oppose the Enemy…

This Country wants for its defence a small but well appointed Army; organized so as to move with great celerity. It should consist of about 5000 Infantry and from eight hundred to a thousand horse. The Enemy cannot maintain a large force in this quarter, neither can we. The resources of the Country are too small to subsist a large body of troops at any one point; and to draw supplies from a distance through such long tracks of barren land, will be next to impossible, unless the business can be aided by a water transportation; and in either case, it will be accompanied with an amazing expence. Could we get a superiority of horse we could soon render it difficult for Lord Cornwallis to hold his position so far in the Country: Nor should I be under any apprehension with a much inferior force to his of taking post near him, if I had but such a body of horse. But the enemy’s horse is so much superior to ours, that we cannot move a detachment towards them without hazarding its ruin….

This army is in such a wretched condition that I hardly know what to do with it. The Officers have got such a habit of negligence, and the soldiers so loose and disorderly that it is next to impossible to give it a military complexion. Without clothing I am sure I shall never do it. I call no councils of war; and I communicate my intentions to very few. The Army was posted at Charlotte when I came up with it; and in a Council it had been determined to winter there; but the difficulty of procuring subsistence and other reasons induced me not only to take a new position, but to make an entire new disposition. All this I effected by a single order having first made the necessary enquiry respecting the new positions by sending a man to examine the grounds and other requisites. If I cannot inspire the Army with confidence and respect by an independent conduct I foresee it will be impossible to instill discipline and order among the troops.

General Lesly [General Alexander Leslie] has arrived and joined Lord Cornwallis whose force now is more than three times larger than ours. And we are subsisting ourselves by our own industry; and I am not without hopes of forming something like a Magazine. I am labouring also to get cloathing from every quarter. Baron Steuben is in Virginia, and is indefatigable in equipping and forwarding the Troops from that State. I left General Gist [Brigadier General Mordecai Gist] in Maryland for the same purpose, but I have got nothing from there yet; nor do I expect much for months to come. The North Carolina State have such a high opinion of the Militia that I don’t expect they will even attempt to raise a single Continental soldier; not withstanding the most sensible among them will acknowledge the folly of employing Militia…"

Camp on the Pedee River, South Carolina, 13 January 1781

"…I am this moment favored with your letter of the 4^th Inst. . . . which I answered the 8^th Inst. Wherein I inform you that I cannot think an expedition into Georgia eligible at this time. Since I wrote you I have received letters . . . informing me of the arrival of Genl. Phillips [British] with a detachment of 2500 men from N. York. This circumstance renders it still more improper for you to move far to the Southward. It is my wish also that you should hold your ground if possible, for I forsee the disagreeable consequences that will result from a retreat. If moving as far as Ninety-Six or any where in the neighbourhood of it, will contribute to the obtaining more ample supplies, you have my consent. Col. Tarleton is said to be on his way to pay you a visit. I doubt not but he will have a decent reception and a proper dismission. And I am happy you have taken every possible precaution to avoid a surprise…"

Camp on the Pedee River, South Carolina, 15 January 1781

"…I am afraid you are not well informed either of the Enemies or Morgan’s strength. If the Enemy’s numbers are not greater than you mention, and Morgan as numerous as you say, they run some hazard in dividing their force. It will afford Morgan an opportunity to strike at one or the other of the divisions; which I have no doubt he will avail himself of, if he thinks his force competent to their numbers.

I am persuaded the object of the movement is to rout Morgan from his present position, and to terrify the Inhabitants. I think there is nothing else in that Country that can be a military object; nor will the resources of the Country afford them subsistence for any length of time. However I wish you to watch their motions narrowly and keep me constantly informed…"

Camp on the Pedee River, South Carolina, 19 January 1781

"…I was informed of Lord Cornwallis’s movements before the arrival of your letter, and agree with you in opinion that you are the object; and from his making so general a movement it convinces me he feels a great inconvenience from your force and situation…He would never harass his troops to remove you if he did not think it an object of some importance: Nor would he put his collective force in motion if he had not some respect for your numbers. I am sensible your situation is critical and requires the most watchfull attention to guard against a surprise. But I think it is of great importance to keep up a force in that quarter, nor can I persuade myself that the Militia alone will answer the same valuable purposes as when joined by the Continental troops.

It is not my wish you should come to action unless you have a manifest superiority and a moral certainty of succeeding. Put nothing to the hazard, - a retreat may be disagreeable but not disgraceful. Regard not the opinion of the day. It is not our business, to risque too much, our affairs are in too critical a situation, and require time and nursing to give them a better tone…

…I am unwilling to recall you if it can be avoided; but I had rather recall you by far, than expose you to the hazard of a surprise.

Before this can possibly reach you, I imagine, the movements of Lord Cornwallis and Col. Tarlton will be sufficiently explained; and you obliged to take some descisive measure. I shall be perfectly satisfied if you keep clear of a misfortune; for tho’ I wish you laurels, yet I am unwilling to expose the common cause to give you an opportunity to acquire them…"

Camp on the Pedee River, South Carolina, at some time between 1 and 23 January 1781

"I am here in my camp of repose, improving the discipline and spirits of my men, and the opportunity for looking about me. I am well satisfied with the movement, for it has answered thus far all the purposes for which I intended it. It makes the most of my inferior force, for it compels my adversary to divide his, and holds him in doubt as to my own line of conduct. He cannot leave Morgan behind him to come at me, or his posts of Ninety-Six and Augusta would be exposed. And he cannot chase Morgan far, or prosecute his views upon Virginia, while I am here with the whole country open before me. I am as near Charleston as he is, and as near to Hillsborough as I was at Charlotte; so that I am in no danger of being cut off from my reinforcements, while an uncertainty as to my future designs has made it necessary to leave a large detachment of the enemy’s late reinforcements in Charleston, and move the rest up on this side of the Wateree…At present, my operations must be in the country where the rivers are fordable, and to guard against the chance of not being able to choose my ground…

I find the difficulties of subsisting an army far beyond all anticipation…"

Camp on the Pedee River, South Carolina, 28 January 1781

"In my [earlier] despatches…I did myself the honor to acquaint your Excellency with the disposition I had made to counteract the movements of the enemy and to protect the country from their depredations.

Lord Cornwallis continued at Weymissbury, making every preparation, and completely equiping his troops for the most active operations, until the 9th Instant; when having been joined by the troops under General Leslie, he put his army in motion and advanced as far as the Cross-roads on the West side of the Catawba River, and about forty miles from Camden.

The position which Brigr General Morgan occupied, was well chosen for harassing the left flank, and checking the progress of the enemy on the route they had taken for the execution of their plan of operations. This I suppose induced his Lordship on the 11^th to detach Lt Colonel Tarlton to dislodge him, and disperse the few Militia who were collecting.

I have the satisfaction to transmit your Excellency the copy of a letter which I this moment received from Brigadier Genl Morgan announcing the total defeat of Lt Colonel Tarlton’s detachment. The victory was compleat, and the action glorious…"

Camp on Pacolet Creek, South Carolina, 31 December 1780

"…The Militia are increasing fast, so that we Cannot be Supplied in this Neighbourhood more that two or three Days . . . Were we to Advance & be constrained to retreat, the Consequences would be very Disagreable and this must be the Case should we lay near the Enemy and Cornwallace reinforce which he can do with the greatest Facility.

…When I have collected my expected Force I shall be at a loss how to Act. Could a Diversion be made in my favour by the main Army I should wish to march into Georgia. To me it appears an Adviseable Scheme. But I should be happy to receive your Directions on this Point, as they must be the Guide of my Actions….

…I would wish to receive an Answer to this proposition as soon as possible. This Country has been so exhausted that the supplies for my Detachment have been precarious and scant ever since my arrival, and in a few days will be unattainable so that a Movement is unavoidable…."

13. Morgan to General Nathanael Greene

Camp on Pacolet Creek, South Carolina, 4 January 1781

"…As soon as I could form a just Judgement of our Situation And prospects I dispatched Collonel Malmady to give you The necessary Information, and I flatter myself he has done it to your Satisfaction…

…Sensible of the Importance of Guarding against Surprises, I have used every Precaution…

…My situation is far from being agreeable to my Wishes or Expectations. Forage and Provisions are not to be had. Here we cannot subsist, so that we have but one Alternative, Either to Retreat or move into Georgia. A Retreat will be Attended with the Most fatal Consequences. The Spirit which now begins to pervade the People and call them into the Field will be destroyed. The Militia who have already Joined will desert us, and it is not improbably, but a Regard to their own safety will induce them to Join the Enemy.

I shall wait with impatience for your Directions…"

Camp at Burr’s Mills, Thickette Creek, South Carolina, 15 January 1781

"…Upon a full and mature deliberation, I am confirmed in the opinion that nothing can be effected by my detachment in this country which will balance the risks I will be subjected to by remaining here. The enemy’s great superiority of numbers and our distance from the main army, will enable the Lord Cornwallis to detach so superior a force against me, as to render it essential to our safety to avoid coming to action; nor will this always be in my power. No attempt to surprise me will be left untried by them, and situated as we must be, every possible precaution may not be sufficient to secure us. The scarcity of forage makes it impossible for us to be always in a compact body; and were this not the case, it is beyond the art of man to keep the militia from straggling. These reasons induce me to request that I may be recalled with my detachment…

…I have now with my only 200 South Carolina and Georgia, and 140 North Carolina volunteers…

Colonel Tarleton has crossed the Tyger [River] at Musgrove’s Mill; his force we cannot learn. It is more than probable we are his object. Cornwallis by the last accounts was at the cross-roads near Lee’s old place.

We have just learned that Tarleton’s force is from eleven to twelve hundred British…"

Camp near Cane Creek, South Carolina, 19 January 1781

"The Troops I had the Honor to command have been so fortunate as to obtain a compleat Victory over a Detachment from the British Army commanded by Lt Colonel Tarleton. The Action happened on the 17^th Instant about Sunrise at the Cowpens…

To give you a just Idea of our Operations it will be necessary to inform you, that on the 14^th Instant having received certain Intelligence that Lord Cornwallis and Lt Colonel Tarleton were both in Motion, and that their movements clearly indicated their Intentions of dislodging me, I abandoned my Encampment at Grindales Ford on [the] Pacolet [River], and on the 16^th in the Evening took Possession of a Post, about seven miles from the Cherokee Ford on [the] Broad River. My original Position subjected me at once to the Operations of both Cornwallis and Tarlton, and in Case of a Defeat, my Retreat might easily have been cut off. My Situation at the Cowpens enabled me to improve any Advantages I might gain, and to provide better for my own Security, should I be unfortunate. These Reasons induced me to take this Post at the Risque of its wearing the face of a Retreat.

I received regular Intelligence of the Enemy’s Movements from the Time they were first in Motion. On the Evening of the 16^th Ins they took Possession of the Ground I had removed from in the Morning, distant from the Scene of Action about 12 miles. An Hour before Day light one of my Scouts returned and informed me that Lt Colonel Tarlton had advanced within five miles of our Camp. On this Information I hastened to form as good a Disposition as Circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the Troops we were soon prepared to receive them…"

[note: the full text of this letter, with Morgan’s detailed description of the battle itself, is in The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, by John Moncure, pp. 122-125.]

From Sherald’s Ford on the Catawba River, North Carolina, 23 January 1781

"I arrived here this morning. The prisoners crossed at the Island ford seventeen miles higher up the river…

Lord Cornwallis…moved up toward Gilbert Town to intercept me the day after I had passed him…"

From Sherald’s Ford on the Catawba River, North Carolina, 24 January 1781

"After my late success and my sanguine expectations to do some thing clever this campaign must inform you that I shall be oblig’d to give over the persuite, by reason of an old pain returning upon me…that renders me entirely incapable of active services…"

From Sherald’s Ford on the Catawba River, North Carolina, 25 January 1781

"The enemy encampd Last night at Ramsowers Mill in force. Thay March[ed] near thirty miles yes[ter]day…"

From Sherald’s Ford on the Catawba River, North Carolina, 1400 Hours, 24 January 1781

"I receive intelligence every half hour of the enemies rapid approach…"

Wynnesborough, 8 November 1780

"I am not sanguine as to your operations in that country [back settlements]. The enemy is, I believe, in no great force, and Marion is cautious and vigilant. If a blow could be struck at any body of the rebels it might be attended with good consequences; but I do not see any advantage we can derive from a partial destruction of the country. As to your movements, I am not sufficiently acquainted with the country, or the state of provisions or forage, to direct you. If you cannot move up between Lynches Creek and Pedee to make the enemy jealous, you must use your own discretion, keeping within reach of Camden, and within a few days’ call of us, in case we should want you, always endeavouring to strike some blow if an opening should offer, and taking up all that have been violent against us, to change for our friends who have been everywhere seized and most cruelly treated. Lord Rawdon is going to command at Camden, and takes his corps with him."

Wynnesborough, 12 November 1780

"…I inclose you Tarleton’s report of his expedition. The state of affairs at Ninety-six absolutely requires immediate offensive measures in that quarter, or everything will be lost and not easily recovered. Our victory the other night was complete, but by Wemyss’s unlucky wound, and the youth and inexperience of the casual commander, we have allowed the enemy to call it a triumph…"

Head Quarters, 1 December 1780

"I think it proper to represent to you that the officers and men taken at King’s Mountain were treated with an inhumanity scarcely credible. I feel myself under the disagreeable necessity of making severe retaliation for those unhappy men who were so cruelly and unjustly put to death at Gilbertstown."

Camp at Wynnesborough, 3 December 1780

"…I shall not trouble you with a recapitulation, except a few words, about poor Major Ferguson…A numerous and unexpected enemy came from the mountains; as they had good horses their movements were rapid. Major Ferguson…was attacked by a very superior force and totally defeated on King’s Mountain.

Wynnesborough, my present position, is a healthy spot, well situated to protect the greatest part of the northern frontier, and to assist Camden and Ninety-Six. The militia of the latter, on which alone we could place the smallest dependence, was so totally disheartened by the defeat of Ferguson, that of that of that whole district we could with difficulty assemble 100; and even those, I am convinced, would not have made the smallest resistance if they had been attacked…Bad as the state of our affairs was on the northern frontier, the eastern part was much worse. Colonel Innes, who commanded the militia of the high hills of Santee, and who was posted on Black River, was surprised and taken, and his men lost all their arms. Colonel Marion had so wrought on the minds of the people, partly by the terror of his threats and cruelty of his punishments, and partly by the promise of plunder, that there was scarce an inhabitant between the Santee and Pedee that was not in arms against us. Some parties had even crossed the Santee and carried terror to the gates of Charlestown. My first object was to reinstate matters in that quarter, without which Camden could receive no supplies. I therefore sent Tarleton, who pursued Marion for several days, obliged his corps to take to the swamps, and, by convincing the inhabitants that there was a power superior to Marion, who could likewise reward and punish, so far checked the insurrection, that the greatest part of them have not dared openly to appear in arms against us since his expedition…

…At the same time I recalled Lieut.-Colonel Tarleton from the low country. Tarleton was so fortunate as to pass, not only the Wateree, but the Broad River, without General Sumpter’s being apprised of it, who, having increased his corps to 1000, had passed the Ennoree, and was on the point of attacking our 1000 militia at Williams’s House, fifteen mile from Ninety-Six, and where, I believe, he would not have met with much resistance. Lieut.-Colonel Tarleton would have surprised him on the south of Ennoree had not a deserter of the 63^rd given notice of his march. He [Tarleton], however, cut to pieces his rear guard in passing that river, and pursued his main-body with such rapidity, that he [Sumpter] could not safely pass the Tyger, and was obliged to halt on a very strong position at a place called Black Stocks, close to it. Tarleton had with him only his cavalry and the 63^rd mounted; his infantry and 3-pounders being several miles behind. The enemy not being able to retreat with safety, and being informed of Tarleton’s approach and want of infantry, by a woman who passed him on the march, and contrived by a nearer way to get to them, were encouraged by their great superiority of numbers, and began to fire on the 63^rd, who were dismounted. Lieut.-Colonel Tarleton, to save them from considerable loss, was obliged to attack, although at some hazard, and drove the enemy with loss over the river. Sumpter was dangerously wounded; three of their colonels killed; and about 120 men killed, wounded, or taken. On our side about 50 men were killed and wounded. Lieutenants Gibson and Cope of the 63^rd were amongst the former, and my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Money, who was a most promising officer, died of his wounds a few days after. Lieut.-Colonel Tarleton, as soon as he had taken care of his wounded, pursued and dispersed the remaining part of Sumpter’s corps, and then, having assembled some militia of that district, and who has by far the greatest influence in that country, he returned to the Broad River, where he at present remains, as well as Major M’Arthur, in the neighbourhood of Brierley’s Ferry.

It is not easy for Lieut.-Colonel Tarleton to add to the reputation he has acquired in this province, but the defeating 1000 men posted on very strong ground, and occupying log houses, with 190 cavalry and 80 infantry, is a proof of that spirit and those talents which must render the most essential services to his country…"

Camp at Wynnesborough, 3 December 1780

"…The militia of Ninety-six, on which alone we could place the smallest dependence, are so totally disheartened by the defeat of Ferguson that of the whole district we could with difficulty assemble 100, and even those, I am convinced, would not have made the smallest resistance if we had been attacked…

Colonel Marion had so wrought on the minds of the people, partly by the terror of his threats and cruelty of his punishments, and partly by the promise of plunder, that there was scarcely an inhabitant between the Santee and Pedee that was not in arms against us. I therefore sent Tarleton, who pursued Marion for several days, and by convincing the inhabitants that there was a power superior to Marion, who could likewise reward and punish, so far checked the insurrection, that the greatest part of them have not dared openly to appear in arms against us since his expedition…"

Wynnesborough, 27 December 1780

"…I can with truth assure you, Sir, that no man abhors acts of cruelty more than myself, or would more reluctantly adopt measures of severity. The proving to the suffering Loyalists that I am in earnest to protect them, and to retaliate on their inhuman oppressors, is a duty which I owe to my country.

You have been greatly misinformed if you have ever been told that any inhabitant of this country has been punished by us for observing a neutrality, but you will find instances enough of the most inhuman persecution, and even tortures, inflicted on those who refuse to take arms on your side.

I have only to add that I shall observe the same rule of conduct which you do, in the treatment of the officers and soldiers of the army, the militia, and the inhabitants of the country."

Wynnesborough, 30 December 1780

"From everything I hear of Greene’s forces, I do not think it possible for him to strike any blow that would materially affect my movements; and by advancing on the west of Catawba, I should, I think, oblige Morgan and Washington absolutely to quit the country before me."

Wynnesborough, 6 January 1781

"The difficulties I have had to struggle with have not been occasioned by the opposite army: they always keep at a considerable distance, and retire on our approach. But the constant incursions of refugees, North Carolinians, Back Mountain men, and the perpetual risings in different parts of this province, the invariable successes of all those parties against our militia, keep the whole country in continual alarm, and render the assistance of regular troops everywhere necessary…

I shall begin my march to-morrow, having been delayed a few days by a diversion made by the enemy towards Ninety-six, and propose keeping on the west of Catawba for a considerable distance. I shall then proceed to pass the river and the Yakdin. Events alone can decide the future steps…"

Camp on Turkey Creek, Broad River, 18 January 1781

"In my letter of the 6^th of this month I had the honour to inform your Excellency that I was ready to begin my march for North Carolina, having been delayed some days by a diversion made by the enemy towards Ninety-six. General Morgan still remained on the Pacolet; his corps, by the best accounts I could get, consisted of about 500 men, Continental and Virginia State troops, and 100 cavalry under Colonel Washington, and 600 or 700 militia; but that body is so fluctuating that it is impossible to ascertain its number, within some hundreds, for three days following. Lieut.-Colonel Tarleton, with the Legion and corps annexed to it, consisting of about 300 cavalry and as many infantry, and the first battalion of the 71^st regiment and one three-pounder, had already passed the Broad River for the relief of Ninety-six. I therefore directed Lieut.-Colonel Tarleton to march on the west of Broad River, to endeavour to strike a blow at General Morgan, and at all events, to oblige him to repass the Broad River. I likewise ordered that he should take with him the 7^th regiment and one three-pounder—which was marching to reinforce the garrison of Ninety-six—as long as he should think their services could be useful to him. The remainder of the army marched between the Broad River and Catawba.

As General Greene had quitted Mecklenburgh County and crossed the Pedee, I made not the least doubt that General Morgan would retire on our advancing. The progress of the army was greatly impeded by heavy rains, which swelled the rivers and creeks; yet Lieut.-Colonel Tarleton conducted his march so well, and got so near to General Morgan, who was retreating before him, as to make it dangerous for him to pass Broad River, and cam up with him at eight o’clock of the morning of the 17^th instant. Everything now bore the most promising aspect; the enemy were drawn up in an open wood, and, having been lately joined by some militia, were more numerous. But the different quality of the corps under Lieut.-Colonel Tarleton’s command, and his great superiority in cavalry, left him no room to doubt of the most brilliant success. The attack was begun by the first line of infantry, consisting of the 7^th regiment, the infantry of the Legion and corps of light infantry annexed to it; a troop of cavalry was placed on each flank; the first battalion of the 71^st and the remainder of the cavalry formed the reserve. The enemy’s line soon gave way, and their militia quitted the field. But our troops having been thrown into some disorder by the pursuit, General Morgan’s corps faced about and gave them a heavy fire. This unexpected event occasioned the utmost confusion in the first line. The first battalion of the 71^st and the cavalry were successively ordered up; but neither the exertions, entreaties, or example of Lieut.-Colonel Tarleton could prevent the panic from becoming general. The two three-pounders were taken, and I fear the colours of the 7^th regiment share the same fate. In justice to the detachment of the royal artillery, I must here observe that no terror could induce them to abandon their guns, and they were all either killed or wounded in the defence of them. Lieut.-Colonel Tarleton with difficulty assembled fifty of his cavalry, who, having had time to recollect themselves, and being animated by the bravery of the officer who had so often led them to victory, charged and repulsed Colonel Washington’s horse, retook the baggage of the corps, and cut to pieces the detachment of the enemy who had taken possession of it, and, after destroying what they could not conveniently bring off, retired with the remainder unmolested to Hamilton’s ford, near the mouth of Bullock’s Creek. The loss of our cavalry is inconsiderable, but fear about 400 of the infantry are either killed, wounded, or taken. I will transmit the particular account of the loss as soon as it can be ascertained…"

Salibury, 4 February 1781

"…Our friends must be so disheartened by the misfortune of the 17^th, that you will get but little good from them. You know the importance of Ninety-six: let that place be your constant care…"

Hillsborough, 21 Feb 1781

"I tried by a most rapid march to strike a blow either at Greene or Morgan before they got over the Dan, but could not effect it. The enemy, however, was too much hurried to be able to raise any militia in this province. The fatigue of our troops and the hardships which they suffer were excessive…

As I am informed that Greene expects reinforcements from Pennsylvania, and that Virginia militia are turning out with great alacrity and in great numbers…"